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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between health and labour market outcomes is of academic 
and policy interest due to the essential role the labour market plays in 
engendering economic growth. It is in this regard that this thesis is both 
timely and essential especially in light of scant literature on the health-
labour market relationship in South Africa. South Africa presents an 
interesting case for a study of this nature as it had experienced high disease 
burden and mortality, coupled with declining labour force participation in 
the period prior to this study. Furthermore, the relationship between health 
and labour market earnings as well as impairment-related wage 
discrimination is not well-known in South Africa. Therefore, this thesis 
sought to establish the relationship between health on the one hand, and 
labour force participation, wage determination and wage discrimination on 
the other, in South Africa. Data was obtained from the first and third waves 
of the National Income Dynamics Study (collected in 2008 and 2012 
respectively), a rich and nationally representative survey dataset of South 
African households. Descriptive analysis and different econometric 
techniques like instrumental variables, censored quantile regression and 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition were used for estimation. 
For the cross-sectional analysis, the study found significant impact of health 
on labour force participation of between 20% and 33% depending on the 
measure, while longer term relationships indicated statistically significant 
association (up to 11% for females and 16% for males). These figures 
indicate that the relationship between health and labour force participation 
was not just temporary. Males had higher labour force participation 
probability than females. Furthermore, grant receipt was associated with 
reduced labour force participation probability while education and age were 
associated with increased labour force participation. Also, 
marriage/cohabitation was negatively (positively) associated with female 




probability was generally higher in other areas relative to traditional 
authority locations. These results conform to a priori expectations. 
On the relationship (or gradient) between health and wages, the study 
established positive and statistically significant gradients between better 
physical, psychological and general health on the one hand, and wages on 
the other, among Africans and coloureds. This was even after controlling for 
education and other important wage determinants like occupational 
category, industry, union membership and gender. These gradients ranged 
from an elasticity of -0.06 to -0.07 for psychological health/depression to an 
elasticity of 0.31-0.45 for physical health (proxied by body mass index) in 
the short term. Also, persistently adverse general health and psychological 
conditions exhibited steep gradients. 
Finally, the study found evidence of non-trivial impairment-related 
differences in returns to wage-determining characteristics (loosely termed 
wage discrimination) in both 2008 and 2012 for the average wage, while the 
proportion of estimated wage gaps contributed by impairment-related 
differences in returns increased over time. Similar findings were obtained 
across the wage distribution, as the proportion of total estimated wage gaps 
accounted for by returns to characteristics increased across waves in 
virtually all deciles of the wage distribution. Even in terms of magnitude, the 
returns/discrimination component of total estimated impairment-related 
wage gaps increased for most quantiles of the wage distribution. Finally, 
education and occupational class contributed the most to the explained 
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There is more agreement among economists regarding economic growth 
influencing health outcomes than the other way round (Mckeown, 1976; 
Pritchett & Summers, 1996). This forms the traditional view of the 
relationship between income and health among economists (Husain, 2010) 
and key channels through which income can affect health include affordable 
health care and increased food availability (Spence & Lewis, 2009). However, 
it has been increasingly recognized that health is not necessarily a mere end 
result of the growth process, but rather a key input into a country’s growth 
function. It is in this sense that the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health states that extending the 
coverage of crucial health services to the poor could save many lives, reduce 
poverty, spur economic development and promote global security (WHO, 
2001). This statement underlies the importance of health in generating and 
sustaining economic growth. More recently, it has been noted that mortality 
reductions have accounted for 11% of economic growth in low- and middle-
income countries while the value of additional life years – a measure of the 
intrinsic value of better health – accounted for growth in full income of 
about 24% in low- and middle-income countries between 2000 and 2011 
(Jamison et al., 2013). The foregoing therefore, shows that both income and 
health reinforce each other, an assertion supported by Deaton (2002). 
The above assertion by the WHO notwithstanding, macro evidence of the 
economic impact of health appears muted at least in comparison to micro 
studies. The reasons for this weak relationship include weak institutions 
(which undermine the effect of health care spending), ineffective 
management and provider absenteeism (Spence & Lewis, 2009). On the 
other hand, Husain (2010) has noted that there seems to be more agreement 
on the issue of causality running from health to income from a 




Strauss & Thomas, 1998) compared to the more tenuous evidence from 
macro studies even though methodological and health measurement issues 
still plague many micro studies. 
The labour market is an important institution which mediates the 
relationship between health and the economy. Currie and Madrian (1999) 
stressed the importance of examining the health-labour market relationship, 
noting that it is a means of evaluating the cost-effectiveness of interventions 
designed to cure or prevent diseases. Arguably, a more compelling reason to 
engage in such a study lies in the potential for good health to readily 
enhance an individual’s ability to enjoy improved economic wellbeing. As 
Jack and Lewis (2009) observed, the most obvious reason why healthier 
people are more likely to be richer than their sicker counterparts is that they 
have a greater capacity to work harder, longer and more consistently than 
the latter. They enumerated a number of channels through which this 
relationship can come about. Firstly, healthy children are more likely to 
invest in human capital accumulation by completing more years of 
schooling than the relatively sick. Moreover, healthy children are less likely 
to experience illness-induced school absenteeism than the sick, thereby 
obtaining higher quality education than the latter. Such investments 
prepare them for future participation in the labour market and higher 
earnings. There is also an inter-generational dimension to this argument; 
most decisions affecting children are made by their parents on their behalf. 
Parental death through sickness is likely to diminish the probability of their 
children acquiring education and other requisite human capital in spite of 
social networks that exist in society (Case, Paxson, & Ableidinger, 2004; 
Jack & Lewis, 2009). Poorly educated kids then eventually earn lower 
incomes than the highly educated on the average when they enter the labour 
market. 
Also, higher incomes from labour market participation, coupled with higher 
life expectancy, lead to higher savings which enhance physical capital 
accumulation necessary for growth. According to Bloom, Canning and 




partly attributed to rising life expectancy. Also, Schultz (1979) observed that 
longer life spans incentivize people to invest more in education and firms in 
more on-the-job training, while the additional health capital and other forms 
of human capital result in higher productivity per worker. Moreover, the 
additional health capital also results in more years of labour force 
participation (LFP) and the reduction of time spent sick. Conversely, poor 
health leads to low productivity and reduction of time spent working among 
adults. 
The foregoing has mainly considered the health-labour market relationship 
as largely operating through the supply of labour. However, it is possible 
that employers may fail to hire job seekers who have some 
impairment/disability, or pay workers with such characteristics less than 
their healthier counterparts even when such individuals have the same 
initial level of human capital as the non-disabled (Madden, 2004). Such 
lower participation/lower earnings of the impaired/disabled which operates 
through labour demand may be the result of health deterioration or due to 
discrimination. In this sense, discrimination occurs when otherwise 
productively identical individuals in similar jobs are treated differently in the 
labour market (in terms of employment, earnings, etc.) (Altonji & Blank, 
1999). Thus, beyond ascertaining the relationship between health and 
earnings that is due to productivity differences, it is interesting from an 
equity and policy perspective to ascertain whether the earnings gap between 
the non-impaired and the impaired reflects discrimination against the latter. 
South Africa presents an interesting case study for analysing the 
relationship between health and the labour market. Not only is evidence on 
this relationship largely lacking, the country has experienced high disease 
burden mainly due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other communicable 
diseases like tuberculosis (TB) as well as non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs) over the past decade. Indeed, the country has been described as 
suffering from a quadruple burden of disease due to mortality from 




deficiencies; NCDs like diabetes and obesity; injuries; and HIV/AIDS1 
(Bradshaw et al., 2000). Furthermore, it has experienced declines in some 
key labour market indices like labour force participation at about the same 
time (Banerjee, Galiani, Levinsohn, McLaren, & Woolard, 2008; Statistics 
South Africa, 2012a). Moreover, the country is noted for institutionalized 
racial discrimination under the apartheid system. Understandably, this has 
resulted in a number of studies examining race-based wage gaps and 
discrimination (Chamberlain & Van der Berg, 2002; Mwabu & Schultz, 
2000). However, studies on impairment/disability-based wage 
discrimination are virtually non-existent. Therefore, this thesis fills these 
research gaps by examining the relationship between health and the labour 
market in South Africa with particular focus on LFP, wages and unexplained 
wage gaps (loosely termed wage discrimination). 
 




This thesis aims to ascertain the relationship between health and the labour 
market in South Africa. 
1.1.2 Objectives 
 
Specifically, I intend ascertaining: 
A. Whether self-reported health (a proxy for actual health status) 
positively affects labour force participation in South Africa. 
B. The magnitude of the gradient between health and wages over the 
wage distribution for physical, psychological and general health 
conditions. 
C. The magnitude of impairment-related differences in returns to 
observable characteristics (loosely termed wage discrimination) in 
South Africa. 
                                       
1 Though HIV/AIDS conventionally belongs to the communicable disease group, its unusually high prevalence in 





1.2 RATIONALE/JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY 
 
This thesis is important in that it contributes to an important literature by 
examining how health relates to labour market outcomes. The importance of 
the labour market to economic growth cannot be over-emphasized and as a 
result, it is important to investigate factors necessary for improved labour 
market outcomes. As shown above, health can play an important role in 
fostering improved labour market outcomes, and ascertaining the nature of 
this relationship in South Africa will add to the richness of the debate on the 




Data for this thesis was obtained from the National Income Dynamics Study 
(NIDS). NIDS, a nationally representative panel dataset of South African 
households, is the result of an initiative by the South African Presidency to 
track changes in wellbeing of South Africans over time. It is a rich source of 
socio-economic and health indicators. The first wave was collected in 2008 
while the second and third waves were collected in 2010 and 2012 
respectively. Data collection for the fourth wave is currently underway. The 
analysis was conducted using the first and/or third wave(s) depending on 
the question answered. Wave 2 was excluded due to inconsistencies between 
it and other waves as well as Statistics South Africa data collected around 
the same period. Such inconsistencies include the inexplicable nontrivial 
drop in the unemployment rate as well as a dramatic increase in the 
number of individuals working less than ten hours weekly between waves 1 
and 2. These inconsistencies have been documented earlier (Cichello, 
Leibbrandt, & Woolard, 2012). Data cleaning is ongoing and has resulted in 
some modification of publicly released data. Therefore, I used the most 
recent versions of the two waves as at the time of writing this thesis (i.e. 




This analysis was restricted to resident continuing sample members (CSMs), 
i.e. respondents who are resident in the household and are to be followed 
across waves. 7296 households with 28226 CSM resident household 
members were visited for interview in wave 1, while the respective numbers 
for wave 3 were 10236 and 30329. Of the 28226 wave 1 CSM household 
residents, 26776 were successfully interviewed while 21384 (79.9%) of these 
were successfully re-interviewed in wave 3. Given that 20% of those 
successfully interviewed in wave 1 were not re-interviewed in wave 3, wave 3 
and dynamic analyses were generally weighted by panel weights to account 
for possible non-random attrition and complex survey design. Similarly, 
wave 1 analyses were suitably weighted with post-stratification weights to 
correct for complex survey design. The sample was further restricted to the 
working age population, defined here as individuals aged 20 to 56 years in 
wave 1. This age restriction was informed by the need to exclude many 
students and those likely to retire by wave 3 from the analysis especially as 
the statutory age of eligibility for old age pension is 60 years (the age 
restriction in Chapter 4 was 20 – 60 years in wave 3 given that most of the 
analysis in that chapter was based on wave 3 data). For instance, only 9% of 
those between 15 and 19 years in wave 1 were employed while 80% were 
economically inactive. Also, 81% of those above 60 years were economically 
inactive. The overall working age sample was therefore restricted to 12337 
respondents made up of 6947 females and 5390 males. All monetary 
measures were deflated using Statistics South Africa’s headline consumer 
price index (Statistics South Africa, 2015) with August 2012 as the base 
month. Throughout this thesis, I urge caution in interpreting any statistic 
involving the Asian/Indian population group (where presented) given the 
small number of respondents belonging to this racial category in the sample. 
A similar caveat has been issued elsewhere regarding this dataset (Ardington 
& Case, 2009). Also, though province has been shown elsewhere to be 
significantly associated with labour market outcomes like LFP in South 
Africa (Ntuli & Wittenberg, 2013; Winter, 1999), this thesis did not conduct 
province-based analysis given that the NIDS sample size is too small to 




Income Dynamics Study, 2013). For more detailed description of the data as 
well as survey methodology and weights, the interested reader should visit 
www.nids.uct.ac.za. 
Finally, the exclusive use of NIDS is informed by the fact that other 
nationally representative South African datasets are either rich in labour 
market outcomes only (e.g. the Labour Force Surveys) or health outcomes 
only (e.g. the Demographic and Health Surveys). On the other hand, census 
data are impinged by the lack of detailed socio-economic indicators 
necessary in a study of this nature. Therefore, NIDS is unique for our 




1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. I give a brief overview of the South 
African economy and discuss the post-apartheid labour market in a general 
background to the study in Chapter 2. Also, a descriptive analysis of the 
labour market between 2008 and 2012 using the NIDS dataset is conducted. 
Chapter 3 provides a brief review of key theoretical models of labour supply, 
wage determination and wage discrimination, issues that are empirically 
investigated in subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 ascertains the impact of 
health on LFP. In this chapter, I use different models to try to recover policy-
relevant causal estimates in an instrumental variables (IV) framework. But 
mindful of the challenges in obtaining purely exogenous instruments, I also 
obtain measures of association between health and LFP. Chapter 5 deals 
with examining the gradient between health and wages in South Africa. I 
make the case for such a study to focus on the relationship at different 
points of the wage distribution rather than concentrating on the mean only. 
This exercise is conducted using physical, psychological and general health 
indicators. In Chapter 6, I examine the existence of impairment-related wage 
discrimination in the South African labour market while I conclude the 




While the thesis has one theme (i.e. an analysis of the relationship between 
health and the labour market in South Africa), each of the three empirical 
chapters (i.e. chapters 4-6) is a “semi-autonomous unit” in that it has an 
introduction, empirical literature review, a “methods” section aimed at 
analysing each of the above specific objectives, results and discussion of 
such results and a conclusion. Finally, “significance” will denote statistical 
significance throughout this thesis. Also, “significance at conventional 






















2 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE POST-APARTHEID SOUTH 




In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the South African economy and 
a historical account of the post-apartheid labour market especially in 
relation to key issues analysed in this thesis. I show that group-related gaps 
in key labour market outcomes like LFP and wages are generally persistent 
over the post-apartheid period. Subsequently, I conduct a descriptive 
analysis of the NIDS dataset especially in relation to labour supply and 
wages as these are key issues to be examined in this thesis. This analysis is 
informed by the recognition that there are non-health factors which play an 
important role in determining labour market outcomes. Subsequently, I 
make the case that an incorporation of health into the analysis is likely to 
enrich labour market models. Therefore, this chapter examines the post-
apartheid South African economy, analyses the historical and current state 
of the labour market and serves as an exploratory prelude toward a more 
holistic study of labour market outcomes in South Africa (i.e. the 
incorporation of health into the analysis) with particular focus on LFP, wage 
determination and wage discrimination. 
 
2.2 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
 
South Africa emerged from the racially exclusive system of apartheid to a 
democratic society in 1994. Apartheid was characterized by the exclusion of 
other racial groups from equal participation in virtually every facet of the 
economy in preference to whites2. The population in 1996 was 40.5 million. 
                                       
2 There are four officially recognized racial groups in South Africa: Africans, coloureds, Asians/Indians and 




This increased to 51.7 million by 2011 while the gender composition 
remained virtually unchanged over the period: the proportions of males and 
females in 1996 (2011) were 48.1% (48.7%) and 51.9% (51.4%) respectively 
(Statistics South Africa, 2012a). According to the 2011 population census, 
the racial make-up of the population was as follows: African- 79.2%, 
coloured- 8.9%, Asian- 2.5%, and white- 8.9% (Statistics South Africa, 
2012a). 
South Africa is an upper middle income country, one of few African 
countries to be so categorized. The economy recorded impressive growth 
before the 2008 global financial crisis. However, growth has slowed 
considerably afterwards. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate 
increased by 2.3% between 1995 and 1999 while annual growth rates were 
4.9%, 5.0%, 5.4% in 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively. Growth however 
declined to 3.6% in 2011, 2.5% in 2012 and 1.9% in 2013, the latter, well 
below the sub-Saharan Africa average of 5.1% (African Economic Outlook, 
2014; National Treasury, 2000; 2008; 2014). This growth decline has been 
attributed to sluggish growth in the country’s European and North American 
trading partners as well as continued labour unrest especially in the 
manufacturing sector, among other factors (African Economic Outlook, 
2014). 
In terms of human development, South Africa ranked 118 out of 187 
countries in the world in 2013 based on a Human Development Index (HDI) 
score of 0.658 (UNDP, 2014). This represents a decline from 0.724 in 1995, 
0.695 in 2000; it was 0.619 in 2011 (du Toit, 2002; UNDP, 2011). This 
decline has been attributed to declining life expectancy attributed to the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic (Ataguba, 2012). Also, of the three components of the 
HDI: health, income and education, health contributed least to the index in 
2011 while education had the highest share (UNDP, 2011). 
                                       





The country has been plagued with a high burden of disease especially in 
the first half of the last decade. As indicated in Chapter 1, South Africa has 
been described as suffering from an enormous burden of disease, while the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and TB are responsible for a significant part of such 
high disease burden. The total number of AIDS deaths substantially 
increased from 198,030 in 2001 to a peak of 314,309 in 2006, while falling 
to 281,404 in 2010. Furthermore, per 100,000 of population, TB mortality 
increased from 133 in 1997 to 183 in 2000, and 230 in 2007 (UNICEF, 
2010). 
This high disease burden resulted in generally declining life expectancy 
between the 1990s and the past decade (see Figure 2.1 below). As noted by 
Ataguba (2012), average life expectancy fell from 65 years in 1995 to 54 
years in 2010. Also, the apparent convergence of the gap in life expectancy 
between males and females can be attributed to disproportionately higher 
HIV/AIDS incidence among females.  
Figure 2.1: Average life expectancy in South Africa, 2001-2010 
 





South Africa is arguably one of the most unequal countries in terms of 
income, in the world. The country’s Gini coefficient, an index of income 
inequality, has also increased over the post-apartheid period. Available 
survey data evidence shows that the Gini coefficient increased from 0.67 in 
1993 to 0.70 in 2008, a 4.5% increase (Leibbrandt, Wegner, & Finn, 2011). 
This increase exhibited substantial variation across the different racial 
groups; Africans, coloureds, Asians and whites experienced Gini coefficient 
increments of 12.7%, 25.6%, 32.6% and 19.1% respectively. Such 
persistently high income inequality has been largely attributed to differences 
in labour market outcomes (Leibbrandt, Finn, & Woolard, 2012). Inter-racial 
differences are also clear when one considers household income differences 
along racial lines. Out of an estimated total household income of R1.57 
trillion in 2010/2011, African households (who constituted more than three-
quarters of the total number of households) earned only 44.6% of total 
annual household income while whites (who made up 12.4% of aggregate 
households) earned 40.1%. On the other hand, coloureds and 
Asians/Indians (8.5% and 2.5% of total households respectively) earned 
9.9% and 5.4% of total household income respectively (Statistics South 
Africa, 2012c). 
The foregoing has provided a snapshot of the South African economy 
especially with regard to key economic and health indicators. The next 
section focuses only on key labour market indicators like (un)employment, 
LFP, wages and wage gaps, issues that are very important in this thesis. 
 
2.3 OVERVIEW OF LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EARNINGS 
AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
A cursory look at the post-apartheid South African labour market literature 
suggests the following, inter alia: 
 Increasing female LFP, especially among Africans in the mid-90s to 




from around the mid-2000s (Banerjee et al., 2008; Statistics South 
Africa, 2012a) 
 High levels of unemployment and poor labour absorption rates, 
especially among the African and coloured populations (Bhorat, 2004; 
Casale, 2004) 
 Mainly involuntary and structural unemployment exacerbated by 
spatial rigidities with regard to accessing employment opportunities 
(Bhorat, 2004; Kingdon & Knight, 2004a) 
 Skills-biased employment growth favouring the highly educated 
(Bhorat & Hodge, 1999; Bhorat, 2004) 
 Substantial and sustained male wage premium (Wittenberg, 2014) 
 Sustained race-based wage premiums in the following descending 
order: whites, Asians/Indians, coloureds and Africans (Wittenberg, 
2014) 
 Higher union premium among Africans relative to whites (Mwabu & 
Schultz, 2000; Schultz & Mwabu, 1998b) 
 Wage discrimination driven by race, location and gender (Casale, 
2004; Chamberlain & Van der Berg, 2002; Grün, 2004; Rospabé, 
2002) 
 
High rates of unemployment have remained a serious issue in post-
apartheid South Africa especially as the unemployment rate increased over 
the period. This increase can be attributed to both labour supply and 
demand forces; partly due to higher LFP (relative to the apartheid era) as 
well as poor labour absorption rates, the latter being the result of higher 
population growth relative to job creation as well as skills mismatch. 
With regard to demand-side factors, the South African economy has largely 
struggled, especially in the post-apartheid era, to create enough jobs for 
those entering the labour market. For instance, labour absorption rates fell 
from 56.3% in the 1990s to approximately 41% in 2010 (Ataguba, 2012; du 
Toit, 2002). In highlighting the deficit in the employment creation 
performance of the South African economy, Bhorat (2004) demonstrated 




at which jobs are to be created in order to employ all new entrants into the 
labour market – grew by 52.4% between 1995 and 2002 (using the expanded 
definition), employment absorption was only 32% over this period. Even with 
the strict definition favoured by government agencies, employment 
absorption was still 40.4%. A breakdown of these figures by race and gender 
suggests wide variations along these characteristics. For instance, while the 
target employment growth rate among Africans was 66.9%, only 28% of 
these were absorbed into employment, while for whites, more than half of 
the 13% target employment growth rate got jobs over the period. For males, 
the target growth rate was 31.7% while 19.1% of these were absorbed, while 
for females, the target was 84.5% while 39.5% was absorbed. 
Some of the factors that might have been responsible for such weak job 
creation outcomes include substantial wage growth especially for the 
unskilled and semi-skilled, skills-biased technological growth (partly as a 
consequence of phenomenal wage growth among the unskilled), as well as 
poor growth in the informal sector. Arndt and Lewis (2001), who reported 
that total employment (narrow definition) of the unskilled and semi-skilled 
workforce in 1999 was a mere 92% of their 1970 levels, largely attributed 
this to phenomenal growth in real remuneration per unskilled and semi-
skilled worker relative to the highly-skilled. Indeed, 1999 semi-skilled and 
unskilled real wage levels grew to 250% of their 1970 levels while that of the 
highly skilled contracted to 90% of their 1970 levels. This perhaps 
significantly contributed to a substitution of capital for unskilled and semi-
skilled labour over this period. A similar point was made by Bhorat and 
Hodge (1999) who noted that the rise in nominal wages in the mining sector 
in the 1980s shifted relative factor prices in favour of capital, thus 
increasing the capital intensity of extraction (indeed, they showed that 
capital-labour ratios substantially increased for all but one sector between 
1970 and 1995). Given that capital accumulation often adversely affects the 
employment of unskilled labour relative to skilled labour, the unemployment 
rate among unskilled labour was exacerbated between 1970 and 1999. 
Apart from the change in production methods occasioned by the above-




a change in the structure of its labour market. As noted by Bhorat (2004), 
the democratic government in South Africa inherited a labour market that 
was subject to structural shifts and technological change. Between 1970 
and 1997, the primary sector of the economy declined by 6.7 percentage 
points, the secondary sector virtually stagnated (it actually lost about 1.5 
percentage points), while the service sector increased by 8.4 percentage 
points as a share of GDP (Bhorat & Hodge, 1999). A closer look across the 
sectors shows that there was an increase in the demand for skilled 
occupational groups. Thus, the general trend was one where a change in 
production methods (mechanization) led to the displacement of unskilled 
labour, while a change in the structure of the economy away from primary 
production to service-oriented production saw an increase in the 
employment of highly-skilled labour (e.g. professionals) relative to unskilled 
labour. As shown in Lewis (2002), while the unemployment rate among 
skilled labour was 16% in 2000, semi-skilled and unskilled labour 
experienced an unemployment rate of over 50%. 
Perhaps, the substantial job loss among the unskilled workforce has led to 
the view that the South African economy experienced jobless growth early on 
in the post-apartheid period. This has however been debunked by Bhorat 
(2004) who observed that the economy created approximately 1.6 million 
jobs between 1995 and 2002; the economy only witnessed relatively low 
employment intensity of growth (economic growth was about 2.8% per 
annum while employment growth was about 2.1% per annum over the 
period). The caveat however is that part of the increase in the number of the 
employed between 1997 and 2001 might have been due to better capturing 
of the informal sector of the economy in household surveys and not 
necessarily the creation of new jobs (Bhorat, 2004; Casale, 2004).  
More recently, Banerjee et al. (2008) observed that though fairly low in the 
1970s, the unemployment rate (by the International Labour Organization 
classification) just before the end of apartheid in 1994 was about 13%. This 
rose to about 15% and 26.7% in 1995 and 2005 respectively. Using the 
broad classification of unemployment (i.e. including the discouraged 




unemployment rate rose from 28% in 1995 to 41% in 2005. Narrow and 
broad unemployment rates for prime-age adults were about 24% and 30% 
respectively in 2008 (Ranchhod, 2009), and have remained largely so in the 
current period. 
Though the above discussion has explained the causes of high 
unemployment as emanating from demand-side factors, supply-side factors 
are equally important. LFP rates exhibited an upward trend between the 
dawn of democracy and September 2000 (mainly driven by a ten percentage 
point increase in the female participation rate) and a downward trend from 
2000 to 20053 (see Figure 2.2), especially in the rural areas (Banerjee et al., 
2008). Further declines have been recorded since then (Statistics South 
Africa, 2012a). 
 
Source: Banerjee et al., 2008; ILO classification 
 
                                       
3 Banerjee at al. (2008) suggested that part of this decline may be due to the incomparability of the October 
Household Survey and Labour Force Survey (the datasets upon which the analysis was based), a point amply 
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Another feature of the post-apartheid labour market is the strong and 
persistent wage-gender gradient. A look at the mean real earnings series for 
wage workers between 1994 and 2012 (Figure 2.3) shows that male earnings 
dominated that of females irrespective of the technique used for 
computation. From the figure, the gender gap apparently did not narrow 
over time. Similarly, the wage-race gradient for wage workers has always 
been strong and persistent between whites and other racial groups, though 
the white-Asian gap appears to be narrowing over time. This finding echoes 
earlier evidence in South Africa, where average wage among whites differed 
from that of blacks by a factor of five (Schultz & Mwabu, 1998b). This is 
unlike what is obtained for the self-employed where the gaps were not 
substantial though the order of dominance remained as among wage 
employees, i.e. whites, Asians, coloureds and Africans in descending order 
(Wittenberg, 2014). 
Figure 2.3: Real earnings of wage workers by gender 
 
Source: Wittenberg (2014) 
 
In a similar vein, the South African labour market is characterized by 
substantial wage inequality. Earlier, it was observed that South Africa is one 




aggregate Gini coefficient (Leibbrandt et al., 2011). LFP, employment and 
labour absorption patterns have played a substantial role in inducing such 
inequality, as participation and labour absorption rates were highest among 
the top income deciles. This resulted in higher employment and lower 
unemployment rates (and the attendant higher income) among these high 
income groups despite unemployment rates generally being on an upward 
trajectory in the country since 1993 (Leibbrandt et al., 2011). Little wonder 
that labour market earnings accounted for 88.3% and 85% of income 
inequality in 1993 and 2008 respectively (Leibbrandt et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, wage inequality differs substantially across industries and 
occupations. For instance in analysing wage trends and inequality in South 
Africa, Hlekiso and Mahlo (2006) observed that the 95/50 wage ratio across 
industries in 2005 was highest in the agriculture, fishery and forestry 
industry at 8.8 and lowest among private households at 1.5. By 
occupational groups, the highest ratio of 11.5 was found among skilled 
agricultural and fishery workers while the lowest ratio of 2.7 existed among 
clerks. 
Related to wage inequalities is wage discrimination. The apartheid system 
institutionalized race-based discrimination in virtually all facets of life. But 
with its abolition and the advent of democracy, it has been noted that race-
based discrimination has become relatively muted and mainly mentioned in 
anecdotes (Seekings, 2008). Perhaps, this is the result of legislations like the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 
passed in the wake of apartheid. This notwithstanding, empirical evidence 
suggests that race continues to be a marker of labour market discrimination 
in South Africa. For instance, McCord and Bhorat (2003) maintained that 
while evidence suggests that schooling and experience are among the most 
important determinants of earnings differentials internationally, earnings 
differentials in South Africa are mainly driven by racial discrimination and 
mobility barriers that have to do with urban-rural and formal-informal 
earnings differentials. Furthermore, gender has also been a source of wage 




The foregoing has given a brief overview of the South African labour market 
with special focus on LFP, wage inequality and wage discrimination, key 
issues to be tackled in this thesis. In the next section, I conduct a 
descriptive analysis of the South African labour market using the NIDS 
dataset. 
 
2.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR MARKET (2008-2012): 
EVIDENCE FROM THE NATIONAL INCOME DYNAMICS STUDY 
 
This section provides an in-depth descriptive analysis of labour market 
outcomes, especially those critically analysed in the thesis, using the NIDS 
dataset. The purpose of this analysis is to afford the reader an in-depth 
understanding of the dataset to be used in this analysis, especially when 
compared with previous empirical evidence. Some of the statistics presented 
below have no doubt appeared elsewhere (Cichello et al., 2012; Ranchhod, 
2009). But the following discussion, taken as a whole, provides an important 
context to the broad themes covered in this thesis using the NIDS dataset. 
Similar descriptive evidence on the interaction between health and key 
labour market outcomes are presented in Chapter 4-Chapter 6 depending 
on the particular labour market outcome examined. This is to avoid 
repetition as well as keeping each of those chapters focused. 
2.4.1 Labour supply outcomes and transitions in South Africa (2008-2012) 
 
Every adult who responded to any of the employment questions was 
classified into one of four mutually exclusive labour market categories: not 
economically active (NEA), unemployed (discouraged), unemployed 
(strict/searching), and employed. The NEA are respondents who were not 
employed and did not want to work at the time of the interview (e.g. 
students, retirees and home-makers); the discouraged unemployed are 
respondents who wanted to work but were not working and had not taken 
any active step to look for employment in the previous four weeks. The 




step(s) toward securing employment in the previous four weeks; while the 
employed are people who were engaged in some productive activity usually 
for the purpose of earning money (Ranchhod, 2009). Unless otherwise stated 
in this thesis, LFP is used broadly to refer to the discouraged unemployed, 
searching unemployed and the employed. Table 2.1 shows the distribution 
of labour market categories in wave 1 and wave 3 as well as transitions 
across time. 
Table 2.1: Labour market transition (2008-2012) 
                                                                    Labour market status (2012) 
 
 
   NEA Discouraged Searching Employed 






















) 21.2 NEA 45.8 4.6 19.5 30.1 
6.0 Discouraged 30.7 9.7 28.6 31.1 
17.6 Searching 25.9 2.9 27.9 43.3 
55.3 Employed 16.1 2.2 9.2 72.5 
Sample is restricted to adults aged 20-56 years in wave 1 who were interviewed in both waves; sample 
is nationally representative and corrected for non-random attrition using appropriate weights 
Source: Own calculations 
 
As the table indicates, the proportion of the working age population (as 
defined in this study) who were non-economically active and the employed 
increased by three percentage points and one percentage point respectively 
while the proportion of the discouraged and searching unemployed both 
declined over the four-year period. The most stable labour market category 
was the employed group (72.5% of the employed in wave 1 remained 
employed in wave 3), followed by the NEA. On the other hand, the least 
stable group was the discouraged unemployed. Furthermore, about a third 
of the discouraged unemployed as well as a quarter of those actively 
searching in wave 1 dropped into economic inactivity in wave 3. This pattern 
of transitions no doubt contributed to declining unemployment rates as will 




A gendered analysis of labour market outcomes in both waves (available on 
request) indicates that women have not fared well in the labour market 
relative to men. This finding also corroborates previous evidence (Casale, 
2004). More women were stuck in economic inactivity and discouragement 
than men in proportional terms across waves. The proportion of women in 
the working age population who were NEA was about double that of men in 
each wave, while the employed proportion among women was about two-
thirds that of men in both waves. Unemployment was also more 
concentrated among women. Furthermore, gender-related transitions over 
these years appeared to make women worse off relative to men. For 
instance, while half of women who were not economically active in wave 1 
remained so in wave 3, it was only a third for men. Among women, only 27% 
of the wave 1 non-economically active became employed in wave 3 while the 
figure was 37% for men. Moreover, while only 66% of employed women in 
wave 1 were still employed in wave 3, 78% of men retained their “employed” 
status. 
It may be argued that the above gender-related outcomes are due to greater 
aversion for work among women relative to men. But as shown in Table 2.4 
below, the proportion of economically inactive men who either disliked work 
in general, or did not like available jobs exceeded that of women especially in 
wave 3. Therefore, the above differences are not likely to have been caused 
by a taste against work among women. Thus, there appears to be evidence 
of gender-biased labour market participation in favour of men, a finding that 
corroborates earlier evidence in South Africa (Klasen & Woolard, 1999). 
Added to the fact that the proportion of household heads made up of women 
increased across waves (in fact about 55% of households in wave 3 were 
headed by women), such gender-biased labour market outcomes present a 
worrying picture for household welfare as households with employed heads 
were significantly (p<0.01) richer on average than those where the head was 
not employed, in each wave. Average monthly household nominal income in 
households with an employed (unemployed) head was R7995 (R3546) in 




A racial decomposition of labour market status over the waves in Table 2.2 
shows that whites had the highest LFP and lowest unemployment rates in 
wave 3 irrespective of definition (Africans had the lowest LFP and highest 
unemployment rates in wave 1). Also, aggregate strict (broad) unemployment 
rate fell by three (five) percentage points, from 24.1% (29.9%) to 21.6% 
(25.2%). However, caution should be exercised in celebrating this decline as 
it was partly due to declining LFP (especially broad LFP); aggregate strict 
(broad) LFP rate fell from 72.9% (78.9%) to 72.4% (75.8%). Also, the racial 
differences in unemployment were substantial. For instance, the African 
unemployment rate was about three times that of whites in wave 1 
irrespective of definition. It was 4-5 times in wave 3. Evidently, race seems 
to play a vital role in determining LFP and unemployment in South Africa.  




Table 2.2: Racial distribution of labour market categories 
    Percentage in each category in wave 3 % point change (wave 3-wave 1) 
   i ii iii iv  v vi vii viii ix x xi 
    Unemployed Employed LFP rate Unemployment 
rate 
LFP rate Unemployment 
rate 
  N NEA Disc† Searching  Strict Broad Strict Broad Strict Broad Strict Broad 














 African 7253 24.7 3.4 18.0 54.0 72.0 75.4 25.0 28.3 0.0 -2.0 -3.0 -5.0 
Coloured 1506 25.9 4.6 9.8 59.7 69.5 74.1 14.1 19.4 -6.0 -8.0 -2.0 -4.0 
Asian 134 27.4 4.7 4.4 63.5 67.9 72.6 6.5 12.5 -8.0 -9.0 0.0 -1.0 
White 336 16.9 2.3 3.6 77.2 80.8 83.1 4.4 7.0 -1.0 -2.0 -4.0 -4.0 
a) Sample is restricted to adults aged 20-56 years in wave 1 who were interviewed in both waves. 
b) All wave 1 (wave 3) proportions have been weighted using post-stratification (panel) weights. 
c) Conventional definitions were used in calculating LFP and unemployment rates: 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
(𝑖+𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
𝑋100; 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝐿𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
(𝑖+𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
𝑋100;  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
(𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
𝑋100;𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖)
(𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)





Figure 2.4 further disaggregates race-based LFP rates by gender in both waves. 
Most gender-race groups experienced a decline in LFP rate across waves. 
Looking at the male sub-sample, all but the African group experienced LFP 
decline across waves. This feature was most pronounced among coloured 
males, with an 18 percentage point decline. A consistent trend however is that 
male LFP was substantially higher than female LFP in both waves across all 
racial groups. An important caveat when considering Figure 2.4 (especially the 
very low female Asian LFP rate in wave 3) is that some of the cell sizes are very 
small. For instance, the number of female Asian and white respondents in the 
sample who were discouraged and searching for jobs in wave 3 was very small. 
Figure 2.4: Distribution of race-gender strict labour force participation (wave 1 
& wave 3) 
 
Statistics appropriately weighted with post-stratification and panel weights 













Total Afr Col Asi Whi Total Afr Col Asi Whi
Wave 1 Wave 3
Female 65.0 64.1 65.1 64.8 72.2 64.8 64.1 67.0 49.9 74.1

























Table 2.3 below analyses key labour market outcomes in wave 3 as well as 
changes in those outcomes between wave 1 and wave 3 by gender, age and 
marital status.  About a third of women were economically inactive in wave 3 
while less than one-fifth of men belonged to this category. Moreover, while 
strict male LFP was about 81%, that of females was only 65%. Also, strict 
female unemployment rate was nine percentage points higher than that of 
males. Neither gender recorded an increase in LFP or unemployment rate. 
A more careful analysis of these gender-related LFP (see Table 2.4) and 
unemployment patterns shows that the most common reasons why inactive 
women did not search for jobs in wave 1 were looking after children (20.5%) 
and sickness (20.3%). Only 1.4% and 3.2% of women reported not searching 
due to work aversion and not liking available jobs respectively. For men 
however, being a full time student (33.1%) and sickness (29.6%) were the most 
common reasons. Child care was also the most common cause of female 
economic inactivity in wave 3. These findings reveal at least two important 
facts: child care is one of the most important impediments of female 
participation in the South African labour market; and ill-health exerts great 
cost on the economy by preventing economic agents from actively participating 
in the labour market. Evidence from the US also corroborates the deleterious 
effect of child care on female LFP (Anderson & Levine, 1999). It is also 
interesting that a high reservation wage relative to the offered wage does not 
appear to be a major impediment of (especially female) LFP as only 0.4% (2.3%) 
of women (men) cited it as a reason for non-participation in wave 1 while the 
wave 3 figures were 1.6% (7.9%). This confirms prior evidence that high 
reservation wage is not a major cause of non-participation in the South African 
labour market (Banerjee et al., 2008; Nattrass & Walker, 2005). In another 
analysis (not shown in Table 2.4 but available on request), family commitments 
(33%) was the second most common reason why unemployed economically 
active women did not accept employment offers in wave 1, and the most 




men (1% and 0% in wave 1 and 3 respectively). But caution should be 
exercised in interpreting these employment refusal figures because of very 
small cell sizes. Thus, there are arguably gender-based differences in the role of 
family commitments on participation in the labour market. It is however 
surprising that a nontrivial proportion of each gender perceived themselves to 
be too old to participate in the labour market given the working age population 
chosen in this study. 
Given the very high levels of youth unemployment in South Africa, it is 
important to ascertain patterns of LFP and unemployment by age. This is also 
shown in Table 2.3. The age groups as shown in the table are in relation to 
wave 1 age classification; therefore, wave 3 age groups are roughly four years 
more than wave 1 age groups. In wave 3, economic inactivity continuously 
declined from 24-29 years to 34-39 years, and rose continuously from 40 to 60 
years. This pattern is reflected in the LFP pattern across different age groups. 
However, unemployment was most acute among the youngest age cohort as 
expected and was continuously decreasing as respondents got older. For 
instance, strict unemployment rate among the youngest (oldest) cohort was 
14.2 (10.6) percentage points higher (lower) than the population average.  
Table 2.3 also indicates substantial differences in the incidence of 
unemployment across marital status groups. The classification of marital 
status groups here was informed by the need to separate those currently living 
together as couples from the currently “single”. That is, respondents still 
married or cohabiting were classified as “married” while those who had never 
married, the divorced/separated and widows/widowers were classified as “not 
married”. Thus, “married” and “not married” are simply terms used to denote 
whether or not people were currently living together as couples and does not 
have any legal connotation. Such a distinction is important especially in light of 
the theory of marriage and labour market participation which suggests that 
single women are more likely to be economically active compared to their 




might explain why a larger proportion of the not married group were searching 
for jobs relative to the married in both waves. Though LFP rates were almost 
identical between both groups in wave 3, unemployment rates were 
substantially lower among the married relative to the non-married in both 
waves: strict (broad) unemployment rate in the married group was 14.2% 
(17.2%) and that of the non-married group was quite higher at 26.4% (28.8%). 
These differences were mainly driven by higher (lower) proportion of searching 
unemployed (employed) in the non-married group relative to married 
respondents.  
Though not supported by all scholars, the dominant literature on family 
specialization suggests that single women are more likely to be economically 
active than their married counterparts while the converse holds for men 
(Becker, 1981; Oppenheimer, 1997). Therefore, labour market participation of 
respondents belonging to different marital status groups is expected to differ 
across gender. For women (table available on request), I found that though LFP 
rates were largely similar between married and non-married respondents, 
unemployment rates among non-married women were substantially higher 
than among their married/cohabiting counterparts (about ten percentage 
points higher for both strict and broad unemployment rates in both waves). 
This is apparently a contradiction of the Becker theory. This was largely driven 
by a combination of higher (lower) proportion of searching (employed) non-
married women relative to their married/cohabiting counterparts as in the 
aggregate case. Perhaps, this captures the effects of networks if 
married/cohabiting women have more job-related networks (and therefore 
more labour market-related information and connection) than the non-married 
due to say, employed husbands/partners. This is likely, given that 
married/cohabiting men had far lower unemployment rate compared to their 
non-married counterparts on the average (strict and broad unemployment 




married/cohabiting in wave 1 while the ratio only declined to approximately 2.5 
times in wave 3; results are available on request). 
In a related development, prior evidence linked declining marriage rates in 
South Africa in the mid to late 1990s to increased female (especially African 
women’s) LFP then (Casale & Posel, 2002). However, evidence from NIDS shows 
increased marriage rates between 2008 and 2012 across all racial and gender 
groups (table available on request). This might be a contributory factor to non-





Table 2.3: Distribution of gender/age/marital status across labour market categories in wave 3 
   Percentage in each category in wave 3 % point change (wave 3-wave 1) 
  i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii 
   Unemployed Employed LFP rate Unemployment 
rate 
LFP rate Unemployment 
rate 
  N NEA Disc Searching  Strict Broad Strict Broad Strict Broad Strict Broad 
Gender 
Aggregate 9203 24.3 3.3 15.7 56.7 72.5 75.7 21.7 25.1 0.0 -3.0 -2.0 -5.0 
Female 5425 31.7 3.5 17.1 47.6 64.8 68.3 26.5 30.3 0.0 -5.0 -5.0 -8.0 
Male 3778 16.1 2.9 14.1 66.9 81.0 83.9 17.5 20.3 -2.0 -3.0 0.0 0.0 
Age categories* 
Aggregate 9229 24.2 3.4 15.7 56.7 72.4 75.8 21.6 25.2 -1.0 -3.0 -3.0 -5.0 
20-25 2274 20.9 3.5 27.1 48.5 75.5 79.1 35.8 38.7 15.0 10.0 -4.0 -8.0 
26-30 1331 18.6 3.9 16.8 60.8 77.6 81.4 21.6 25.3 -2.0 -5.0 -10.0 -11.0 
31-35 1248 16.6 2.5 16.0 64.9 80.9 83.4 19.8 22.2 2.0 -1.0 -3.0 -6.0 
36-40 1119 20.2 4.1 13.1 62.6 75.7 79.8 17.3 21.5 -4.0 -7.0 1.0 -1.0 
41-45 1151 25.6 3.3 10.3 60.8 71.1 74.4 14.5 18.2 -9.0 -9.0 -3.0 -3.0 
46-50 1056 31.6 5.0 7.7 55.7 63.4 68.4 12.2 18.6 -8.0 -8.0 -4.0 -3.0 
51-56 1050 48.9 1.9 5.4 43.8 49.2 51.1 11.0 14.3 -12.0 -14.0 1.0 0.0 
Marital status** 
Aggregate 8190 25.8 2.5 15.7 56.1 71.8 74.3 21.8 24.4 -1.0 -5.0 -2.0 -6.0 
Not 
married 
5318 25.6 2.4 19.0 53.0 72.0 74.4 26.4 28.8 1.0 -3.0 -2.0 -6.0 
Married 2872 26.1 2.5 10.2 61.3 71.4 74.0 14.2 17.2 -5.0 -7.0 -2.0 -3.0 
(a) Sample is restricted to adults aged 20-56 years in wave 1 who were interviewed in both waves. (b) All wave 1 (wave 3) proportions have been weighted using post-stratification 
(panel) weights.(c) Conventional definitions were used in calculating LFP and unemployment rates: 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
(𝑖+𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
𝑋100; 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝐿𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
(𝑖+𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
𝑋100;  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
(𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
𝑋100;𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖)
(𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑖𝑣)
𝑋100 . (d) (i)-(iv) sum to 100. (f) *Age categories are in reference to wave 1 categories. This 
implies wave 3 age groups are roughly four years more than wave 1 age groups. (e) **Not married never married, divorced/separated, or widow/widower; Married married, or 





Table 2.4: Reasons for non-participation by gender in percentage (All column 
percentages sum to 100) 
 Wave 1 (%) Wave 3 (%) 
 Female Male Female Male 
Too old 11.8 7.6 20.4 18.9 
Full time student 12.7 33.1 3.5 5.1 
Sick/disabled 20.3 29.6 17.7 32.8 
Don't like available jobs 3.2 2.2 3.6 7.1 
Don't like working 1.4 3.0 2.8 3.5 
Domestic duties 11.0 2.0 14.3 0.7 
Looking after children 20.5 0.4 21.5 0.5 
Job search is expensive 3.4 8.9 6.9 18.4 
Low wages 0.4 2.3 1.6 7.9 
Cooking/cleaning 4.9 0.6 3.4 0.1 
Other 6.6 6.8 2.4 5.1 
Pregnant 2.0 - 1.8 - 
Still searching 1.9 3.6 - - 
Total sample size 1861 700 1858 615 
a) Sample is restricted to adults aged 20-56 years in wave 1 who were interviewed in both 
waves. 
b) All wave 1 (wave 3) proportions have been weighted using post-stratification (panel) weights. 
 Source: Own calculations 
 
One lasting legacy of apartheid and an arguably important determinant of 
labour market outcomes in South Africa is the spatial distribution of the 
population. Apartheid-era racial segregation led to the spatial restriction of 
non-white population groups (Rospabe & Selod, 2006). As a result, there is 
disproportionate representation of different population groups in different 
locations across the country. For instance, whites are generally over-
represented in rich urban neighbourhoods while Africans mostly populate 
the rural and poor informal urban locations. This pattern of living 
arrangements is reflected in the NIDS dataset. For instance, Africans ((who 
made up about 79% of the population in 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 
2012a)) constituted 99.9% of traditional authority dwellers and 96.3% of 
urban informal areas in wave 3. On the other hand, whites (who accounted 
for about 9% of the population) constituted 14.4% of urban formal areas and 




One thing that is apparent is the wide geographical variation in the level of 
economic activity and unemployment incidence in South Africa even within 
the same racial group. For instance, the African broad LFP rate ranged from 
65% in traditional authority areas to 87% in rural formal areas in wave 1. 
On the other hand, the wave 1 African broad unemployment rate ranged 
from 16% in rural formal areas to 43% in traditional authority and urban 
informal areas. African unemployment was also most severe in traditional 
authority areas in wave 3. Though participation rates were not starkly 
different between Africans, coloureds and whites in urban formal areas in 
wave 1, unemployment incidence varied widely; African and coloured broad 
unemployment rates were 28% and 24% respectively while that of whites 
was 11%. A similar pattern obtained in wave 3. The foregoing shows that 
one’s location appears to be an important determinant of LFP and 
unemployment, while reinforcing the racial undertones of unemployment in 
South Africa. Similar findings have been made in previous studies 
(Dinkelman & Pirouz, 2002; Ntuli & Wittenberg, 2013). 
Related to location in a South African context is job search. Given that 
apartheid-era structures resulted in jobs being mainly situated in formal 
cities, it is expected that job search will be more expensive for job seekers 
living away from cities (Banerjee et al., 2008). For the currently employed, 
the average number of months spent in unemployment before securing the 
current job was 39.7 months in wave 1. But this duration varied 
substantially across locations. It was highest in traditional authority areas 
(53 months) and lowest in rural formal areas (35 months). Wave 3 figures 
are unavailable as this question was dropped from the questionnaire. For 
the searching unemployed, average transport cost spent searching for jobs 
in the past week was R103 in wave 1. Disaggregating this amount across 
locations, job search was most expensive in rural formal areas (R381) and 
cheapest in urban informal areas (R69). In wave 3, the overall average 
increased to R137. It was costliest in traditional authority areas (R145) - 
only slightly more expensive than in rural informal areas (R139) - and also 




formal locations incurred the second lowest cost of job search in both waves 
(R86 and R134 respectively). This is largely supportive of the above thesis of 
relatively low search costs in cities. These amounts are however substantial 
especially when viewed from the perspective of an unemployed economic 
agent. This may be one of the reasons why a large proportion of job seekers 
subsequently dropped into economic inactivity as earlier shown in Table 2.1. 
2.4.2 Wage determination and wage-related transitions in South Africa 
(2008-2012) 
 
Another issue investigated in this thesis is wage determination. As in the 
foregoing section, I conduct descriptive analysis of the relationship between 
wage and key covariates and compare these to other findings as well as 
examine temporal changes in the relationships. “Wage” as used here, refers 
to individual real monthly take home pay from main job (casual and self-
employment were excluded). Average and median real wages increased from 
R5491.50 and R2871.80 respectively in wave 1 to R5861.53 and R3256.58 
in wave 3 respectively. Thus, there was evidence of real growth in both 
average and median wages as well as positively skewed wage distributions 
across waves. 
Education is a common measure of human capital accumulation. 
Respondents with at least a matric4 qualification earned about three times 
their less educated counterparts on the average in both waves (𝑝 < 0.01). 
Given the high degree of aggregation inherent in this kind of classification, I 
also disaggregated the analysis by actual years of schooling. Average 
monthly wage among those with no education was R1529 (N=1130) and 
R1931 (N=884) in wave 1 and wave 3 respectively. Table 2.5 below shows 
differences in average monthly wage for each year of schooling relative to no 
education in both waves. 
 
                                       
4 ‘Matric’ is a colloquial term used in South Africa to refer to the National Senior Certificate, which is obtained 
upon the successful completion of the National Certificate Examinations. It is equivalent to roughly twelve years 
of schooling. A matriculation endorsement or exemption is the minimum requirement for admission to a 




Table 2.5: Monthly real wage differentials between various levels of 
education and no education (Rands) 
Years of schooling Wave 1 Wave 3 
 N Wage differences N Wage differences 
1 70 -511.04** 52 6,030.21 
  (0.02)  (0.14) 
2 149 -31.61 132 431.28 
  (0.88)  (0.11) 
3 289 596.92 247 342.63 
  (0.13)  (0.25) 
4 381 884.14 350 161.13 
  (0.13)  (0.63) 
5 458 
 
325.79 360 392.57 
 (0.10)  (0.19) 
6 581 
 
470.07** 451 458.25 
 (0.02)  (0.23) 
7 885 
 
749.06*** 736 513.83* 
 (0.00)  (0.08) 
8 861 
 
693.64*** 706 1,319.54*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
9 949 
 
788.35*** 772 858.28*** 
 (0.00)  (0.01) 
10 1327 
 
2,075.26*** 1054 1,595.36*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
11 1539 
 
1,744.06*** 1407 1,506.42*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
12 2461 
 
4,492.29*** 1769 4,003.30*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
13 860 
 
7,988.85*** 1127 6,267.88*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
15 143 
 
10,763.47*** 138 15,763.75*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
16 121 
 
12,010.89*** 158 12,438.85*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
18 43 
 
27,213.01*** 45 26,665.31*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
p values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey design 
and non-random attrition 
 
Generally, there was no significant earnings differential between 
respondents without any education and those with up to five years of 
schooling in wave 1 (indeed, individuals with only a year of schooling earned 
significantly less than those without any education). However, from the sixth 
year of education onwards, statistically significant positive differences 
emerged up to the highest number of years of schooling (i.e. eighteen). These 
differences increased with years of schooling. The differences ranged from 




associated with at least one extra year of schooling above the matric level 
compared with quitting school at matric. For instance, the thirteenth year of 
schooling was associated with an extra R3500 per month on the average 
compared to stopping school at matric level, while eighteen years of 
education (equivalent to having at least a master’s degree) was associated 
with an extra R23000 per month on the average relative to a matric. A 
similar trend occurred in wave 3 (here, the returns to schooling only kicked 
in at the seventh year). Lam (1999) also found positive and increasing 
returns to schooling at each year of schooling from the fourth year onwards 
in both South Africa and Brazil (it was for all schooling years in Brazil). In 
addition to South Africa, this pattern has also been confirmed in Nigeria, 
Ghana, Kenya and Ivory Coast (Schultz, 2004). 
Earlier, I showed that gender played an important role in determining LFP 
and unemployment. I hereby examine how important it is in wage 
determination once one secures employment. Real average monthly wage for 
females (males) was R4640 (R6069) in wave 1 as shown in Figure 2.5 below. 
This implies that male wage in wave 1 was 31% higher than female wage on 
the average. A racial analysis of this gap (see Figure 2.5) shows that male 
wages exceeded female wages by 41-46% across all racial groups (with the 
biggest difference occurring among Africans) except the Asian group where 
average female wage exceeded male wage by 52%, though not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. But as earlier noted, Asian statistics are to 
be viewed with caution given small sample size. The aggregate gender wage 
gap narrowed to 20% in wave 3, while only the African and white gaps (21% 
and 39% respectively) were statistically significant (p<0.05). Thus, while the 
African gap declined from 46% to 21% between 2008 and 2012, the white 
gap only fell from 43% to 39% over the same period. The substantial 
percentage drop in the African gap was necessitated by a 31% rise in African 
women’s wage earnings compared to only 10% for African men. On the other 
hand, wage growth for white women and men were similar: 15% and 12% 
respectively. Nontrivial gender-based wage gaps (in favour of men) has been 




market for both employees and employers/the self-employed (Wittenberg, 
2014). 
Figure 2.5: Race-gender wage distribution (2008-2012) 
 
Statistics appropriately weighted with post-stratification and panel weights 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Unionization remains a vexing issue in South Africa. Proponents argue that 
unions ensure more egalitarian wage distribution in firms (Freeman, 1982). 
However, others maintain that unionization increases unemployment, the 
result of wages rising faster than productivity (Banerjee et al., 2008). Overall 
in the dataset analysed, unionization was associated with higher real 
monthly wage on average in both waves (Figure 2.6). In wave 1, average 
monthly wage of trade union members (R6965.09) was 57% higher than that 
of non-union members (R4426.75) while it was higher by 44% in wave 3. 
These wage differences were statistically significant in each wave (p<0.01). 
Though the average wage of union members only grew by 4.6% between 
both waves while that of non-members grew by 14.4%, it is important to 











Total Afr Col Asi Whi Total Afr Col Asi Whi
Wave 1 Wave 3
Female 4640 3028 3839 14670 10203 5266 3976 4821 10143 11772

















less than union members’ average wage in wave 1 (R6965.09). These huge 
wage differentials may also encompass selection issues. For instance, it has 
been argued that union members are generally better skilled than non-
members in South Africa (Seekings, 2014). Controlling for education (“at 
least matric” vs. “no matric”), I found that the monthly average wage of 
unionized workers without a matric qualification (R3995.85) was still 
significantly higher than the corresponding non-members’ average wage 
(R2068.24). Thus, education-related selection into union membership is not 
wholly responsible for such high union premium. The difference was 
however not statistically significant (even at the 10% level) for those with at 
least a matric qualification. These trends were replicated in wave 3. 
Some studies have shown that the union premium in South Africa is not 
race-neutral (Chamberlain & Van der Berg, 2002; Schultz & Mwabu, 
1998b). A similar pattern holds here as union premium among Africans, 
coloureds and Asians were statistically significant in wave 1 at conventional 
levels, while that of whites was not. In wave 3, only those of Africans and 
Asians were significant. Generally, unionization appears to favourably affect 
Africans; among Africans, union members’ average wage was more than 
double that of non-members in wave 1. It only declined to 75% in wave 3 
(see Figure 2.6). A very high African union premium, especially among low-
earners, is not new in South Africa; Schultz and Mwabu (1998b) found that 
average African male union members’ wage in the bottom decile of the wage 
distribution was 145% of their non-union counterparts in 1993.  On the 
other hand, I found that among whites, the average wage of union members 
was only 14% higher than that of non-members in wave 1 while union 
members actually suffered a wage penalty of 3% compared to non-union 
members in wave 3 (though not statistically significant). In a related 
development, Schultz and Mwabu (1998b) found a 24% conditional wage 





Figure 2.6: Race-union status wage distribution (2008-2012) 
 
Statistics appropriately weighted with post-stratification and panel weights 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Furthermore, wage differentials may arise due to differences in occupational 
categories. Respondents’ primary jobs were grouped into three occupational 
classes: managerial/professional (legislators, senior officials, managers, 
professionals, technicians and associate professionals); semi-skilled (clerks, 
service workers, shop and market sales workers, skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers, craft and related trades workers as well as plant and 
machinery operators and assemblers), and the elementary occupations. This 
classification is in line with Cichello et al. (2012). These groups are no doubt 
highly aggregated but provide an indication of occupational differentiation 
nonetheless. 
There were numerically substantial and statistically significant (p<0.01) 
wage differentials between these occupational classes. For instance in wave 










Total Afr Col Asi Whi Total Afr Col Asi Whi
Wave 1 Wave 3
Non-union 4427 2830 3703 12983 11410 5066 3386 3910 15376 13928

















was six times that of the elementary group (R1717.32) and two and a half 
times that of the semi-skilled category (R4182.55) on average (see column 3 
of Table 2.6). These proportions declined somewhat in wave 3 but the 
differences still remained nontrivial (column 6 of Table 2.6). It is important 
to observe that though these occupational classes are expected to mirror 
educational and skill differences between workers, there may be underlying 
non-skill factors driving some of these earnings differentials. For instance, 
workers in the managerial/professional group with no matric still earned 
more than twice (p<0.01) that of their counterparts in the elementary 
category and almost one and half times (p<0.05) that of their semi-skilled 
counterparts in wave 1. These differences persisted into wave 3. Moreover, 
the average wage for respondents with at least a matric exceeded that of 
non-matric holders within each occupational group (p<0.01). These wage 
differences are shown in Table 2.6 below. Also, regarding the manner of 
transitions across these occupational categories, the most immobile category 
was the elementary occupations as 81% remained in this category over the 
four-year period, while the most mobile was the semi-skilled as only 65% 
remained in this category in both waves. About 18% of the semi-skilled 
category in wave 1 “adversely” moved into elementary occupations in wave 3 
(transition matrix available on request). 
Table 2.6: Wage distribution across occupational class and education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
Occupational category Matric No matric Total Matric No matric Total 
Manager/professional 11517.69 3994.16 10315.70 12822.52 4544.34 11360.49 
Semi-skilled 5787.21 2850.72 4182.55 6020.728 3351.90 4620.199 
Elementary 2514.95 1587.03 1717.32 3942.448 2004.22 2387.675 





As earlier indicated, average and median real monthly wage increased 
between waves 1 and 3. In reality, this may not reflect welfare improvement 
if it was only brought about by more hours of work. It is important to note 
the existence of measurement error in the weekly hours variable as some 
weekly hours exceeded 168 (maximum possible hours in a week). Therefore, 
I set weekly work hours exceeding 105 (i.e. 15 hours/day for 7 days) to 
missing. Average weekly hours virtually remained unchanged across waves 
(41.9 hours and 41.7 hours respectively) while the median remained 
unchanged at 42 hours per week in each wave (not shown in Table 2.7). 
Therefore, growth in monthly wage was not due to higher working hours in 
wave 3 relative to wave 1. 
Table 2.7: Distribution of average real wage (monthly) and hours (weekly) 
across industries 
 Wave1 Wave 3 
Industry Wage N Hours N Wage N Hours N 
Private households & exterritorial org. 1254.8 376 36.3 336 1421.9 316 35.9 305 
Agriculture 1483.2 492 48.0 453 1950.2 410 44.4 401 
Mining and quarrying 9019.2 150 44.8 129 8257.6 141 44.8 140 
Manufacturing 4696.9 475 44.2 434 5157.6 265 44.4 260 
Electricity gas and water supply 6666.6 23 44.1 23 8289.8 47 41.3 46 
Construction 3225.0 174 41.7 159 3438.0 123 45.0 119 
Wholesale and retail trade 4178.9 433 42.9 400 4805.1 526 40.4 517 
Transport, storage and communication 5643.9 112 40.8 102 5084.7 153 45.6 147 
Financial intermediation  7478.8 241 45.3 224 7464.4 200 44.6 199 
Community, social and personal service 7308.4 776 37.9 735 8420.1 925 39.9 913 
Total 5239.5  41.9  5917.3  41.7  
(a) Sample is restricted to adults aged 20-56 years in wave 1 who were interviewed in both waves.  
(b) All wave 1 (wave 3) proportions have been weighted using post-stratification (panel) weights. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 2.7 depicts the distribution of average wages and weekly work hours 
across industries. Monthly wages were highest in the mining sector in wave 
1. This was followed by financial services. The mining industry was second 
highest in wave 3 behind community, social and personal services in wave 3 




the other hand, the private household and agriculture industries earned the 
lowest average wage in both waves. Table 2.7 reveals deep inequalities 
across industrial groups in the South African labour market. For instance, 
average wage in the mining industry was six times that of the agricultural 
industry in wave 1. This only declined to four times in wave 3. Real wages 
only declined noticeably in the mining and transportation industries while 
the other industries (except financial intermediation) experienced average 
growth in monthly wages. 
Average weekly work hours were highest in the agriculture industry in wave 
1 and the transport industry in wave 3 but lowest in the private & 
exterritorial industrial sector in both waves. However, hours worked was 
similar across industries especially in wave 3 and is therefore not a 
significant driver of these wage disparities. Overall, most workers in these 
industries worked full time (defined here as working at least 30 hours per 
week). As in Klasen and Woolard, (1999), part-time work was more prevalent 
among women than men: 30% of women and 17% of men worked part-time 




This chapter has provided an overview of the South African economy and a 
historical overview of the state of the South African labour market over the 
post-apartheid period, especially with regard to labour market participation 
and wage determination. Finally, using the dataset to be analysed 
throughout this thesis, I conducted a descriptive analysis of labour market 
participation and wage determination between 2008 and 2012 focusing on 
factors often considered to be important in labour market models. The 
results generally conformed to expectations with regard to the relationship 
between the labour market outcomes of interest and these factors. 
Though LFP increased in the mid-90s to early 2000s (mainly due to the 




then onwards. Also, a substantial proportion of the searching unemployed 
in 2008 moved into economic inactivity by 2012, a trend that is more 
pronounced among women. This might not be unconnected with substantial 
search costs faced by the unemployed. I also showed that non-participation 
is not mainly driven by high reservation wages but by family commitments 
(for women), full time study (for men), perceived old age and sickness. 
Furthermore, the analysis showed that labour market differences in 
outcomes like LFP, unemployment and wages are largely persistent along 
gender, racial and occupational lines over the post-apartheid period. Also, 
union membership is associated with higher remuneration especially among 
Africans, while location plays an important role both in the participation 
decision and remuneration. A positive finding though, is that many of these 
gaps reduced between 2008 and 2012. Unlike prior evidence however, 
marriage rates increased between 2008 and 2012. Also, returns to schooling 
are very large but only kick in around the sixth or seventh year of formal 
education. 
As shown in the foregoing discussion, ill-health seems to be one of the 
biggest impediments to labour market participation in South Africa. 
Consequently, it is important to ascertain the potential role health plays in 
determining participation. This is the crux of Chapter 4. Also, as 
subsequently shown, employees in relatively poor health receive significantly 
lower pay compared to their counterparts who enjoy better health 
conditions. This issue, as well as health-related differentials in returns to 
observable workers’ characteristics (popularly dubbed wage discrimination) 
is given in-depth attention in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Before tackling 
these issues however, the next chapter reviews relevant theoretical models of 
labour supply, wage determination and wage discrimination which form the 












This chapter reviews a number of theoretical models of labour supply, wage 
determination and wage discrimination. The purpose is to provide a 
theoretical basis for the empirical questions answered in this thesis in both 
a traditional context (i.e. without incorporating health) as well as in a 
health-augmented scenario. Given that it is not my intention to modify any 
of the existing theories, the following theoretical review will not attempt to 
restate the technical details of each model. Rather, attention will focus on 
the basic meaning and implication of each model. 
 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF LABOUR SUPPLY THEORIES 
 
Theoretical advances in the conceptualization of labour supply have been 
well documented (Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999; Bowen & Finegan, 1969; 
Pencavel, 1986). Early theoretical work uncovered an ambiguous wage-
labour supply relationship in constrained optimization models (subsequently 
known to be the result of income and substitution effects of wage variations) 
(Robbins, 1930). Arguably the earliest study that tested this ambiguity 
assertion, Douglas (1934) concluded that the elasticity of work hours with 
respect to wages in the US probably ranged between -0.1 and -0.2. Other 
important work on LFP include Woytinsky (1940), Bancroft (1958) and Long 
(1958). Subsequent studies aimed at fleshing out income and substitution 
effects more carefully, especially from a gendered perspective, were later 
conducted. For instance, Mincer (1962b) examined the LFP of married 
women, while Kosters (1966) focused on men’s work hours (Heckman & 
MaCurdy (1981), Heckman et al. (1981) and Killingsworth (1981; 1983) 




As noted by Pencavel (1986), most of the early work as well as later studies 
on labour supply draw from Hicks’ (1946) model of the determinants of 
labour supply. These models, which are either based on the individual as an 
independent unit or view the household in a single-member dimension, or 
as consisting of a group of individuals seeking to maximize a homogenous 
well-behaved utility function subject to a family budget constraint, represent 
the orthodox view (see e.g. Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999; M. R. Killingsworth, 
1983; M. R. Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986). Gary Becker was a popular 
exponent of this conceptualization of household decision-making (Becker, 
1965; 1973). These so-called unitary models often assume the existence of a 
benevolent dictatorial household head who makes decisions on behalf of 
other household members in the best possible way so as to maximize family 
welfare. 
However, the unitary model has been criticized for some of its apparently 
unrealistic assumptions and its occasional failure when confronted with 
data. A key criticism is that the model assumes away key intra-household 
differences and strategic interaction which have been found to be important 
in modelling household behaviour at times (Chiappori, 1992; Fortin & 
Lacroix, 1997). Models that incorporate these important features, otherwise 
dubbed collective models, often characterize intra-household decision-
making in a game-theoretic manner (see e.g. Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, 
Hoddinott, & Kanbur, 1995; Fortin & Lacroix, 1997). In this framework, the 
individual seeks to maximize their own utility within a household set-up, 
and household resources including time are allocated on the basis of these 
intra-household power relationships. 
Both the unitary and collective labour supply theories draw from the basic 
static neoclassical model of household behaviour. In this model, an 
individual/household maximizes a smooth and well-behaved utility function 
which is a function of goods consumption, leisure/work hours and 
individual characteristics. Other key properties of the utility function 
include homogeneity and the satisfaction of other Slutsky conditions like 




includes the assumption of symmetry. According to this framework, the 
agent’s decision problem involves making a trade-off between work and 
leisure. There is no unemployment as jobs are instantaneously available at 
the market clearing wage; agents are either employees/labour market 
participants or non-participants (Mortensen, 1986). 
However, the basic static neoclassical model has been criticized as 
inadequate for explaining labour supply decisions in reality. Important ways 
through which this model has been enriched include the incorporation of job 
search and unemployment duration (Mortensen, 1986; Stigler, 1961; Stigler, 
1962), labour supply decisions over the entire work life cycle (Blundell & 
MaCurdy, 1999) and the division of non-market time into both leisure time 
and time devoted to home production (Becker, 1965). 
Though many studies on labour force participation criticize the unitary 
model as unrealistic, it still remains popular empirically. Perhaps, its 
continued popularity lies in the fact that much progress has not been made 
in developing a common framework for collective models that enjoys 
widespread acceptance among practitioners (Lundberg & Pollak, 1996). And 
given that the unitary model has been described as a fairly accurate 
description of the South African situation, it is apparent that it suits our 
purposes especially given embedded patriarchal forms of family organization 
in South African families (Ntuli, 2009). This notwithstanding, I am not 
unaware of empirical evidence which lends credence to the collective theory 
of intra-family interaction in South Africa (Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Miller, 
2003; Duflo, 2003). Thus, given that I make the individual the main object 
of the analysis while capturing important household-related LFP 
determinants, I incorporate important aspects of both unitary and collective 
household decision making into the analysis by modelling LFP as a function 






3.2.1 Labour supply: theoretical framework 
 
Given the foregoing, this study adopts a standard static labour supply 
model. The framework adopted here, which closely follows Pencavel (1986) 
and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), originates from Hicks (1946). 
In this framework, the labour supply function is derived from general 
consumer demand theory where a fixed endowment of a commodity (a fixed 
block of time, 𝑇) is divided into two parts: one for sale in the market, and 
another for direct consumption. In this simple characterization, 𝑇 is to be 
divided into work hours (ℎ) and leisure time (𝑙), where 𝑙 incorporates all non-
market use of time (including home production). Thus, the agent faces a 
time constraint, 𝑇 = ℎ + 𝑙. 
Given perfect certainty, it is assumed that an agent with a “characteristics” 
vector (𝑋) seeks to maximize a well-behaved utility function (𝑈) defined over 
her consumption of a composite commodity (𝐶) and work/leisure hours 
thus: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈(ℎ𝑖, 𝐶𝑖; 𝑋𝑖, 𝑖)                                                                                                       [3.1] 
subject to the following constraint: 
𝑃𝐶𝑖 = 𝑊ℎ𝑖 + 𝑌𝑖                                                                                                                 [3.2] 
That is, total (labour and non-labour) income is fully spent on the 
consumption of the composite commodity (𝐶). , 𝑃,𝑊 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌 are: unobserved 
characteristics/tastes/abilities in home production, price of the composite 
good, the wage rate, and non-labour income respectively. The agent selects 
𝐶 > 0 and ℎ ≥ 0 to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.2). Assuming 𝑃 to be a 
numeraire, this yields the following first order conditions: 
𝑈𝑐(ℎ𝑖, 𝐶𝑖; 𝑋𝑖, 𝑖) = 𝜇 and 𝑈ℎ(ℎ𝑖, 𝐶𝑖; 𝑋𝑖, 𝑖) ≥ 𝜇𝑊, where 𝜇 is the marginal utility of 
income. The marginal rate of substitution between hours of work and goods 
consumption is the ratio of these marginal utilities. 
The agent’s reservation wage, 𝑊𝑟 is the slope of an indifference curve 
between commodity consumption and hours of work evaluated at ℎ = 0. For 
each individual, 𝑊𝑟 varies for each value of 𝐶, and as a result, indirectly 
upon 𝑌 for each 𝑋 and , i.e. 𝑊𝑟(𝑌, 𝑋, ). The foregoing implies that an agent’s 




between participation and non-participation. At this margin, if the market 
wage (𝑊𝑚) exceeds the reservation wage, she participates; otherwise, she 
does not. Consequently, the participation decision is as follows: 
𝑊𝑚 > 𝑊𝑟  ⇒ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒                                                                                              
𝑊𝑚 ≤ 𝑊𝑟  ⇒ 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒                                                                        [3.3] 
These conditions, together with the reservation wage function, 𝑊𝑟(𝑌, 𝑋, ) 
show that relevant determinants of labour force participation include non-
labour income as well as observed and unobserved characteristics. In this 
vein, Sprague (1994) argued that the personal characteristics which 
determine the reservation wage (and by extension, LFP) include race, gender, 
marital status, ages and number of children, while the expected market 
wage offer (𝑊𝑚) depends on personal and human capital characteristics like 
age, labour market experience, schooling and unobserved innate ability. 
Additionally, the general state of the labour market is another key 
determinant of the market wage offer. This analysis can be easily extended 
to a multi-member household with minor modifications. 
Though the foregoing framework has been extensively used in modelling 
labour supply/labour force participation as a function of the above-
mentioned characteristics, health can be considered a component of the X 
vector whereby illness is likely to raise one’s reservation wage given one’s 
increased taste for leisure. On the other hand, being healthy is likely to 
increase one’s latent productivity and consequently, the opportunity cost of 
leisure, thereby enhancing willingness to participate in labour market 
activities. Therefore, the human capital theory hypothesizes a positive 
relationship between health and LFP (Cai & Kalb, 2006). However, it is 
possible that participation may occur under perverse conditions due to an 
unhealthy working environment, thereby resulting in negative health 







3.2.2 Theoretical review of the health-labour supply relationship 
 
Health is a form of human capital (Becker, 1964; Fuchs, 1972; Mushkin, 
1962) while there are many avenues through which both health and LFP (or 
labour supply in general) can be related. Before detailing these channels of 
influence, it is important to state that LFP in this context is not only used in 
the intensive margin (i.e. actual supply of work hours) but also in a broad 
sense to include the willingness to engage in economic activities of any kind, 
i.e. broad LFP. 
Firstly, being healthy is likely to encourage LFP as it is associated with 
increased latent and actual productivity. Such higher (latent) productivity 
associated with better health invariably results in an increase in the 
opportunity cost of leisure, thereby enhancing willingness to participate in 
the labour market (Cai & Kalb, 2006). Conversely, sickness increases the 
demand for leisure and reduces the willingness to participate in the labour 
market. 
Health status can also affect labour supply by changing an individual’s 
preferences between market time and non-market time. Ill-health can affect 
the manner in which individuals value time away from work thereby 
changing the relative utility between income and non-market time. More 
favourable valuation of non-market time by the sick relative to the healthy 
may stem from the fact that non-market time may be utilized in seeking 
health care. This channel is independent of the effect of health on 
participation through changes in productivity earlier mentioned (Chirikos, 
1993). 
Another important channel through which health may be related to labour 
market participation is through its effect on life expectancy and the 
importance of the latter in making labour market decisions. Reduction in life 
expectancy reduces the time horizon over which an individual makes 
economic decisions especially as it will imply less need for financial 
resources to finance years of retirement (van Solinge & Henkens, 2010). 




attractive relative to when individuals expect to enjoy longer life spans. This 
is evidenced by increasing calls to extend the retirement age in the face of 
longer life spans (van Solinge & Henkens, 2010).  
However, it is possible for poor health to result in an increase in labour 
supply. This is because, conditional on the sick being able to supply actual 
hours of labour and by reducing productivity, illness decreases earnings and 
can result in an increase in labour supply. Such increase in labour supply 
may be necessitated by the need to make up for lost earnings (due to lower 
productivity) and/or to earn more income given the high cost of seeking 
health care especially when medical care is associated with direct financial 
cost (Cai & Kalb, 2006). Thus, though mostly working through channels 
that predict a positive impact, the direction of the impact of good health on 
LFP may also be negative and is therefore an empirical question. 
The foregoing has demonstrated various channels through which health can 
influence LFP. Theoretically, LFP can also affect health outcomes in a 
number of ways. Firstly, employment-related income can be used to procure 
better nutrition and health care. Secondly, the active nature of participation 
(especially for those who actually work or are actively seeking employment) 
can have positive health effects akin to exercise. Moreover, given the value 
attached by society to gainful employment, non-participation in labour 
market activities may be associated with psychological trauma due to the 
shame and stigma associated with non-participation. Indeed, it has been 
hypothesized that otherwise healthy but non-participating individuals may 
falsely claim to be sick in order to rationalize their non-participation (Stern, 
1989). Such psychological trauma may result in significant health 
deterioration. Furthermore, lack of activity associated with non-participation 
may lead to boredom with its attendant adverse health conditions, coupled 
with social problems like alcohol and drug abuse, depression and suicide 
(Patterson & Pegg, 1999). On the other hand, participation may also be 
detrimental to health. Employment in hazardous and stressful environments 
can result in deteriorating health. An example is work-related health 




From the foregoing, there seems to be a number of ways through which 
health is related to LFP or labour supply in general. Health can influence 
LFP and vice versa. Furthermore, the direction of impact can be positive or 
negative. The same is true of the effect emanating from LFP. Thus, the 
relationship is theoretically ambiguous and remains an empirical question. 
These bi-directional relationships between health and LFP will likely result 
in endogeneity of health in a labour supply/LFP equation. 
 
3.3 WAGE DETERMINATION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The discussion in Section 3.2.1 above briefly alluded to factors that 
determine the market wage (𝑊𝑚) but did not outline the process of wage 
determination. Various wage determination theories formulated under the 
assumptions of perfect and imperfect competition provide insight into the 
wage determination process. While perfect competition models stress the 
role of human capital and differences in job characteristics as the reasons 
for compensating wage differentials, models that incorporate market 
imperfection stress the role of non-human capital characteristics like 
barriers to entry, lack of transparency and discrimination as important in 
determining wage differentials. The following discussion mainly draws from 
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004). 
Becker’s (1964) human capital model provides a foundation for most models 
of wage determination and accords great importance to the role of human 
capital, principally education, in driving wage differences. The model fits 
into the perfect competition framework where it is shown that wages match 
the supply and demand for labour and equalize marginal productivity in 
equilibrium. The perfect competition framework crucially depends on the 
existence of no barriers to entry and exit as well as perfect information 
about opportunities, worker quality and job characteristics.  
Another notable strand in this literature is the hedonic theory of wages. This 




More difficult jobs will attract higher pay relative to easier ones. An early 
exposition of this theory was made by Adam Smith who posited that workers 
with similar capability should be paid differently if their working conditions 
were different. Rosen (1974) has also made significant contributions to this 
theory and explains wage differences as resulting from differences in the 
level of difficulty associated with different jobs. Within the hedonic theory of 
wage differentials under perfect competition, two scenarios can be 
examined: a situation with jobs of equal difficulty; and another, with jobs of 
different difficulty levels (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004). In the former, the 
(omniscient) planner’s problem is to choose levels of worker disutility of 
work to maximize the sum of individual utilities. The solution to this 
problem is the equalization of work disutility with worker’s marginal 
productivity. 
But assuming different levels of difficulty across jobs, where jobs with higher 
difficulty/risks are more productive, the worker’s problem is to choose an 
effort level to maximize utility (a function of income, effort level and work 
aversion) subject to participating in the labour market. The worker only 
participates if the marginal returns to effort equals the job’s disutility. The 
wage received by a worker in equilibrium is therefore equal to the 
productivity associated with the job, where productivity is a function of 
effort exerted. This scenario yields multiple equilibria, where individuals 
with high aversion for work choose jobs requiring little effort, thus earning 
low wages in equilibrium while the converse obtains for those with low 
aversion for work. An implication of this theory is that public policy aimed at 
mitigating the difficulty associated with jobs in a perfectly competitive 
setting will lead to welfare loss. 
However, the actual process of wage determination rarely takes place in the 
controlled world of perfect competition. Principal reasons for deviations from 
perfect competition are information asymmetry and entry barriers. Market 
imperfection results in wage differentials that are not solely driven by 
differences in marginal productivity (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004). Factors 




productivity include geographical and occupational factors. Transport costs 
for instance, may prevent a worker from taking advantage of work 
opportunities elsewhere other than their immediate environment even when 
the local wage does not equalize marginal productivity. On the other hand, 
costs of entry sometimes prevent firms from entering a market dominated by 
a monopsony or oligopsony (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004). 
The foregoing review has identified education, information asymmetry, job 
difficulty and entry barriers (due to geographical and occupational barriers 
for instance) as some of the factors that can theoretically determine wages. 
Additionally (and particularly relevant to this thesis), health can be 
considered an important determinant of productivity/wages. 
The idea that health is an important determinant of productivity stems from 
the recognition that it is a form of human capital since it affects the ability 
to produce output (Weil, 2007). And it is an established fact that better 
human capital boosts productivity and hence wages, ceteris paribus. 
However, the point that health has a human capital element does not negate 
the fact that some important aspects of health are the result of genetic, 
cultural and social factors which are generally pre-determined. It only 
implies that some aspects of human capacities contribute to increased 
output and can be influenced by human choices (Savedoff & Schultz, 2000; 
Weil, 2007). 
Research into human capital formation was boosted by Becker’s (1964) 
observation that growth in physical capital and labour contributed relatively 
little to income growth in most countries. The earlier growth accounting 
framework of neoclassical economic theory identified capital, labour and 
productivity as the key drivers of economic growth, where productivity was 
believed to be driven by technological progress, considered exogenous in the 
neoclassical framework (Solow, 1956). Subsequent advances modelled 
technological progress as endogenously determined by human capital 




asserted that human capital investment raises productivity, thus 
accelerating economic growth. 
Though much emphasis on the role of human capital has focused on 
education, there has been increasing attention on health as a veritable 
component of human capital. As Suhrcke et al. (2005) observed, it is 
intuitively obvious that health would impact on labour productivity. Jack 
and Lewis (2009) maintained that the most obvious reason why healthier 
people are more likely to be richer than the sick is their greater capacity to 
work harder, longer and more consistently than the latter. Deaton (2002) 
also agreed that good health enhances one’s ability to work, thereby 
enhancing productivity and wage. Other channels of influence include the 
fact that poor health induces early retirement (Bazzoli, 1985; Bound, 
Schoenbaum, Stinebrickner, & Waidmann, 1999; McGarry, 2004), 
presupposing subsequent loss of wage income. There is also a long-term and 
inter-generational link between poor health and future productivity. Early 
parental death due to illness results in orphans whose educational 
prospects, future productivity and earnings are severely hampered (Case et 
al., 2004; Jack & Lewis, 2009).  Similarly, mothers’ smoking habits during 
pregnancy have been found to adversely affect their children’s health, 
educational attainment and subsequent productivity, while stunting (partly 
due to say, childhood diseases) has been associated with higher future 
unemployment (and therefore lower lifetime wage income) (Deaton, 2002). 
Furthermore, in utero nutritional supplements can affect children’s future 
human capital acquisition; for instance, reduction in iodine deficiency 
disorders through intensive iodine supplementation of mothers resulted in 
additional 0.35-0.56 years of schooling for the benefitting children in 
Tanzania (Field, Robles, & Torero, 2009). 
Further justification of the importance of health in driving productivity and 
wages stems from efficiency wage theories which highlight the role of 
nutrition in engendering improved health. For instance, Leibenstein (1957) 
hypothesized that better nourished workers are more productive than their 




productivity is steeper at very low levels of nutrition. The implication of such 
efficiency wage theories is that employers have an incentive to pay healthy 
workers above the minimum wage while excluding those in poor health from 
the labour market given their high cost of employment (Strauss & Thomas, 
1998). 
A popular and clear formulation of the human capital nature of health can 
be attributed to Grossman (1972) in a modification of Becker’s human 
capital model (Becker, 1964). The Grossman model shows that current 
health status is a function of previous health stock, material and time 
inputs into health production, exogenous productivity shifters (such as the 
rate of depreciation of health capital which likely varies with age5), person-
specific productivity shifters (e.g. health investments) and random 
productivity shock. It clearly identifies the relationships between health, 
work time and wages. According to the model, individuals produce as well as 
demand health. In terms of health production, individuals are born with a 
stock of health which deteriorates over time through sickness for instance 
but replenished via investments in health care. Also, people demand health 
both as a consumption and capital good. As a consumption good, health 
directly enters the utility function as individuals enjoy being healthy. As a 
capital good, it is used in the production of healthy time which can be spent 
in both market and non-market activities, where healthy time increases 
both time spent in productive work as well as productivity, ceteris paribus. 
Therefore, the marginal utility of having an extra unit of health stock has 
both a consumption and capital component, the sum of which must equal 
the marginal cost in equilibrium (Zweifel, Breyer, & Kifmann, 2009).  
Though health potentially influences productivity/wages, wage no doubt 
affects health. That wage is a predictor of health stems from the health-
income literature. Higher wages facilitate the purchase of essential nutrients 
and services important for healthy life as well as the ability to control one’s 
circumstances (see e.g. Marmot, 2002). Also, a dominant income effect of 
                                       
5 In a more complicated version of the model, Grossman treated the rate of depreciation as endogenous, but noted 




wage increases over the substitution effect results in the well-known 
backward-bending labour supply curve in neoclassical economic theory, 
leading to reduced labour supply and enjoyment of more leisure - when 
leisure is a normal good - (with its attendant health benefits) than would 
have been possible at low wages (Pencavel, 1986). But given this chapter’s 
focus on the gradient running from health to wages only, I will not delve into 
this literature. A concise theoretical formulation of this endogenous 
relationship is available in Savedoff and Schultz (2000). 
 
3.4 THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION 
 
Though the above theories of wage determination have explained wage 
differentials as emanating from differences in skill/preferences of workers, 
some important extensions have established the possibility of wage 
differentials between otherwise productively identical workers (Altonji & 
Blank, 1999). This is a classic case of labour market discrimination. 
Discrimination may however be very difficult to detect. This is because 
discrimination can influence human capital investment decisions pre- and 
post-labour market entry (e.g. when women acquire less education or select 
themselves out of certain disciplines due to discrimination) -see e.g. Coate 
and Loury (1993). In the following section, I discuss factors that can 
theoretically result in wage discrimination. 
Defining labour market discrimination as a situation whereby providers of 
labour services who possess equal levels of physical or material productivity 
are unequally treated in a manner related to an observable characteristic 
like gender, ethnicity or race, Altonji and Blank (1999) identified two broad 
classes of economic models of discrimination: competitive models (which 
focus on agents’ individual actions), and collective models (which stress a 
group’s collective actions against another). Competitive models highlight two 
broad kinds of discrimination. The first is prejudice, defined as a taste by 




those of a minority group6, while the other is statistical discrimination by 
employers due to imperfect information regarding the skills or behaviour of 
minority group members. On the other hand, collective models pay more 
attention to the consequences of collective action of one group against 
another. Such models are often informal and emphasize the use of the legal 
system or the threat of violence as an enforcement mechanism (Altonji & 
Blank, 1999). The focus in this review is on competitive models as they are 
more popular among mainstream labour economists and also adequately 
illustrate the point intended in this thesis, i.e. that disability/impairment 
can be a marker of discrimination. 
3.4.1 Prejudice/taste-based discrimination 
 
Becker (1971), who modelled prejudice as a taste for discrimination, defined 
employer discrimination as a situation in which some employers are 
prejudiced against a minority group. In this model, employers seek to 
maximize a utility function which is the sum of profits and the monetary 
value of utility derived from employing members of particular groups. 
Prejudiced employers can only hire workers from the minority group if the 
wage paid to the dominant group is at least equal to the prejudice-adjusted 
wage rate offered the former (where the prejudice-adjusted wage rate 
exceeds the nominal wage rate payable to the minority group in the absence 
of discrimination). The implication is that only the least prejudiced firms 
employ workers from the minority group, thus resulting in a segregated 
labour market between majority and minority groups. Furthermore, the 
model implies that non-discriminating employers would earn higher profits 
than their discriminating counterparts since non-discriminators would pay 
less for hiring minority workers. 
The model predicts the elimination of the wage gap in the long run if there is 
free entry and/or constant returns to scale. This is because in the long run, 
the number of non-discriminating employers would have grown to the point 
                                       
6 Minority and majority groups are used throughout this discussion to refer to the group being discriminated 




where minority workers need not work for prejudiced employers. However, 
this is in stark contrast to the persistence of, say, gender- and disability-
related wage gaps found in empirical studies. The inability of the theory to 
concur with empirical evidence suggests a number of reasons. Either there 
is no more discrimination (implying that the observed gaps are caused by 
productivity-related factors) or all potential employers are discriminators, or 
that employer discrimination is actually not the main form of labour market 
discrimination, or still that other factors such as collective action or search 
frictions impinge on the expansion of non-discriminating firms. This model 
can be extended to account for employee discrimination, consumer 
discrimination as well as taste-based discrimination in the presence of 
costly search (Altonji & Blank, 1999). 
3.4.2 Statistical discrimination theory 
 
Most of the literature on labour market discrimination has been devoted to 
explaining the consequences of race- or sex-based statistical discrimination. 
The main idea of statistical discrimination models is that firms possess 
limited information with regard to the applicants’ skills and turnover 
propensity. Therefore, these firms may resort to using easily observable 
characteristics like disability status or ethnic origin to statistically 
discriminate among employees if it is believed that these characteristics are 
correlated with productivity. Major contributors to this literature include 
Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973). 
Two main strands of the statistical discrimination theory have emerged. One 
is concerned with ascertaining how employers’ prior beliefs/stereotypes 
regarding different group members’ productivity affect their hiring and 
remuneration decisions. Arrow (1973) and Coate and Loury (1993) have 
made significant contributions to this aspect of the literature. The other 
strand is concerned with issues regarding the consequences of group 
differences in the level of the precision of information that firms have with 
regard to individual productivity. Prominent contributors to this literature 




On the role of employers’ stereotypes, Coate and Loury’s model shows that 
differences in firms’ prior beliefs about the skills of different groups of 
workers can result in equilibria whereby groups that possess the same level 
of innate ability end up with different levels of skills. In this model, all 
workers have the same level of basic skills and employers observe workers’ 
group membership as well as a noisy signal ratio (whose distribution is a 
function of the worker’s qualification status). In deciding whether to assign 
the worker to a skilled or unskilled job, the firm forms a posterior 
probability that the worker is qualified based on the observed signal as well 
as a prior belief that a member of that particular group is qualified, 
assigning all workers above a given critical value of the posterior probability 
to the skilled job. On the other hand, workers only decide to become trained 
if the value of the change in the probability of being assigned the highly 
skilled job exceeds the cost of training. Overall, the model predicts that even 
if both workers’ groups have identical skills and the same distribution of 
training costs and firms update their priors in a sensible way, stereotypes 
that are initially negative may become self-confirming, i.e. prior beliefs 
against a particular worker group will result in a lower wage for members of 
that group. 
As mentioned earlier, another strand of the statistical discrimination theory 
deals with issues regarding the consequences of group differences in the 
level of the precision of information that firms have with regard to individual 
productivity. Lundberg’s (1991) model (which is prominent in this literature 
and builds on earlier models- see e.g. (Altonji & Blank, 1999)) starts by 
assuming that the accuracy of the information firms have about the 
productivity of individuals differs across groups. The model shows that this 
can result in an equilibrium in which firms statistically discriminate on the 
basis of group membership and there are ex post group differences in 
productivity, though average innate ability is the same across groups (Altonji 
& Blank, 1999). In a situation where firms are allowed to discriminate, a 
firm will use two separate wage equations for the two worker groups given 




(thereby paying different wage rates across groups). If firms are not allowed 
to discriminate given group-specific productivity parameter, differences in 
wages and human capital investment will be eliminated. Also, preventing 
firms from estimating different productivity equations for the two groups will 




This chapter has reviewed models which provide a theoretical basis for 
studying the determination of LFP, wages and wage discrimination. Key 
points that emerge from this discourse are that unearned income and 
human capital characteristics like health, education and job characteristics 
are important determinants of labour supply. Also, human capital 
characteristics and tastes result in wage differentials. On the other hand, 
even equally productive individuals may be paid differently due to factors 
unrelated to their productivity. Such factors might include one’s group 
membership. The following three chapters ascertain whether differences in 
















4 THE IMPACT OF HEALTH ON LABOUR FORCE 




It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that the non-incorporation of health into 
most labour supply models is a gap in the South African labour supply 
literature. In Chapter 2, I showed that ill-health was one of the main 
reasons why South Africans were economically inactive in both 2008 and 
2012 (Table 2.4). Consequently, this chapter examines the impact of health 
on LFP in South Africa. This is essential because if ill health results in 
reduced LFP by working age economic agents, then it imposes a cost on the 
economy beyond the cost of treatment. Additionally, the magnitude of such 
impact is an important input into the conduct of cost-benefit analysis of 
interventions required to boost population health from an economic point of 
view (Cai & Kalb, 2006). 
Though a number of studies have examined the trends and determinants of 
labour supply in South Africa, the possible impact of health is largely 
lacking (Banerjee et al., 2008; Bhorat, 2007; Ntuli & Wittenberg, 2013; 
Wittenberg, 1999). Available data show that prime-age LFP has been 
declining in recent years in South Africa; for instance, though strict LFP rate 
increased from 51.4% to 59.4% between 1995 and 2001 in South Africa, it 
declined to 57.2% in 2005 (Banerjee et al., 2008), with a further decline to 
54.3% in the final quarter of 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2012a). Given the 
important role that gainful labour market participation plays in economic 
growth as well as the role of the labour market in driving income inequality 
especially in South Africa (Leibbrandt & Woolard, 2001), it is imperative to 





Also, though not the focus of this chapter, demand conditions are very 
important in understanding labour market dynamics in an economy. In 
South Africa, it has been observed that together with increased labour 
supply, especially in the post-apartheid period, a virtually stagnant labour 
demand has greatly contributed to the high unemployment rates 
characterizing the country (Banerjee et al., 2008). Given that it is not my 
intention to rehash the earlier discussion about labour demand in South 
Africa, suffice it to say that labour demand factors such as growth in 
capital-intensive, as opposed to labour intensive sectors, the general low 
labour absorption in the formal economy, as well as poor growth of the 
informal economy, are also essential in determining labour supply 
outcomes. This is because poor demand conditions may discourage job 
search efforts, thereby leading to declining labour supply. 
Moreover, South Africa is beset with substantial disease burden as a result 
of the high incidence of HIV/AIDS and rising morbidity from non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) (Bradshaw et al., 2000). Rising mortality 
from NCDs especially is not surprising given some lifestyle choices among 
South Africans. For instance, 35% of adult men smoked tobacco while 48% 
(63%) of adult men (women) were categorized as inactive in 2003; 
furthermore, most age groups from 15 years upwards reported an increase 
in tuberculosis incidence while the prevalence of hypertension also 
increased between 1998 and 2003 (Department of Health, Medical Research 
Council, & OrcMacro, 2007). Also as Figure 4.1 shows, South Africa had a 
high disease burden in 2004 even relative to other select developing 
countries. And compared to 2000 disability-adjusted life year (DALY) figures 
(approximately 16 million), 2004 figures (approximately 22 million7) 
represent substantial increase in DALYs even in the face of (at least slightly) 
declining HIV/AIDS incidence (AVERT, undated), suggesting increased 
morbidity from non-HIV/AIDS-related causes. 
                                       




Figure 4.1: Absolute disease burden across select developing countries, 
2004 
 
Source: ECONEX calculations from WHO (2009) 
 
In a nutshell, South Africa has experienced high (and arguably increasing) 
disease burden in about the same period characterized by declining LFP in 
the country. Therefore, it is important to investigate if health influences LFP 
in the South African context.  
 
4.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of this chapter is to ascertain the impact of health on LFP. 
Specifically, this chapter ascertains: 
i) Whether self-assessed health (SAH) exerts a significant 
contemporaneous effect on LFP in South Africa. 
ii) Whether the relationship between SAH and LFP extends beyond 

















































4.3 HEALTH STATUS AND LABOUR SUPPLY: CONCEPTUALIZATION 
AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
Researchers are often faced with the problem of deciding what health 
measure to use in a labour supply model. Apart from observed health status 
being possibly endogenous due to perceived simultaneity between both 
health and labour supply, most of the measures used to represent health 
suffer from measurement problems given their imperfection in accurately 
capturing work capacity (see e.g. Lambrinos, 1981). This is because health 
is like ability, in the sense that inasmuch as everybody has an idea of what 
it means, it remains difficult to measure (Currie & Madrian, 1999). This 
failure to properly measure health potentially leads to a bias akin to what 
Griliches (1977) termed ability bias in standard human capital models. 
Thus, the definition of health has proved to be a vexing issue. Perhaps the 
most popular definition is that of the WHO: a state of complete physical, 
mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity (WHO, 1946, p. 100).  
However, Saracci (1997) has criticized this definition as being more idealistic 
than practical especially with regard to informing researchers of how to 
actually measure health. He maintained that the above definition is related 
more to happiness than health, where clear distinctions exist between both 
concepts (for instance, one may engage in a health-enhancing activity which 
results in a decline in happiness, such as quitting smoking). Therefore, he 
proposed an alternative and more practical definition which attempts to 
separate both concepts, where health is defined as a condition of wellbeing, 
free of disease and infirmity and a basic and universal human right. 
The foregoing demonstrates the difficulty inherent in measuring health. The 
incomplete understanding of the full ramifications of health has led to the 
use of health proxies such as life expectancy and infant mortality ratio 
(Pritchett & Summers, 1996), illness severity and body mass index (BMI, 
measured in kg/m2)8 (Rivera & Currais, 2005), SAH measures (Cai, 2010), 







disability measures/functional limitations with activities of daily living (ADL) 
(Stern, 1989), and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) (Murray, 1994) 
among others in exploring the health-labour supply relationship. As noted 
by Cameron and Trivedi (2005), such measurement errors if not properly 
accounted for, may attenuate estimates of the impact of the covariate of 
interest (in this case, health) on an outcome (say LFP), thus rendering it 
inconsistent. The foregoing measurement issues have led to vigorous debate 
on which health measures are a better reflection of true unobserved health 
status. 
It has been argued that more comprehensive health measures (e.g. whether 
health limits work, and self-reports of overall health status) increase the 
explanatory power of health in labour supply models compared to the use of 
limitation with a specific activity of daily living (Manning, Newhouse, & Ware 
Jr, 1982). But as shown subsequently, some studies prescribe the use of 
relatively objective health measures (e.g. life expectancy, BMI and limitations 
with ADL) over more subjective measures like SAH (see e.g. Kreider, 1999). 
This is because the measurement error associated with self-reported health 
might not be random, where non-labour force participants may be more 
likely than participants to cite illness as the reason for their non-
participation given the social stigma associated with non-participation and 
the fact that receipt of certain public transfers is dependent on health status 
(Boskin, 1977; Currie & Madrian, 1999; Parsons, 1980). This potentially 
leads to a bias referred to as rationalization endogeneity, a bias likely to lead 
to an over-estimation of the impact of health and under-estimation of the 
effect of financial variables on labour supply (Bound, 1991; Bound, 
Schoenbaum, & Waidmann, 1995; Cai, 2010; Cai & Kalb, 2006). 
Furthermore, self-reported health measures might be influenced by whether 
or not the individual in question has sought treatment (Dow, Gertler, 
Schoeni, Strauss, & Thomas, 1997), where utilization of medical services 
generally increases with income despite the fact that the rich (who often 




1995; Strauss & Thomas, 1998). This scenario can result in a spurious 
positive relationship between reported ill-health and labour supply. 
The potential for subjective/self-reported health measures to suffer from 
rationalization endogeneity has led to some authors preferring the use of 
objective health measures (see e.g. Bartel & Taubman, 1986; Johnson & 
Lambrinos, 1985; Kreider, 1999; Mitchell & Burkhauser, 1990). However, to 
the extent that these objective health measures are imperfect measures of 
true health status, they are likely to under-estimate the impact of health on 
labour supply. For instance, height, which reflects quality of childhood 
nutrition and the absence of debilitating disease conditions especially during 
one’s formative years (Fogel, 1994; Savedoff & Schultz, 2000) may be a poor 
reflection of work capacity (e.g. computer programming ability) even though 
its associated measurement error is likely to be random in a population 
(Currie & Madrian, 1999; Strauss & Thomas, 1998). Also, subsequent 
mortality has been criticized as inadequate in capturing true health status 
even with most available longitudinal data (Bazzoli, 1985). Therefore, 
objective health measures suffer from errors-in-variables bias just as 
subjective ones. It should be noted that objectivity/subjectivity may be 
understood in relative terms as even self-reported health conditions referring 
to some specific condition or activity (e.g. walking, bathing, and seeing) may 
be considered objective relative to a self-reported assessment of overall 
health status even as the former may not be based on physician diagnosis. 
Given the foregoing, Bound (1991) suggests that subjective health measures 
might be associated with less bias than objective ones since they would 
likely be affected by two opposite sources of bias (rationalization endogeneity 
and error-in-variables) which might cancel out, while objective health 
measures are only likely to be biased downwards (due to the attenuation 
bias associated with errors-in-variables bias). As noted by Currie and 
Madrian (1999), this is consistent with the observation of smaller health 
effects in labour market studies that use objective health measures relative 
to those that employ subjective ones. Even more important at least for the 




different age groups, geographical entities (including South Africa) and 
patient groups have affirmed that global SAH measures predict subsequent 
mortality fairly well (Ardington & Gasealahwe, 2014; DeSalvo, Bloser, 
Reynolds, He, & Muntner, 2006; Frankenberg & Jones, 2004; Larsson, 
Hemmingsson, Allebeck, & Lundberg, 2002; Nybo et al., 2003; Wong, Wong, 
& Caplan, 2007). Such a strong relationship between SAH and mortality 
apparently results from the largely logical context informing SAH responses 
as well as its relatively comprehensive nature. Indeed, SAH has been 
demonstrated to emanate from respondents’ rational thought processes, 
while encompassing various dimensions of their health (including cultural 
and biological), as well as bodily sensations which may not be easily 
detected via clinical tests (Jylhä, 2009). 
But in proxying true health status with subjective health measures in 
labour supply models, some researchers have advocated instrumenting the 
subjective health measure with relatively objective health indicators as a 
means of overcoming the potential inconsistency of their estimates. Such 
objective instruments include subsequent mortality (Anderson & 
Burkhauser, 1984; 1985; Parsons, 1982) and specific health conditions and 
symptoms like general weakness, blindness and breathing problems 
(Campolieti, 2002; Dwyer & Mitchell, 1999; Stern, 1989; Haveman, Wolfe, & 
Huang, 1989). However, Bound (1991) maintained that this may not be 
enough to ensure consistency. If the correlation between SAH and the error 
term in the LFP equation (i.e. rationalization endogeneity) is (at least partly) 
due to the correlation between SAH measurement error and, say, financial 
variables in the LFP equation, then even instrumenting SAH with objective 
health conditions a la Stern (1989) will yield inconsistent estimates of the 
effects of both SAH and the financial variables on LFP. This is the case 
when, say, the unemployed over-report illness as the cause of their 
unemployment status in expectation of unemployment-related financial 
rewards predicated on illness. But as noted by Au et al. (2005), if the 
correlation between SAH and the error term in the labour supply equation is 




unobserved determinants of labour supply (e.g. taste for leisure), then 
instrumenting SAH with objective health measures yields a consistent 
estimate of the impact of health on labour supply, even though the 
coefficients of financial variables will still remain inconsistent. 
The foregoing discussion shows that no health proxy strictly dominates the 
other a priori in capturing the true effect of health on labour supply. That 
said, it is likely that composite health measures like SAH might be more 
effective in uncovering the health-labour supply relationship compared to 
individual illnesses/symptoms. Given the foregoing, this chapter used SAH 
to proxy true health status. 
 
 
4.4 HEALTH STATUS AND LABOUR SUPPLY: AN EMPIRICAL 
REVIEW 
 
Many studies have investigated the relationship between health and labour 
supply. The main labour supply outcomes often researched in the literature 
include LFP (extensive margin), employment probability and number of 
hours worked. These outcomes are surely not only determined by supply 
factors; demand factors such as whether job opportunities exist in the first 
place as well as the general economic condition play an important role in 
their determination and can be particularly important in a country like 
South Africa characterized by high unemployment rates. In this review, I 
focus on the labour supply characteristics of these outcomes in line with the 
way they are conceptualized in the reviewed literature. 
Stern (1989) examined the simultaneous impact of health (SAH and health 
limitations) on LFP and vice versa in the US using the 1978 Survey of 
Disability and Work and the 1979 cohort of the Health Interview Survey. The 
health and labour participation equations were identified by excluding 
marital status and its interaction with sex from the former, and various 




latter. Results showed that self-reported disability status significantly 
explained LFP while there was evidence of weak endogeneity of disability on 
LFP. Also, there was no evidence of systematic over-reporting of disability by 
non-labour force participants. 
However, a drawback of the study is the difficulty in justifying the exclusion 
of marital status from the health equation as well as the inadequate test of 
exogeneity of SAH. While showing that better SAH increased the probability 
of LFP for all sex-age groups, similar studies conducted in Australia by Cai 
and Kalb (2006) and Cai (2010) rejected the hypothesis of SAH exogeneity. 
To achieve identification, Cai and Kalb excluded birth place, presence of 
young children and interactions between the latter and marital status from 
the SAH equation, while occupation, work status, smoking and drinking 
status, long term illness, lack of physical activity, and physical functioning 
were excluded from the LFP equation. For Cai (2010), only the presence of 
young children and its interaction with marital status were excluded from 
the SAH equation, with only the presence of a long term illness and physical 
functioning excluded from the LFP equation, perhaps realizing the difficulty 
in justifying the exclusion of smoking and drinking habits from labour 
supply equations as noted in Heckman et al. (2006). Also, Wilkinson (1995) 
and Haan and Myck (2009) suggested the existence of a significant 
relationship between having young children and parental health, thus 
rendering the use of the former as a means of identification suspect.  
Other studies that have used health conditions and/or some measure of 
physical functioning as health instruments include Dwyer and Mitchell 
(1999) and Campolieti (2002). The case for using them as instruments for 
SAH stems from human capital theory where health is seen as a form of 
human capital. Thus, it is taken that adverse health conditions/limitations 
in physical functioning affect participation in the labour market only 
through their effects on the underlying health capital (here proxied by SAH). 
In estimating the effect of health on the work effort of single mothers in the 




respect to ADL, whether she reported poor/fair health compared to other 
health assessments, and whether she had a disabled child, significantly 
reduced her probability of being employed. However, the exogenous 
treatment of these health variables (without formally testing the suitability 
of such an assumption) makes the interpretation of these coefficients as 
causal effects suspect. 
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Kreider’s (1999) 
simultaneous model of work participation, disability and income flows 
opposed the use of self-reported health status as a reliable measure of true 
health in labour supply models. The health variable was a three-category 
ordinal variable representing various levels of health-induced work 
limitation. Work limitation of only workers was used to predict that of non-
workers given the author’s belief that the former had no incentive to over-
report disability-related work limitation. The results suggested that male 
(female) non-workers over-reported work limitation by 2.8 (6.2) standard 
deviations, while over- reporting was most prevalent among non-working 
high school drop-outs, non-whites and former blue collar workers. Similarly, 
Kreider and Pepper (2003) found that models estimated under the 
assumption of accurate disability reports of both workers and non-workers 
led to biased inferences, with non-workers having a tendency to over-report 
disabilities. But a concern regarding Kreider’s (1999) methodology is that 
even if non-labour force participants are more likely than participants to use 
health as an excuse for non-participation, it is not clear that labour force 
participants’/workers’ work limitation responses are accurate. Currie and 
Madrian (1999) have observed that the latter might under-report their 
health limitations. Also, O’Donnell (1998) has noted that Kreider’s estimates 
lack efficiency since information on work limitation was only obtained from 
workers. 
In contrast to Kreider (1999), Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) found, using the 
same data (i.e. HRS) that disability applicants did not over-state their 
disability status on average. Even though Au et al. (2005) found some 




employment in Canada using the Canadian National Population Health 
Survey, employment effects of disability were similar to what obtained when 
more objective health measures were used. Also, using the National 
Population Health Survey in Canada, Campolieti (2002) found a large 
negative effect of disability on the LFP of older Canadian males but 
suggested that using self-reported health measures will under-estimate the 
impact of disability on labour force decisions. 
Though O’Donnell (1998) concurred with Kreider’s finding that non-workers’ 
disability responses were unreliable, he suggested that such a conclusion 
should only be made after conducting formal tests. In his work on the effect 
of disability on employment using the British Office of Population Censuses 
and Surveys which comprised only disabled respondents, O’Donnell made 
the case for recognition that disability potentially leads to work incapacity. 
In other words, models of disability and employment should incorporate the 
fact that employment is determined by both a capacity and desire for work, 
and not only the latter. He contended that the employment status of some 
disabled individuals was not the outcome of a comparison of utility in two 
states: employment and non-employment, but rather that only one state was 
possible (i.e. non-employment due to work incapacity). This is supported by 
Nagi (1969) who observed that 55% of US disability insurance applicants 
were not fit for any kind of work, as well as Bound (1989) who concluded 
that many disability insurance applicants would not be working even in the 
absence of the disability insurance programme because of the extent of their 
disability. 
Using the 1997 and 2003 waves of the UK Labour Force Survey data, Jones 
et al. (2006) explored the relative effects of physical and mental disability on 
employment. They found that disabled respondents (work-limited and non-
work-limited) with physical disabilities were more likely to be employed than 
their counterparts with mental disabilities. However, their inability to 
account for the likely endogeneity of health in employment models due to 




Gomez and Nicolas (2006) employed difference in difference and matching 
techniques in studying the simultaneous causal relationship between health 
(i.e. SAH) shocks and employment in the Spanish labour market using the 
European Community Household Panel. To avoid possible rationalization 
endogeneity, only individuals who reported health deterioration in the 
second and third years of a three-year cycle but remained employed in the 
first and second years were counted as truly having experienced a health 
shock. Likewise, only those who were employed in the first year, 
unemployed in the last two years but reported being in good health in the 
first two years were regarded as genuinely having an adverse employment 
shock. They found that individuals who suffered a health shock were around 
5% less likely to remain in employment and 3.5% more likely to remain 
inactive than those who did not suffer any health shock. 
Haan and Myck (2009) examined the dynamic (sequential) simultaneous 
relationship between health (SAH) shocks and non-employment risk of adult 
males aged 30-59 years using the 1996-2007 waves of the German Socio-
economic Panel. Similar to Bartel and Taubman (1986) and Haveman et al. 
(1994), lagged health status (non-employment) was used to predict current 
non-employment risk (health status) in order to avoid endogeneity. Results 
showed that lagged SAH (non-employment risk) exerted a significant impact 
on current non-employment (SAH) whether or not unobserved heterogeneity 
was controlled for. 
Some studies have also tracked the relationship between health status and 
future labour market outcomes. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), Smith (2009) found that having self-reported one’s health to be 
excellent or very good up to age 16 had a positive and statistically significant 
effect on future hours of work relative to worse health outcomes. Also in a 
study that explored own/sibling’s labour market implications of health 
outcomes using the relatively income poor sub-sample of the PSID, Choi 
(2007) found that an unhealthy young adult was less likely to work as an 




likely to work as adults relative to other females, suggesting long term 
effects of illness and perhaps intra-family income transfer requirements. 
To the author’s best knowledge, there is not much evidence on the 
relationship between health and labour supply in developing countries. In 
Taiwan, Mete and Schultz (2002) found a negative association between poor 
health and LFP among the elderly. Bridges and Lawson (2008) also found 
that poor health was associated with a decline in the probability of being in 
the formal labour market in Uganda, where this relationship was stronger 
among women. Moreover, investigating the relationship between health 
status and LFP in Sub-Saharan Africa using a dynamic panel data model 
with 46 countries, Novignon, Novignon and Arthur (2015) found a positive 
and significant relationship between population health and LFP in the 
general and female populations. 
Relatively few studies have investigated the health-labour supply 
relationship in South Africa. They include Arndt and Lewis (2001), Booysen 
et al. (2002), Young (2005) and Levinsohn et al. (2013). While Arndt and 
Lewis found no significant impact of HIV/AIDS on employment in South 
Africa, Young found a significant long run relationship. Booysen et al. also 
found some relationship between the disease and labour supply in the Free 
State Province. Apart from not utilizing nationally representative survey 
data, these studies largely ignored the causal dimension of labour supply 
determination in South Africa. These concerns were addressed by Levinsohn 
et al. who found, using propensity scores, that being HIV-positive was 
associated with a 6-7 percentage point increase in unemployment 
probability. A common feature of these studies is that none evaluated the 
impact of a composite/global health indicator like SAH or limitations with 
activities of daily living on these labour market outcomes as each focused on 
a single health measure, mainly HIV/AIDS. Consequently, this study used 
IV techniques to ascertain the impact of a global health measure (i.e. SAH) 





4.5 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
4.5.1 Modelling strategies and theoretical model specification 
 
Firstly, I estimated “traditional” LFP equations (i.e. without including health 
as a regressor). Subsequently, the bivariate probit model and instrumental 
variable linear probability model (IV-LPM) were estimated (given the 
apparent endogeneity of SAH as well as the binary nature of both observed 
LFP and SAH). Thereafter, the statistical properties of the models were 
ascertained. Though a case was made for the suitability of the instruments 
including the fact that similar instruments have been used in previous 
empirical work, I am not unaware of the difficulty in obtaining convincing 
instruments in social science research. Therefore, a number of models were 
estimated to ascertain the existence of a relationship, however non-causal, 
between health and LFP in both contemporaneous and temporal settings. 
Finally, given the apparent gender bias in labour market outcomes in South 
Africa as shown in Chapter 2, the analysis was also disaggregated by 
gender. 
Though the bivariate probit model is an important model with which to 
recover the effect of a dichotomous variable on a dichotomous outcome as in 
this study, its dependence on normality of the joint distribution of the error 
terms necessitates incorporating IV-LPM into the analysis as the latter is not 
reliant on the joint normality assumption for consistency. However, two 
well-known shortcomings of the LPM are heteroscedasticity and probability 
predictions outside the unit interval. In this application, the former is not a 
major problem given that all estimates were corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
Also, most of the predicted probabilities in the model lie within the unit 
interval; indeed, there was no negative predicted probability while only 2.4% 
of predictions exceeded 1. Among those that exceeded 1, the average value 
was only 1.02 while the largest value was 1.07, thus suggesting that these 
predictions are not likely to exert significant influence on the estimates. IV-
LPM has also been shown to be quite robust and simple in implementation 




In the first stage, I assume that latent health status (ℎ𝑖
∗) is a linear function 
of a vector of exogenous variables, 𝑋 (e.g. socio-economic status) and 
excluded instruments (𝑧𝑖) necessary to identify the impact of health on LFP, 
and a random error term ( 𝑖,𝐻). In the second stage, unobserved latent LFP 
(𝑙𝑖
∗) is specified as a function of a vector of exogenous variables (𝑋), latent 
health status (ℎ𝑖
∗) and a random error term, 𝑖,𝐿. Though 𝑧𝑖 is an instrument 
vector, it is represented as a scalar in equation (4.1) below for notational 
simplicity. Importantly, there are possibly some unobserved joint 
determinants of both latent LFP and health status such as genetic 
heterogeneity. These relationships can be modelled in both a bivariate probit 
framework, assuming joint normality of the error terms, 𝑖,𝐻 and 𝑖,𝐿 (see 
Section 4.6.3 of Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Section 15.7.3 of Wooldridge 
(2002)) or in the two stage least squares framework using the IV-LPM 
framework. The relationships are specified as follows: 
ℎ𝑖
∗ = 𝑋/𝛽∗ + 𝛾∗𝑧𝑖 + 𝑖,𝐻                                                                              [4.1] 
𝑙𝑖
∗ = 𝑋/𝛼∗ + 𝛿∗ℎ𝑖
∗ + 𝑖,𝐿                                                                              [4.2] 
Model assumptions in the bivariate probit framework are as follows: 𝐸( 𝑖𝐿) =
𝐸( 𝑖,𝐻) = 0; 𝑣𝑎𝑟( 𝑖,𝐿) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟( 𝑖,𝐻) = 1; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟( 𝑖,𝐿 , 𝑖,𝐻) = 𝜌. Also, identification is 
achieved by assuming normality of the error terms (i.e. 𝑖,𝐿 and 𝑖,𝐻 are 
assumed to be distributed bivariate normal). A key condition for 
identification in this instrumental variables framework is that the 
instruments in equation (4.1) are uncorrelated with both 𝑖,𝐻 and 𝑖,𝐿 (Angrist 
& Pischke, 2009). 
Given that there are only discrete measures of both LFP and health (i.e. 
SAH), the above model was implemented via a non-linear transformation of 
the linear index model in equations (4.1) - (4.2) as follows: 
ℎ𝑖 = 1[𝑋
/𝛽∗ + 𝛾∗𝑧𝑖 + 𝑖,𝐻 > 0]                                                                       [4.3] 
𝑙𝑖 = 1[𝑋
/𝛼∗ + 𝛿∗ℎ𝑖




From equation (4.4), an individual is deemed to participate in the labour 
force if her underlying latent LFP index exceeds zero. An analogous 
interpretation holds for health status as shown in equation (4.3). Model 
(4.1)-(4.4) is similar to those used in modelling the impact of fertility on 
labour supply in the US (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) and the relationship 
between health status and poverty in South Africa (Godlonton & Keswell, 
2005), where similar identification issues arise. 
For the bivariate probit specification, the above model was estimated via full 
information maximum likelihood, a technique that yields efficient estimates. 
A formal test of exogeneity entails testing whether the correlation coefficient, 
𝜌 is statistically different from zero. If 𝜌 is statistically significant, it is 
evidence of the endogeneity of SAH. Statistical insignificance of 𝜌 on the 
other hand, would suggest that estimating separate LFP and SAH equations 
may not produce inconsistent estimates. 
4.5.2 Data and empirical model specification 
 
Most of the analysis in this chapter was based on the third (i.e. most recent) 
wave of the NIDS dataset. The sample was restricted to respondents aged 
between 20 and 60 years in wave 3 so as to exclude students and retirees 
from the analysis. Furthermore, Asians were excluded given their small 
sample size. Labour force participation was modelled on the extensive 
margin; therefore, the outcome is LFP, a dummy variable which equals one 
if the respondent is a labour force participant (broad definition, i.e. the 
respondent was willing to work in the past month) and zero otherwise. It is 
expected that a healthy individual will be more willing and able to work 
relative to one in poor health, ceteris paribus. Estimates from strict LFP 
models were used as robustness check on the estimates. 
The main covariate of interest is SAH, a dummy variable derived from a five-
level question regarding how an individual rates her health over the past 
month. Possible responses are: excellent, very good, good, fair and poor. In 
this analysis, healthy respondents (i.e. SAH=1) are those who self-reported 




(SAH=0) are those who declared fair or poor health. Though being “healthy” 
or “sick” is a complex phenomenon not fully captured by one’s SAH 
response, these terms are adopted nonetheless for want of better 
terminology. As shown in Figure 4.2 below, LFP was not very different 
between the excellent, very good and good categories. 
For the bivariate probit model, the empirical specification of model (4.1) - 
(4.4) is as follows: 
             Pr(ℎ𝑖 = 1|𝑋, 𝑍) =Φ(𝑋
/𝛽 + 𝛾𝑧𝑖)                                                                [4.5]   
Pr(𝑙𝑖 = 1|𝑋) =Φ(𝑋
/𝛼 + 𝛿ℎ𝑖)                                                        [4.6] 
where ℎ𝑖 is SAH and 𝑙𝑖, observed LFP. For the general specification, X 
consists of household grant receipt, years of schooling, age dummies, 
location, race, provincial unemployment rate, marital status, gender, 
number of under-17 children in the household and household size. For the 
gender-specific models, X is identical to the above except for the exclusion of 
gender from both male and female equations and the inclusion of the 
presence of at least one employed male in the household in the female 
specification. 
Z is a vector of SAH instruments. These are dummy variables indicating 
whether the respondent has experienced joint pain/arthritis and/or memory 
loss in the past 30 days. The approach used here hinges on the recognition 
that SAH is a summary/representative measure of overall health status, an 
assertion amply demonstrated in the literature (Benítez-Silva et al., 2004; 
Ferraro, 1980; LaRue, Bank, Jarvik, & Hetland, 1979; Nagi, 1969). This is 
also supported by the earlier point that SAH strongly predicts subsequent 
mortality. I assume that an individual who experiences say, joint pains 
would only change her labour market status due to illness only when such a 
condition so adversely affects her health that she rates it below “good”. This 
informs the treatment of such health conditions as SAH instruments given 
that much as they directly affect health status (proxied by SAH), I see no 




as a covariate. Thus, I assume that they affect LFP only indirectly through 
their influence on overall health status (captured by SAH). This is similar to 
Bound’s (1991) argument that merely proxying health status with relatively 
objective health measures in a labour supply equation does not solve the 
problem of endogeneity as objective health measures do not perfectly reflect 
work capacity. But I am not unmindful of the fact that regarding SAH 
responses as representing the totality of true health status may come across 
as a strong assumption. Unfortunately, this is as much as I can do in the 
present circumstance. 
A potential argument against the suitability of these instruments is that 
unobserved individual characteristics associated with low LFP probability 
(e.g. low innate ability and drive) may also lead to a higher probability of 
having such health conditions (i.e. the instruments). To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no convincing evidence in the literature in this regard. 
Moreover, I regressed each of the instruments on parental education and 
parental mortality before the respondent reached five years (since these 
variables may affect a respondent’s future labour market outcomes) as well 
as relevant covariates like own education, location and other socio-economic 
variables. Parental education and parental mortality were not statistically 
significant even at the 10% level for both males and females (results 
available on request). 
Moreover, though I argued earlier that individuals are assumed to be 
rational when making self-assessments of their health status and that SAH 
may be considered to represent the totality of one’s health, it may also be 
argued that the instruments may directly influence participation in specific 
sectors, e.g. joint pain/arthritis influencing manual jobs. Unfortunately, this 
could not be reliably tested due to data constraints but should be borne in 
mind when interpreting the results. 
Furthermore, these instruments are considered largely exogenous to one’s 
labour market status, i.e. they are not likely to be the result of 




(Au et al., 2005; Bound, 1991; Bound et al., 1995; Cai, 2010; Cai & Kalb, 
2006; Stern, 1989). This is important as their validity will be questionable if 
they are determined by one’s labour market status. For instance, if being 
employed under hazardous working conditions significantly determines any 
of the instruments, or if unemployed respondents who do not actually suffer 
from any of the conditions implied by the instruments declare that they 
suffer from them due to the shame/stigma associated with being 
unemployed or a non-labour force participant, the instruments may no 
longer be valid. To empirically test this, I regressed each instrument on the 
employment status dummy and a host of covariates like education, age, race 
and gender. The employment dummy was not statistically significant even at 
the 10% level in each of the regressions (results also available on request). 
This empirically strengthens the case for the exogeneity of the instruments. 
Finally, it is hoped that the array of socio-economic controls included in the 
health and LFP equations above helped purge the error term of most of the 
plausible reasons why it may be conditionally correlated with the 
instruments. 
Earlier, I noted Bound’s (1991) concern that merely instrumenting SAH with 
more objective health conditions may not be enough to  identify the impact 
of health on labour supply if the measurement error associated with SAH is 
systematically correlated with, say, financial gains due to non-participation. 
In this case, the coefficient of SAH in the IV framework above over-estimates 
the effect of health on LFP. This is however not likely a significant issue in 
this study, as disability grant in South Africa is not predicated on non-
labour force participation. But as earlier noted, the estimates are consistent 
if rationalization endogeneity is due to, say, tastes for leisure (see e.g. Au et 
al., 2005). I return to this point in the results section. 
Descriptive statistics 






Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev.a 
labour force participation 11250 0.73 0.4 
self-assessed health 9822 0.90 0.3 
matric 11271 0.37 0.5 
age20 - 25  11294 0.22 0.4 
age26 - 30  11294 0.15 0.4 
age31 - 35  11294 0.14 0.3 
age36 - 40  11294 0.13 0.3 
age41 - 45  11294 0.11 0.3 
age46 - 50  11294 0.10 0.3 
age51 - 60  11294 0.15 0.4 
traditional authority 11264 0.29 0.5 
rural formal 11264 0.06 0.2 
urban formal 11264 0.53 0.5 
urban informal 11264 0.12 0.3 
African 11294 0.83 0.4 
coloured 11294 0.09 0.3 
white 11294 0.08 0.3 
married/cohabiting 9824 0.40 0.5 
number of under-17 children in household 11294 1.43 1.7 
male 11264 0.48 0.5 
grant 11264 0.54 0.5 
household has employed male 11285 0.50 0.5 
provincial unemployment rate 11294 25.47 3.5 
household size 11264 4.80 3.2 
joint pain  9823 0.08 0.3 
memory loss  9819 0.05 0.2 
Source: NIDS wave 3; author’s calculations; sample corrected for complex survey design and non-
random attrition; a standard deviation 
 
With regard to a priori expectations, education is expected to increase the 
probability of LFP. Also, it is likely to improve health through greater 
awareness of health-related knowledge (Cai & Kalb, 2006). Age is also likely 
to be positively correlated with LFP as older respondents tend to have more 
networks which is an important determinant of continued participation in 
the labour market. However, it has been found to be negatively associated 
with health status (see e.g. Cai & Kalb, 2006; Kenkel, 1995). Apart from the 
point made in Chapter 2 of a potential relationship between ones’ location 
and race on the one hand and one’s LFP status on the other, location and 
race also capture place and racial heterogeneity in health status. Compared 




historical realities in the country. Also given that they are more likely to 
reside in urban formal centres with better medical facilities, whites are also 
expected to enjoy better health status. Evidence of a significant relationship 
between marital status and LFP exists in the literature, where the 
relationship is especially negative for females (Jaumotte, 2003). On the other 
hand, health is mainly seen to be positively associated with marital status 
(Beckett & Elliott, 2002). Grant receipt is likely to be negatively associated 
with LFP as non-labour income may result in higher reservation wage or 
early retirement (Mastrobuoni, 2009); conversely, non-labour income of the 
elderly has been associated with increased job search of prime age adults 
due to the extra income it brings to the household (Ardington, Case, & 
Hosegood, 2009). Provincial unemployment rate is expected to be negatively 
associated with LFP (Dinkelman & Pirouz, 2002; Evans & McCormick, 
1994). This variable is used as a proxy for local labour market conditions, 
an attempt to capture some demand-side determinants of labour supply. 
Having an employed male (usually a primary breadwinner especially in an 
African context) may put less economic pressure on the woman, thereby 
resulting in reduced female LFP especially if the hypothesis that women are 
the main producers of domestic services like childbearing and child care 
holds (Joll, McKenna, McNabb, & Shorey, 1983); but it may also lead to a 
rise in female LFP due to increased labour market-related 
information/networks (Dinkelman & Pirouz, 2002). 
Table 4.1 shows that 73% of the sample were labour force participants while 
90% reported being in the excellent, very good or good health category. 
Married/cohabiting respondents made up 40% of the sample, while 48% 
were male. With regard to the SAH instruments, 8% and 5% suffered from 
joint pain/arthritis and memory loss respectively. 
There appears to be a negative relationship between age and health status 
as older respondents were more likely to be in worse SAH categories and 
less likely to be in healthy categories relative to their younger counterparts 
as shown in Table 4.2 below. Furthermore as shown in Table 4.3, fair and 




proportions in the best two health categories. Therefore, there is tentative 
evidence of a negative relationship between age and being female on the one 
hand, and health on the other. 
Table 4.2: SAH across the age distribution (row percentages sum to 100) 
Age categories Excellent V.good Good Fair Poor Row total (N) 
 (%)  
20-25 43.9 31.1 21.9 2.5 0.6 2374 
26-30 39.9 33.4 22.2 4.0 0.6 1481 
31-35 40.1 27.5 23.7 5.6 3.1 1138 
36-40 35.5 30.5 25.8 5.5 2.7 1070 
41-45 29.0 30.1 28.4 9.0 3.5 978 
46-50 23.9 31.9 28.6 12.0 3.5 1063 
51-60 19.4 25.3 32.5 16.1 6.7 1718 
Total 34.0 29.9 25.8 7.4 2.8 9822 
Source: NIDS wave 3; author’s calculations; sample corrected for complex survey design and non-
random attrition 
 
Table 4.3: SAH across gender groups (row percentages sum to 100) 
 SAH categories (%)  
 Excellent Very good Good Fair Poor Row total (N) 
Female 30.9 29.5 27.2 8.9 3.6 5858 
 Male 37. 8 30.5 24.2 5.8 1.8 3964 
Total 34.0 29.9 25.8 7.4 2.8 9822 
Source: NIDS wave 3; author’s calculations; sample corrected for complex survey design and non-
random attrition 
 
Figure 4.2 below reveals a positive relationship between better health status 
and LFP for both males and females. Apparently, there was not much 
heterogeneity in the LFP rates of the various groups classified as healthy. 
Furthermore, males had higher participation rates across all SAH categories 
(except poor) than females. Between-gender (i.e. male-female) percentage 
point differences ranged from -6 for the poor health category to 19 for the 
fair category.  Figure 4.2 also perhaps highlights structural features of the 
South African labour market unrelated to health, as broad LFP rate among 




Figure 4.2: Health-LFP relationship by gender 
 
 
With regard to health and human capital accumulation, Figure 4.3 shows 
relatively higher densities of poor health outcomes compared to better 
outcomes at lower educational levels while the converse obtained at higher 
educational levels. This lends credence to the hypothesis that healthier 




Figure 4.3: Distribution of SAH by years of schooling 
 
 
In line with the use of a two-category health variable in the regressions, 
Table 4.4 reveals that the proportion of non-labour force participants who 
self-reported being sick (i.e. fair or poor health) was twice that of labour 
force participants for both strict and broad LFP. This is a tentative 
indication of a positive relationship between better SAH and LFP. 
Table 4.4: Health-LFP status in wave 3 (row percentages sum to 100) 
 Health Status (%) Row total (N) 
LFP Status Sick Healthy  
    
Strict Non-LFP 15.8 84.2 3848 
Strict LFP 7.8 92.2 6318 
Broad Non-LFP 16.0 84.0 3217 
Broad LFP 8.0 92.0 6585 





Finally, I consider a descriptive relationship between SAH and its 
instruments in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Distribution of instruments across SAH categories 
 SAH categories (%) Row size 
(N)  Has condition? Sick Healthy  
joint pain/arthritis No 7.7 92.3 8949 
 Yes 40.2 59.8 870 
Memory loss No 9.0 91.0 9295 
 Yes 35.0 65.0 520 
Source: NIDS wave 3; author’s calculations; sample corrected for complex survey design and non-
random attrition 
 
Table 4.5 provides preliminary evidence of non-trivial correlation between 
SAH and the instruments. For instance among those with no joint 
pain/arthritis, only 8% reported being in fair or poor health while it was 
40% of those with the condition. A similar finding was obtained for memory 
loss. 
The foregoing descriptive analysis shows substantial scope for the 
incorporation of health into LFP determination. It has been shown that non-
labour force participants were twice as likely as participants to report worse 
SAH (Table 4.4). Also, other relationships such as that between education 
and LFP might have a health undertone as health is an important 
determinant of the amount of education acquired by an individual. 
Ascertaining the health-LFP relationship is the focus of the following 
analysis. 
4.5.3 Results and discussion 
 
As a preliminary analysis, Table A4.1 in the appendix depicts a traditional 
LFP model and the results generally conformed to a priori expectations. For 
instance, education, age, being male and location (relative to living in 
traditional authority areas) were associated with increased LFP probability. 
Marriage/cohabitation, which was associated with higher male participation 




associated with reduced LFP as expected while the presence of at least one 
employed male in the household was associated with increased female 
participation, apparently suggesting positive network externalities. A 
surprising result is the statistical insignificance of race. This did not change 
even with the exclusion of location which is a possible confounder given the 
strong link between race and location discussed in Chapter 2. As shown 
shortly, these results are very similar to what was obtained after controlling 
for health. Therefore, the discussion only focuses on the latter. 
For the main analysis, attention is focused on the bivariate probit and IV-
LPM models in Table 4.6. In line with Angrist and Pischke (2009), a useful 
way to think about policy-relevant measures in the bivariate probit 
framework is to consider marginal effects rather than difficult-to-interpret 


















Table 4.6: Marginal effects of SAH and controls on LFP probability (bivariate 
probit and IV-LPM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bivariate probit IV-LPM 
Variables Total Female Male Total Female Male 
       
sah 0.22*** 0.20* 0.25* 0.22** 0.17 0.19 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) 
grant -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
matric 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.05* 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
age26-30 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age31-35 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age36-40 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age41-45 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
age46-50 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.05 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
age51-60 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
rural formal 0.07*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.04 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
urban formal 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
urban informal 0.06** 0.09*** 0.02 0.08** 0.11*** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
African 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
coloured 0.00 0.06 -0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
prov. unemp† 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
married†† 0.02 -0.04* 0.09*** 0.02 -0.04* 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
male 0.10***   0.10***   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   
num. children‡ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
household size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
employed male‡‡  0.04**   0.05**  
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
constant    0.26** 0.31** 0.40** 
    (0.12) (0.15) (0.17) 
       
R2    0.12 0.12 0.11 
F-stat 42.14 26.65 13.36 47.8 27.3 17.3 
rho -0.23 -0.20 -0.28    
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.30)    
N 9775 5825 3950 9775 5825 3950 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 
design and non-random attrition; †provincial unemployment rate; ††married/cohabiting; ‡number of 





Given these results from the bivariate probit model, Angrist and Pischke 
maintained that one can recover estimates of average treatment effect (ATE), 
average effect of treatment on the treated (TOT) and local average treatment 
effect (LATE) of the impact of health (viewed as a kind of endogenous 
treatment in this context) on LFP. On the other hand, the IV-LPM only yields 
the LATE estimator. Similar measures have been recovered from both the 
bivariate probit and IV-LPM models in a study of the effect of fertility on 
female employment where similar identification issues arise as in this study 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Therefore, following Angrist and Pischke, ATE, i.e.  
𝐸[𝑙1,𝑖 − 𝑙0,𝑖] = 𝐸{1[𝑋
/𝛼∗ + 𝛿∗ > 𝑖,𝐿] − 1[𝑋
/𝛼∗ > 𝑖,𝐿]}  
can be specified as: 
𝐸{1[𝑋/𝛼∗ + 𝛿∗ > 𝑖,𝐿] −  1[𝑋
/𝛼∗ > 𝑖,𝐿]} = 𝐸 {Φ [
𝑋/𝛼∗ + 𝛿∗
𝜎𝜀𝑖,𝐿
] − Φ [
𝑋/𝛼∗
𝜎𝜀𝑖,𝑖




while TOT, i.e. 𝐸[𝑙1,𝑖 − 𝑙0,𝑖|ℎ𝑖 = 1] takes the following form: 
𝐸{1[𝑋/𝛼∗ + 𝛿∗ > 𝑖,𝐿] −  1[𝑋
/𝛼∗ > 𝑖,𝐿]|𝑋
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/𝛽∗ + 𝛾∗, 𝑋/𝛼∗ + 𝛿∗; 𝜌𝜀𝑖,𝐿𝜀𝑖,𝐻
) + Φ𝑏 (−(𝑋
/𝛽∗ + 𝛾∗), 𝑋/𝛼∗; −𝜌𝜀𝑖,𝐿𝜀𝑖,𝐻
)] − [Φ𝑏 (𝑋
/𝛽∗, 𝑋/𝛼∗ + 𝛿∗; 𝜌𝜀𝑖,𝐿𝜀𝑖,𝐻
) + Φ𝑏 (−𝑋
/𝛽∗, 𝑋/𝛼∗; −𝜌𝜀𝑖,𝐿𝜀𝑖,𝐻
)]
Φ(𝑋/𝛽∗ + 𝛾∗) − Φ(𝑋/𝛽∗)








where 𝑙0, 𝑙1, Φ,Φ𝑏 , 𝜎 and 𝜌 are the LFP outcome of the non-treated, the LFP 
outcome of the treated, normal cumulative distribution function (CDF), 
bivariate normal CDF, error variance and error correlation coefficient 
respectively. The simultaneous estimation of the first and second stage 
equations is implicit in the above system. 
Especially important for the LATE estimator in the above bivariate probit 
framework, I assume a homogenous effects model. This assumption also 
informs subsequent statistical tests with regard to the IV model. Though an 
apparently strong assumption, it is not as restrictive as it seems. This is 
because, though the LATE parameter capturing the impact of health on LFP 
(i.e. 𝛿) appears as a constant effect in the above specification, it can be 
conceptualized as a heterogeneous effects coefficient obtained by estimating 
the LATE estimator for each 𝑋𝑖 by IV and averaging using the histogram of 
covariates. This capability also makes the LATE estimator robust to 
violations of the normality assumption (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). For IV-
LPM, the LATE estimator is obtained as the usual marginal effect in a two 
stage least squares framework. 
Table 4.7 depicts ATE, LATE and TOT estimates of the impact of health on 
LFP obtained from the above bivariate probit model and IV-LPM. Standard 





Table 4.7: Effect of health on LFP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Bivariate probit IV-LPM marginal effects 
 ATE TOT LATE LATE 
 Total Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male 
sah 0.23*** 0.20** 0.29* 0.26*** 0.23** 0.33* 0.24*** 0.20** 0.29* 0.22** 0.17 0.19 
 (008) (0.09) (0.17) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) 
N 9775 5825 3950 9775 5825 3950 9775 5825 3950 9775 5825 3950 




From Table 4.7, ATE was 0.23 for the general (i.e. total) specification using 
equation (4.7). For the female and male specifications, ATE was 0.20 and 
0.29 respectively. Using equation (4.8), TOT estimates were 0.26, 0.23 and 
0.33 for the general, female and male specifications respectively. As 
indicated above, the set of bivariate probit estimates that should be directly 
comparable with IV-LPM estimates are the LATE estimates (columns 7-9). 
Apart from the male coefficient, both models were quite numerically similar, 
with bivariate probit coefficients slightly higher than their IV-LPM 
counterparts (Abadie (2000b) and Angrist (2001) also found higher bivariate 
probit estimates relative to linear IV estimates). Even the male bivariate 
probit LATE estimate that seemed to differ much from its IV-LPM 
counterpart was only statistically significant at 10%. The generally higher 
LATE estimates may be an indication that the effect of SAH on LFP among 
compliers (i.e. the sub-population whose memory loss and joint pain status 
affected their SAH ratings) was higher than in the general population. Table 
4.7 suggests that depending on the estimator, being healthy resulted in 
increases in LFP probability of 20-23%, 29-33%, and 22-26% among the 
female, male and general populations respectively. These are similar to 
estimates of the impact of health (SAH) on employment (25% and 19%) 
obtained among older men and women (50-64 years) respectively in Canada 
(Au et al., 2005).  
First stage estimates and instrument relevance 
 
Full first stage results for the IV-LPM are presented in Table A4.2 in the 
appendix (covariates conformed to theoretical expectations and were mostly 
statistically significant at conventional levels) while the coefficients of only 
the instruments are presented in Table 4.8 so as to keep the discussion 
focused. The results clearly show that each of the instruments significantly 
predicted SAH even at the 1% level of significance. They also conformed to 
theoretical expectations, as suffering from any of the conditions was 
associated with increased probability of being in poor health relative to not 
suffering from it. The F statistics in a joint test of the instruments in all 




statistic of 10, implying that the instruments were not weak. Similar 
conclusion was reached for the gender-based models. 
Table 4.8: First stage LPM estimates: marginal effects 
 Dependent variable: 𝐏𝐫 (𝒔𝒂𝒉 = 𝟏|𝑿) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Total Female Male 
    
joint pain -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.23*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
memory loss -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.20*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
    
N 9795 5836 3956 
F (for joint pain & memory loss) 60.5 56.9 16.5 
Hansen J (p value) 0.11 0.51 0.50 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 




Given the assumption of a homogenous effects model, to formally ascertain 
instrument validity for the IV-LPM, Hansen’s J test of over-identifying 
restrictions failed to reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments even at 
10% as shown in Table 4.8. 
With regard to whether relatively objective health conditions directly 
explained LFP, I included different relatively objective health measures 
(relative to SAH) in a LFP equation that excluded SAH9. The relatively 
objective health conditions include: serious injury, body ache, persistent 
cough, rash, painful urination, back ache and tight chest among others 
(results available on request). None of these other objective health controls 
was statistically significant even at the 10% level. This is expected and is in 
line with Bound et al. (1999) who maintained that these measures also 
suffer from measurement error in that they do not perfectly reflect work 
capacity (thus, making them susceptible to attenuation bias inherent in 
                                       





poorly-measured variables when used as health proxies in a labour supply 
regression). 
A potential concern regards the generalizability of the above bivariate probit 
and IV-LPM results over the entire population as it may be argued that the 
nature of the instruments makes them likely to disproportionately affect old 
individuals. To ascertain whether the above results were driven by old 
respondents, I re-estimated the models on a sub-sample younger than 50 
years. Across all estimators (ATE, TOT and LATE), the results were very 
similar to the above estimates, mainly differing in the second decimal place. 
Also, the patterns of statistical significance were similar. The same is true of 
the IV-LPM results. These results are available on request. 
With regard to the controls in Table 4.6 above, the marginal effect of interest 




𝑋−𝑘 are covariates other than 𝑋𝑘). This is the marginal effect of each 
covariate on the probability of a respondent being a labour force participant 
conditional on other covariates. For each discrete covariate, the change in 
LFP probability is in response to a unit change in such a covariate. 
Table 4.6 (i.e. the health-augmented model) generally replicated the 
relationship between regression controls and LFP earlier found in the 
“traditional” specification (Table A4.1). A key qualitative difference was the 
significant negative association between marriage/cohabitation and LFP 
among women in the health-augmented model. Also, the highest age-LFP 
gradient now occurred later for men (mid-forties) while the female 
relationship appeared smoother with the highest gradient in the late thirties. 
This relationship mirrors findings in Ntuli and Wittenberg (2013) where only 
the oldest age cohort (in their case, aged 55-59 years) did not have 
significantly higher LFP relative to 20-24 year old African women. Average 
marginal effects of regression controls from both specifications (i.e. bivariate 
probit and IV-LPM) were almost identical and the estimates largely 
conformed to a priori expectations and were statistically significant at 




with 5-7% reduction in LFP probability across both models, a finding similar 
to Bertrand et al.’s (2003) result of 4% reduction of employment probability 
associated with household eligibility for the old age pension among Africans. 
Also, having at least a matric was associated with 5-15% increase in LFP 
probability. Furthermore, spatial distribution mattered for LFP (apparently 
reflecting persistent effects of apartheid-era living arrangements where most 
jobs were located away from informal areas mostly occupied by non-whites); 
LFP probability was generally higher in other locations relative to traditional 
authority areas mainly populated by Africans. Local labour market 
conditions (proxied by provincial unemployment rate, which is a proxy for 
demand-side determinants of LFP) generally had no association with LFP. 
Marriage/cohabitation was negatively (positively) associated with female 
(male) participation, thereby supporting the theory of marriage and labour 
market participation which suggests that single women are more likely to be 
economically active compared to their married counterparts while the 
converse holds for men (Becker, 1981). Negative marital status-LFP 
relationship for women has also been documented in South Africa (Ntuli & 
Wittenberg, 2013; Posel & Casale, 2003). Males had 10% higher LFP rates 
than females. For females, the positive sign on the presence of at least one 
employed male in the household negates the added worker effect (Jaumotte, 
2003), suggesting that male participation was associated with increased 
female participation. This likely captures network effects as suggested by 
Dinkelman and Pirouz (2002). The flip side is that families without male 
participants may become poorer, as not having at least one employed male 
in the household was associated with 4-5% decline in the probability of 
female participation. 
Results in Table 4.6 (for both SAH and controls) were robust to the outcome 
being strict LFP except that the female SAH coefficient was no longer 






The following sensitivity analyses were conducted to ascertain the 
robustness of the above estimates. 
Disability grant exclusion 
It was earlier noted that systematic over-reporting of illness by non-labour 
force participants due to the expectation of financial reward (e.g. disability-
based grants for non-participation) may render both estimates of SAH and 
such financial variables inconsistent even when objective health measures 
are used to instrument for SAH (see e.g. Au et al., 2005). Therefore, I 
stripped the household grant receipt variable of its disability grant 
component. Though the disability grant scheme in South Africa is not 
predicated on non-labour force participation per se, it is the component of 
the government’s grant basket that directly targets economic agents with 
some kind of incapacity and may be the most likely economic reason 
(however remote) why respondents may give spurious health assessments. 
The results (available on request) showed virtually identical results for both 
SAH and the other controls, while the grant variable had slightly lower 
coefficients across specifications (but remained negatively statistically 
significant). Thus, it is not likely that the results in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 
were over-estimates of the impact of health due to rationalizing non-
participation in the labour market in expectation of illness-related financial 
reward in the form of disability grants. 
Testing for exogeneity of SAH 
 
It was earlier noted that the dominant view in the literature is that self-
reported health is an endogenous determinant of LFP, necessitating the use 
of instrumental variables as done in the foregoing analysis. However, it was 
also noted that some previous studies could not reject the hypothesis of 
exogenous SAH. If SAH is truly an exogenous determinant of LFP in any 
empirical context, applying IV techniques may be superfluous and will 
increase the likelihood of failing to reject the null hypothesis of no 




relative inefficiency of IV estimates compared to ordinary least squares (OLS) 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Murray, 2006). 
A formal test of SAH exogeneity in the bivariate probit framework is a Wald 
test of the statistical significance of the cross-equation correlation (𝜌) 
between the LFP and SAH equations. If 𝜌 is statistically different from zero, 
there is evidence of SAH endogeneity and vice versa. In this case, a positive 
𝜌 suggests that unobserved determinants of LFP are positively associated 
with unobserved determinants of SAH while the converse holds for a 
negative 𝜌 (see e.g. Cai & Kalb, 2006; Stern, 1989). Table 4.6 above suggests 
failure to reject the null hypothesis of SAH exogeneity, i.e. 𝜌 = 0, across all 
specifications. Also, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of the null hypothesis that 
SAH is exogenous failed to reject the null hypothesis of SAH exogeneity in all 
three specifications given p values of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.7 for the total, female 
and male specifications respectively. These suggest that SAH may not be 
endogenous to LFP in this context. The above conclusion of no SAH 
endogeneity is not novel as Stern (1989) found evidence of weakly 
endogenous self-reported disability on LFP in the US. Indeed, Bound et al. 
(1999) observed that most of the literature on the effect of health on labour 
force behaviour treats health as exogenous. On the contrary, some studies 
have rejected the hypothesis of exogeneity of SAH in Australia (Cai, 2010; 
Cai & Kalb, 2006). Thus, while SAH might prove to be exogenous in certain 
contexts, such conclusions appear to be context-specific and should be 
informed by appropriate statistical tests. 
Marginal effects from a regression of LFP on SAH under the assumption of 
SAH exogeneity are shown in Table 4.9 below. Comparing these estimates 
for the regression controls with those in Table 4.6, one observes that the 
models appear to be robust to the exogeneity assumption. Perhaps this 
reinforces the findings from the more formal Durbin-Wu-Hausman and error 
correlation tests above. However, there was a marked decline in the 
marginal effect of SAH especially in the probit model in Table 4.9 (relative to 
the bivariate probit marginal effects). Here, being “healthy” was associated 




male and general populations respectively. However, the relative efficiency of 
single equation relative to IV estimates resulted in statistically significant 
SAH marginal effects across all specifications even with these numerically 
smaller estimates. In a similar study in Canada, Au et al. (2005) found 
smaller coefficient of SAH in an employment equation when SAH 





















Table 4.9: LFP determination allowing for exogeneity of SAH (marginal 
effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit LPM 
Variables Total Female Male Total Female Male 
       
sah 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
grant -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
matric 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.05** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
age26_30 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age31_35 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age36_40 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age41_45 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
age46_50 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.04 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
age51_60 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05* -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
rural formal 0.07*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.03 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
urban formal 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
urban informal 0.06** 0.09*** 0.02 0.08** 0.10*** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
African 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
coloured -0.00 0.06 -0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
prov. unemp† 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
married†† 0.02 -0.03 0.10*** 0.02 -0.03* 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
male3 0.11***   0.11***   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   
num. children‡ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
household size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
employed male‡‡  0.04**   0.05**  
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
constant    0.36*** 0.38*** 0.44*** 
    (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
       
R2    0.13 0.12 0.11 
F-Stat 36.3 20.1 12.9 50.0 28.0 18.1 
N 9784 5830 3954 9784 5830 3954 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 
design and non-random attrition; †provincial unemployment rate; ††married/cohabiting; ‡number of 
under-17 children in household; ‡‡household has at least one employed male 
 
Also, a regression of LFP on the five-category SAH showed that other 




associated with significantly higher LFP relative to poor health (results are 
available on request). 
Past health versus current LFP 
 
Another way to look at the relationship between health and LFP if one 
suspects endogeneity of SAH is to exploit the timing of SAH responses 
relative to LFP status. Given the panel nature of the dataset, one can 
estimate current LFP as a function of past SAH, an approach that has been 
adopted in the literature (see e.g. Bartel & Taubman, 1986; Haveman et al., 
1994). Though this method does not completely solve the endogeneity 
problem, especially if past SAH responses were used to justify past LFP 
status, it does mitigate the contemporaneous feedback relationship that 
likely exists between both variables. Therefore, I regressed wave 3 LFP 
status on wave 1 SAH status, wave 1 LFP and the same controls used above. 
The marginal effects of past SAH are presented in Table 4.10 below 
(marginal effects of the controls are similar to what obtained in the main 
regressions and are therefore not reported; they are however available on 
request).The results (expectedly attenuated) show that health significantly 
affected LFP even four years after a given health assessment. The magnitude 
ranged from 6-9%. 
Table 4.10: Relationship between past SAH and current LFP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit LPM 
Variables Total Female Male Total Female Male 
       
sah 0.06*** 0.07** 0.09** 0.07*** 0.07** 0.09** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
       
F statistic 38.4 29.8 17.4 56.4 29.8 17.4 
N 8328 5217 3111 8328 5217 3111 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 






Health shocks and labour force participation 
 
Some studies have exploited health changes (otherwise termed health 
shocks) available in panel datasets to provide a plausible argument with 
regard to the labour supply effect of arguably exogenous variations in SAH 
(see e.g. Chirikos & Nestel, 1985; Gómez & Nicolás, 2006). Consequently, I 
estimated models for the effect of positive and negative self-reported health 
shocks on LFP. I categorized an individual as having suffered an adverse 
health shock if she identified herself as healthy in wave 1 but sick in wave 3 
while the baseline category consisted of respondents who were healthy in 
both waves. On the other hand, an individual was identified as having 
experienced health improvement if she was sick in wave 1 but healthy in 
wave 3 while the benchmark category in this case comprised respondents 
who remained sick in both waves. For the first category, 7.6% of usable 
responses (total=7112 observations) recorded adverse health shocks among 
working age respondents in wave 3 while 71.9% of usable responses from 
the second category (total=1333 observations) recorded health improvement. 
As Table 4.11 indicates, the results for adverse health shocks were 
qualitatively similar (in terms of sign) to what was obtained in the 
contemporaneous and between-wave analyses above: adverse health shocks 
were associated with a 12-14% decline in male LFP in wave 3 while such 
shocks were not associated with any change in female LFP. These estimates 
were however, smaller than the IV estimates in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. The 
“total” coefficients representing 8-9% higher probability of inactivity due to 
adverse health shocks in the population are higher than Gomez and 
Nicholas’ (2006) estimate of 3-4% in Spain. Such differences may be due to 
the fact that Gomez and Nicholas estimated causal effects of adverse health 
shocks (which this study could not recover due to fewer data waves). They 
could also stem from apparent differences in levels of mechanization in both 
labour markets, as South Africa is a developing economy where labour 
market participation may be more strongly associated with health. Health 
improvement was statistically significant for both males and females. Labour 




improvement increased by 10-11%, 14-16% and 11% in the female, male 
and general populations respectively relative to those who remained in 
constant bad health. Thus, both health deterioration and health 
improvement were associated with higher percentage changes in LFP 
probability for men relative to women. This is consistent with all the 
evidence throughout this chapter.  
Table 4.11: Health shocks and LFP (marginal effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit LPM 
Variables Total Female Male Total Female Male 
 Adverse health shock 
 -0.08*** -0.05 -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.06 -0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
F statistic 26.5 14.1 11.4 34.6 18.1 14.1 
N 7083 4318 2765 7083 4318 2765 
 Health improvement 
 0.11*** 0.10** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.14** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
F statistic 7.2 5.9 5.2 11.3 9.8 8.0 
N 1327 947 380 1327 947 380 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 





This chapter has ascertained the effect of health on labour force 
participation in South Africa. The foregoing discussion suggests that better 
health (measured as composite/global self-reported health) is positively 
related to LFP. When treated as endogenous in a contemporaneous setting, 
ATE, TOT and LATE estimates from the bivariate probit model suggest that 
SAH exerts positive effect on LFP on the general population as well as in the 
male and female sub-populations. These results show 20-23%, 29-33% and 
23-26% increase in LFP probability among the “healthy” relative to the “sick” 
for the female, male and general populations respectively. As noted above, 
the higher LATE estimates may be indicative of LFP being more sensitive to 




given the rather strong assumption of a homogenous effect model, various 
diagnostic tests suggest that SAH may not be endogenous to LFP in South 
Africa, a result not inconsistent with previous cross sectional evidence in the 
US (Stern, 1989). Exploring dynamic health changes made possible by the 
panel nature of the data suggests that adverse health shocks are associated 
with significantly decreased LFP of around 12-14% and 8-9% in both the 
male and general populations respectively over the four-year period (2008-
2012). Health improvement is associated with about 11% LFP increase 
among the female and general populations as well as 16% increase among 
males. This study has therefore shown that better health is positively related 






























In Chapter 4, it was shown that better health has a positive effect on LFP 
(i.e. the willingness to participate in the labour market) in both cross-
sectional and temporal settings in South Africa. Even if one finds the 
argument for causality tenuous, it was shown that a positive association 
exists. Beyond such an exercise, it is important to determine whether health 
is related to wages for the employed. As noted in Chapter 1, ascertaining the 
relationship between health and the labour market is important given that 
health constitutes human capital and that better health should enhance 
productivity while higher productivity and earnings engender welfare 
improvement (Becker, 1964; Jack & Lewis, 2009).  
Though the argument that health should positively influence productivity 
and wages is intuitively appealing (Suhrcke et al., 2005), whether this 
relationship actually holds in a particular context as well as its magnitude 
remains an empirical question. Furthermore, such a relationship may 
depend on the particular health measure being analysed, where the health-
wage/productivity gradient may differ by context and health condition. For 
instance, it has been found that different physical and mental health 
indicators like hypertension, heart disease, depression and other mental 
illnesses are associated with varying productivity penalties in the US 
(Goetzel et al., 2004). Additionally, such costs may vary across the earnings 
distribution even for a particular health indicator. 
Though many studies have examined determinants of wages in South Africa, 
they mainly focused on factors like education, race, gender and occupational 
class with virtually none examining the potential relationship between 
health and wages (Bhorat, 2004; Lam, 1999; Mwabu & Schultz, 1996). 
Consequently, I examine the average and heterogeneous relationship 




nuanced relationship between health and wages, I examine the relationship 
between physical and psychological health on the one hand, and wages on 
the other. Though both physical and psychological health are very important 
in their own right and are likely to reinforce each other (Prince et al., 2007), 
it is important to ascertain the differential magnitudes of the wage penalty 
associated with poor physical and psychological health respectively, 
especially in the face of severely binding budget constraints typical of a 
developing country like South Africa. In the event that available resources 
are insufficient to carry out substantial interventions on both health 
measures, it may make economic sense to prioritize the measure which has 
a more pronounced relationship with productivity so as to possibly set off a 
virtuous cycle where increased output will eventually help achieve holistic 
health interventions. Finally, knowledge of the temporal dimension of the 
health-wage gradient is important as it will help ascertain whether the 
productivity cost of illness might be under-estimated in a cross sectional 
analysis. 
 
5.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of this chapter is to ascertain the magnitude of the relationship 
between health and wages over the wage distribution in South Africa. 
Specifically, I intend to ascertain: 
i) The magnitude of the gradient between physical health (proxied by the 
body mass index) and wages in South Africa for low, median and high 
earners. 
ii) The magnitude of the gradient between psychological 
health/depression and wages in South Africa for low, median and 
high earners. 




5.3 EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF THE HEALTH-WAGE/PRODUCTIVITY 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
One … way to evaluate health indicators is to test them against other 
observable effects of health status…. Because we believe that 
healthier people are likely to be more productive and therefore, on 
average, better remunerated in their employment, it should be 
possible to validate or qualify the various yardsticks of health. 
(Savedoff & Schultz, 2000, p. 7) 
The above quote indicates that good health is expected to have a positive 
effect on productivity and earnings. Though many studies have been 
conducted in this regard and the results largely positive, there is no 
consensus on the magnitude of impact due to differences in methodology, 
health measures, etc. (Suhrcke et al., 2005). 
Some prominent studies that have examined the health-productivity 
relationship employed randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to examine the 
impact of certain nutrients on productivity. For instance, Thomas and 
Frankenberg (2002) discussed a number of studies that examined the 
impact of iron on productivity. Generally, iron deficiency was negatively 
related to work capacity, endurance, energy efficiency and aerobic capacity 
(i.e. the maximum amount of oxygen that can be used by the body). In a 
study of the effects of iron on male rubber workers in Indonesia, it was 
shown that giving iron supplementation to workers with iron deficiency 
anaemia could raise such workers’ output by approximately 20%, though 
selective attrition of those in the control group may have resulted in an over-
estimation of the effect (Basta, Karyadi, & Scrimshaw, 1979). Also, an iron 
supplementation RCT conducted by Li et al. (1994) on Chinese cotton mill 
workers showed a 5% increase in energy efficiency among the treated group 
relative to the controls after 12 weeks of treatment. Treatment also resulted 
in a 17% increase in production efficiency though there was no increase in 
work output. Similarly, better health and economic success were observed 
among men who were offered a 120mg weekly iron supplement relative to 




Indonesia (Thomas et al., 2003). Evidence also exists of the effects of other 
nutrients on wages. For instance, a high protein drink administered to 
children in their first three years of life in Guatemala increased male hourly 
wage rate by USD0.67 when they were aged 25-42 years (Behrman, 2009). 
Most empirical studies of the health-wage relationship are based on 
observational studies resulting in correlations or causal relationships (the 
latter established using quasi-experimental methods). In the US for 
instance, Lee (1982) estimated a simultaneous equations model of the 
health-wage relationship in order to account for the endogeneity of both 
health and wages. The labour market outcome was log hourly wage, while 
the health variables were a dichotomous health limitation variable and SAH. 
Identification was achieved by excluding net family asset from the wage 
equation; and the square of experience, race and region dummies from the 
health equation. The validity of these identification restrictions have however 
been questioned (Currie & Madrian, 1999). Results showed 161-222% 
health effects on wages. In another US-based study, Chirikos and Nestel 
(1985) found significant wage reductions for whites with improving, 
deteriorating and constant poor health conditions relative to those in 
constant good health. However, there was no significant wage change for the 
black sub-samples across different health variables. In another instrumental 
variables study that exploited variations in the birth weight of monozygotic 
twins, it was found that increasing the birth weight of children in the lower 
ends of the birth weight distribution to the average US birth weight could 
increase future earnings by up to 26% (Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2004). 
Jackle and Himmler (2010) estimated the impact of health on wages in 
Germany using a panel framework with corrections for sample selection and 
endogeneity. Data was from the 1995-2006 annual German Socio-Economic 
Panel. Number of doctor visits in the past 3 months was used to instrument 
SAH given its possible endogeneity to work participation. Results showed 
that the effect of health on participation was greater for IV participation 
models than their single equation counterparts for both men and women, 




significant determinant of male wages only, while it generally had no 
significant effect on women. 
Savedoff and Schultz (2000) surveyed considerable literature on the impact 
of health on productivity in Latin America. A key finding that cut across all 
the studies is that instrumenting for health resulted in higher health 
coefficients in wage regressions relative to OLS, a finding consistent with 
attenuation bias of OLS in the presence of possibly mis-measured health 
variables (see e.g. Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). To achieve identification, they 
suggested aggregating individual responses to questions regarding access to 
health services, or price of health inputs at, say, the municipal level. Such 
instruments include average distance from a household to the nearest clinic, 
community-level use of health and sanitation services, proportion of the 
community with access to potable water, and the number of medical 
personnel in a community. In other instances, government records on 
climate, geography and infrastructure for each community can be matched 
to specific individuals who were resident in such places when some 
significant events (like drought) occurred so as to identify the impact of such 
exogenous events  on their current health condition. However, the 
underlying assumption is that place of residence is not related to average 
health heterogeneity, migration decisions, individual preferences affecting 
health, location of health and other service infrastructure, among others, an 
assumption that may be difficult to justify (Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1986; 
Schultz, 1988). Furthermore, selection into wage employment should be 
accounted for where possible as it enhances the generalizability of the 
results.  Studies in this regard include Murrugarra and Valdivia (1999) and 
Cortez (1999)- Peru (health indicator: number of days ill); Parker (1999)- 
Mexico (health indicators: disability, disabled days, self-reported relative 
health status and functional limitations); and Ribero and Nunez (2001)- 
Colombia (health indicators: disability and number of disabled days). 
Also using community-level price variables as health instruments, Knaul 
(2001) examined the impact of age at menarche on female wages in Mexico. 




associated with a 23-26% increase in hourly wages on the average. However, 
the explanatory power of the instruments on age at menarche was 
somewhat weak and the data had no information on place of birth and 
migration. As a result, it was not possible to adequately control for the 
disease/health environment when the women were growing up (which is a 
critical time for nutritional investments). 
Another strand of the literature has examined the relationship between 
anthropometric measures like height and BMI on wages and productivity. 
For instance, Schultz (2002) examined wage gains associated with height as 
a form of health human capital in Ghana, Brazil and the US. Instruments 
for height were community supply of health-related services and 
infrastructure (a proxy for local price of health), parental education and 
occupation, a combination of these two sets of instruments and 
ethnic/racial heterogeneity. IV estimates showed that height significantly 
and positively explained variations in log wage in general and that IV 
estimates exceeded OLS estimates. 
There are problems in using height as a health measure capturing the effect 
of human capital in a wage regression. A component of height is genetically 
determined and may not reflect nutrient intake, which is important for 
increased productivity. Additionally, height evolves over a long period of time 
and partly reflects conditions during early childhood including investments 
made by parents. Therefore, its explanatory power in a wage regression is 
expected to decrease with the inclusion of socio-economic status indicators. 
But, unlike height, BMI captures both short and long term aspects of 
nutrient intake (Thomas & Frankenberg, 2002). Though obesity is viewed as 
a problem especially in developed countries, it has been suggested that 
employers view higher BMI as a marker of good health in developing 
countries especially given the difficulty in observing true health, hence its 
positive association with wages (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1992; Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 1994). For instance, BMI was found to positively affect the 




while a 1% increase in BMI was associated with 2.7% increase in wages in 
Ethiopia (Croppenstedt & Muller, 2000). 
However, a number of studies conducted on the impact of obesity on wages 
in developed countries found negative or no effect. Using the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth in the US, Register and Williams (1990) found 
that obesity reduced female wages by 12% but had no impact on male 
wages. Using the same data, Loh (1993) found no significant effect of obesity 
on wage levels for both men and women. However, the study found that 
obesity significantly affected wage changes negatively for males but had no 
significant effect for females. Also, examining the effect of obesity on wages 
in the US, Baum and Ford (2004) showed the existence of persistent obesity-
induced wage penalty in the first two decades of employment for both men 
and women. 
Other studies have examined the impact of past health status/sickness 
history on current wages. Examining the effect of sickness on earnings in 
Sweden, Andren and Palmer (2001) found that individuals who were sick in 
previous years had lower earnings than others even if the previously sick 
were currently healthy. The effects were more pronounced for men relative 
to women. In a detailed study of the life cycle profile of the health-wage 
relationship, Pelkowski and Berger (2004) examined labour market effects of 
temporary and permanent health conditions. They found that permanent 
health conditions resulted in larger negative wage reductions for females 
relative to males (males experienced larger declines of hours worked relative 
to females). Also, adverse negative labour market consequences for males 
resulted from the onset of health problems in the 40s, while the labour 
market effects of negative health problems for females peaked in their 30s 
on the average. 
Some studies have investigated the impact of psychological/mental health 
on earnings/income. To the best of my knowledge, evidence in this regard 
with respect to Africa in particular and developing countries in general is 




disorders and earnings. The earnings equation was only estimated for those 
with positive income, implying that possible selection into work was not 
accounted for. Results of both OLS and IV models showed that the presence 
of any psychiatric disorder had detrimental effects on income for women, 
while IV estimates for men were not significant at conventional levels. Also, 
IV estimates were generally higher than OLS results, apparently due to the 
attenuation bias typical of the latter. Moreover, the authors suspected 
attenuated estimates as the wage proxy was annual personal income (which 
included disability-related income).  However, using fixed and random 
effects IVs on the British Household Panel, Contoyannis and Rice (2001) 
found that reduced psychological health resulted in a decline in wages for 
males while excellent SAH raised female wages. Also, health variables were 
positively correlated with time-invariant individual effect. In another study, 
mental health has also been associated with greater earnings penalty 
relative to physical ailment for disabled UK men and women (Jones et al., 
2006). Serious mental illness (computed using the Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview of the WHO) has been associated with annual earnings 
reduction of about USD16300 twelve months after mental health 
examination in the US (Kessler et al., 2008). To obtain more exogenous 
estimates, another study found that psychological conditions in childhood 
resulted in permanently low earnings of about USD4094 per year in the US 
(Smith & Smith, 2010). Also, respondents who suffered serious mental 
illness earned a third less than median earnings in a WHO survey involving 
19 countries in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and New 
Zealand (Levinson et al., 2010). Using quantile regression, it was found that 
while average mental health effects on wages were not sizeable, substantial 
effects were present at the lower part of the wage distribution especially 
among women in the US (Marcotte & Wilcox-Gok, 2003).  
Though some studies have been conducted on wage determination in South 
Africa, they did not ascertain the role of health. Mwabu and Schultz (1996) 
have examined the returns to education at various quantiles of the wage 




Development data (SALDRU, 1994). Usual controls in a standard Mincerian 
(Mincer, 1974) wage regression such as education, quadratic labour market 
experience and its square, as well as place of residence were included in the 
quantile wage regression. The results showed that private wage returns to 
schooling were twice as high for non-whites than for whites in 1993, coupled 
with the fact that the returns to schooling increased with educational level 
for both racial groups. Also, Mwabu and Schultz (2000) have observed that 
returns to secondary and tertiary education are higher for women than men 
in South Africa. 
Bhorat and Leibbrandt (1999b) found that returns to secondary education 
exceeded those of primary and tertiary education for Africans.  However, 
Chamberlain and van der Berg (2002) cautioned that estimates of returns to 
education would likely bias the impact of education on earnings if one does 
not adjust for educational quality. For both whites and blacks, higher 
quality adjustment factors (i.e. assuming that most of the years of schooling 
were of poor quality) tended to depress the returns to primary and 
secondary education and vice versa, while the converse obtained for tertiary 
education. 
In pointing out the so-called feminization of the South African labour market 
between 1995 and 1999, Casale and Posel (2002) noted that while more 
women were entering the labour force relative to men, women experienced 
higher unemployment and those who secured employment were mostly 
employed in low-paying jobs, suggesting a gender-based wage penalty 
against women. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that studies investigating wage 
determination in South Africa have not accounted for the potential effect of 
health. Also, most international studies have only focused on average 
health-wage relationships without investigating wage determination over the 
wage distribution. Furthermore, though some international studies have 
investigated the effect of psychological/mental health on wages, the results 




determination over the wage distribution, accounting for possible censoring 
of wages as well as ascertaining the relationship between health (physical, 
psychological and general) and wages. 
In ascertaining the relationship between health and wages, the potential 
endogeneity of health is apparent. Factors responsible for such an 
endogenous relationship include the omission of important but unmeasured 
wage determinants like ability, as well as bidirectional causality (given that 
higher wages can facilitate the purchase of better health care). Additionally, 
health measurement error, which may result from say, the poor under-
reporting their health due to their inability to “afford” to be ill (McIntyre, 
Gilson, Valentine, & Soderlund, 1998) may plague observed health 
measures. Also, environmental (i.e. non-genetic) factors are known to 
influence health (Cawley, 2004). These factors are likely to imbue health 
with endogeneity in a wage regression. However, given the lack of credible 
instruments in the dataset, this study does not investigate causal gradients. 
This is surely a limitation of this study. 
 
5.4 ANALYTICAL METHODS AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
5.4.1 Theoretical model specification 
 
From the foregoing review, it is apparent that a large chunk of the empirical 
work on the health-wage relationship examined the average relationship. 
However, a common observation is that a summary measure (say, the 
average) may be inadequate to fully characterize the wage distribution; for 
instance, it has been noted that upper earnings quantiles have been 
increasing while lower quantiles have been decreasing in the US (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009). Even more relevant for the purpose of this chapter is that 
the relationship between a variable of interest and wages may differ across 
the wage distribution. For instance, as shown in the following descriptive 
analysis, the relationships between self-reported health status and other key 




to differ at different parts of the earnings distribution. Quantile regression 
therefore represents a powerful tool with which to model such apparent non-
linearities in the relationship of interest as it can help uncover the 
heterogeneous relationship between the outcome and covariate of interest, a 
relationship that may be masked when examining the average gradient. In 
this case, the coefficients of the various characteristics at each quantile 
represent rates of return to these characteristics at the specified quantile of 
the conditional wage distribution (Melly, 2005), quantities that cannot be 
obtained with OLS regression.  Other advantages of this estimation strategy 
relative to OLS include its robustness to heteroscedasticity, outliers and 
non-normality of the error term, which are problems that often plague the 
typical wage distribution (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; 2010; Powell, 1986a). 
Given that a nontrivial proportion of the sample was censored (i.e. their 
characteristics were observed while they did not have information on wages 
given that they were unemployed) – indeed 56% and 44% of waves 1 and 3 
samples respectively were left-censored- I estimated censored quantile wage 
regressions as espoused by Powell (1986a) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005). 
Generally for a linear continuous function,𝑦, the 𝑞𝑡ℎ quantile regression 
estimator, 𝛽?̂? minimizes the loss function: 














                              [5.1] 
over 𝛽𝑞, where x is a vector of regressors and 𝛽𝑞 indicates that different 
quantiles estimate different values of 𝛽. 
The starting point of Powell’s (1986a) estimator is the Tobit model; but the 
Powell estimator leaves the distribution of 𝑖 unspecified: 
𝑦𝑖 = max{0, 𝑥𝑖
/
𝛽 + 𝑖}                                                                                            [5.2] 
Following Powell (1986a), the first step in the definition of censored 
regression quantile estimators is to determine the functional form of the 
quantiles of 𝑦𝑖, i.e. 𝐹𝑌
−1(𝑞|𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽). If the distribution of 𝑖 is continuously 




𝑖, i.e.  𝐹
−1(𝑞) and given the equivariance of population quantiles to 
monotonic transformations, the qth conditional quantile of 𝑦𝑖 can be 
represented as: 
𝐹𝑌
−1(𝑞|𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽) = max{0, 𝑥𝑖
/
𝛽 + 𝐹−1(𝑞)}                                                          [5.3] 
where equation (5.3) is obtained by replacing 𝑖 in equation (5.2) with its qth 
conditional quantile, 𝐹−1(𝑞). The censored quantile regression estimator of 
𝛽𝑞, i.e. 𝛽?̂?(𝑞) is that value of 𝛽 for each quantile (𝑞), which minimizes the 









                                                   [5.4] 
where 𝜌𝑞(𝑥) = [𝑞 − 1(𝑥 ≤ 0)]. 𝑥 are quantile-specific weights (Koenker & 
Bassett Jr, 1978). 
Consistency of the qth regression quantile estimator of the slope coefficients 
requires that the distribution function of the error term be continuously 
differentiable with positive density at the qth quantile of the i.i.d. sequence, 
𝑖. Additionally, it must be that 𝑥𝑖
/
𝛽 + 𝐹−1(𝑞) > 0 for a positive fraction of 
observations, while regressors satisfying this condition must have enough 
variation to identify 𝛽. Thus, Powell’s estimator makes use of observations 
that are not likely to be censored (Kowalski, 2009). 
In summary, the above Powell model uses semi-parametric conditional 
quantiles to characterize the distribution of the observable data in terms of 
the parameters and the distribution of the error term, as well as allowing 
censoring at zero earnings non-parametrically. This is in contrast with the 
fully parametric maximum likelihood estimation of the censoring process in 
the Tobit/Heckman model. 
To also obtain average gradients in a censored framework, the following 





Let latent participation (𝑦1
∗) be a linear function of observable covariates (𝑥1) 
and a random unobservable term ( 1) and let latent wage (𝑦2
∗) be a linear 
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                                                                                   [5.5b] 
i.e. actual wage is observed if the participation index exceeds zero and is 
unobserved otherwise (in reality, given that the outcome in the outcome 
equation is log wage, the censoring point is the smallest non-zero value, K, 
rather than zero). The model assumes normality of the errors as well as 
homoscedasticity. 
5.4.2 Empirical model 
 
Each of the above models was specified to include one health measure at a 
time. For the empirical specification of the censored quantile regression 
model, the determinants of wages are as follows: health (log of BMI (lnbmi), 
log of the CES-D10 psychological index (lncesd10) and SAH (sah) 
respectively for each equation), education, quadratic in age, location, race, 
gender, provincial unemployment rate, marital status, number of under-17 
children in the household, tenure in current job, union membership, 
belonging to the managerial/professional occupational category, 
employment in the tertiary sector and number of weekly hours worked. 
Given possible censoring of log wages, I used a cut-off, K, which is the 




value of zero may not be feasible given that the outcome of interest is log 
wages. This is consistent with earlier work in the literature (Kowalski, 2009). 
Corresponding Heckman selection models were also estimated to ascertain 
average relationships in a censored framework. Explanatory variables in the 
participation equation were: health (lnbmi, lncesd10 and sah respectively for 
each equation), education, quadratic in age, location, race, gender, 
provincial unemployment rate, marital status and number of under-17 
children in the household. Furthermore, identifying restrictions involved the 
inclusion of household grant receipt and household size only in the 
participation equation as they are expected to directly influence the decision 
to work rather than actual wage received. 
5.4.3 Sample, variable description and descriptive analysis 
 
Only Africans and coloureds were included in the sample as the Indian and 
white samples were very small in most quartiles of the wage distribution. I 
restricted the sample to adults aged 20-56 years in wave 1 so as to exclude 
students and those likely to retire by wave 3 from the analysis as well as 
ensure comparability of results for both waves. Additionally, only employees 
were included in the wage regressions (i.e. the self-employed and casual 
workers were excluded). Wage, as used in this chapter, is monthly take-
home pay from main job. 
Along with other physiological health proxies, BMI (comprising weight and 
height measures) is regarded as an indicator of the extent of nutrient intake 
and absence of disease in childhood even though height has some genetic 
component (Husain, 2010). Similarly, Schultz (2002) has used height as an 
indicator of health human capital in a wage regression (the drawback of 
using height as an indicator of work capacity in a wage regression was 
discussed in the above empirical review). Therefore, I used BMI as a proxy 
for physical health. BMI has also been used in a study of the health-wage 
gradient in Ethiopia (Croppenstedt & Muller, 2000). Later in the study, I 
used an indicator of being underweight, following the WHO classification of 




has a negative gradient with wages since such a condition partly 
presupposes lack of adequate body nutrients and/or health challenges. 
The ten-question Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (i.e. 
cesd10) – a standard depression scale -, was obtained from a ten-question 
list eliciting an individual’s psychological/emotional health. Responses to 
questions on whether respondents felt  unusually bothered, had trouble 
keeping their minds on what they were doing, felt depressed, felt fearful, had 
restless sleep, felt everything was an effort, felt lonely, could not get going, 
felt happy and/or hopeful about the future (all in the previous week) were 
used to construct the cesd10 variable. Each question had four options 
regarding the frequency of the experience in the past week, ranging from 
“rarely or none” (< 1 day) to “all of the time” (5-7 days). These questions are 
similar to those found in the British General Household Questionnaire, 
originally used to evaluate psychiatric illness (Contoyannis & Rice, 2001). 
Though the CES-D20 index (a twenty-question index) appears popular in the 
literature, the questions necessary for creating it are lacking in the dataset. 
But the CES-D10 index has been shown to be informative of one’s 
psychological state. It ranges from 0 to 30, where a cut-off of 10 or more 
indicates depressive symptoms (Andresen, Malmgren, Carter, & Patrick, 
1994; Zhang et al., 2012). Internal consistency of the cesd10 index was 
achieved given a Cronbach alpha coefficient of 0.78 (0.74) in wave 1 (wave 
3). Therefore, this variable was used as an indicator of psychological health. 
Robustness checks were later conducted with a CES-D8 index obtained by 
excluding the two questions on happiness and hope (Cronbach alpha 
coefficients of 0.84 and 0.90 in waves 1 and 3 respectively). 
Data constraints prevented the use of longer term psychological health 
measures in the main analysis. I acknowledge that individuals who are 
generally free of psychological conditions but happened to frequently 
experience some of the above adverse conditions in the previous week are 
likely to be erroneously assigned a high CES-D10 measure, thus suggesting 
that they have depressive symptoms. This will likely result in an under-




wages, as their monthly wages are highly unlikely to be adversely affected by 
such rare conditions. Theoretically, this will result in the well-known 
attenuation bias (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). I return to this issue in the 
results section where I show that a longer term measure of psychological 
health yields steep health-wage gradients. 
SAH served as a measure of general health status as it evaluates overall 
health status as perceived by the respondent. This is informed by earlier 
literature which maintains that SAH is a summary/representative measure 
of overall health status (Benítez-Silva et al., 2004; Ferraro, 1980; LaRue et 
al., 1979; Nagi, 1969) 
Kernel densities of the distribution of the natural logarithm of real wage in 
both waves (Figure 5.1) indicate that they are not exactly normal. This 
apparently suggests that the mean might not be a very good representation 
of the wage distributions, necessitating estimation at different parts of the 
wage distribution. As expected, males generally earned more than females in 





















Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics (working age Africans and coloureds) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev.a N Mean Std.Dev. 
employee† 7122 0.47 0.5 5437 0.58 0.5 
sah 9443 0.83 0.4 7828 0.88 0.3 
bmi 8448 26.07 6.4 7634 27.20 6.3 
cesd10 9479 8.34 4.8 7824 7.13 4.4 
real wage 3156 3993.00 6053.0 3054 4593.00 5353.0 
matric 11321 0.31 0.5 8778 0.33 0.5 
age 11400 34.29 10.0 8795 38.95 10.2 
age2 11400 1276.00 735.4 8795 1622.00 838.7 
num. children†† 11400 1.78 2.0 8795 1.45 1.7 
prov. unemp‡ 11400 23.58 3.0 8795 25.55 3.5 
formal. loc‡‡ 11400 0.57 0.5 8775 0.57 0.5 
African 11400 0.89 0.3 8795 0.90 0.3 
coloured 11400 0.11 0.3 8795 0.10 0.3 
married 9481 0.43 0.5 7828 0.43 0.5 
male 11400 0.48 0.5 8775 0.47 0.5 
grant 11400 0.55 0.5 8775 0.57 0.5 
household size 11400 4.70 3.3 8775 4.76 3.2 
tenure 3088 6.87 7.7 3030 7.70 8.7 
union 3076 0.34 0.5 3047 0.35 0.5 
manprof¥ 3115 0.19 0.4 3014 0.21 0.4 
tertiary 2916 0.50 0.5 2919 0.63 0.5 
hours 2880 40.58 14.8 3001 41.04 13.5 
Source: NIDS wave 1and wave 3; author’s calculations. Samples restricted to 20-56-year-old 
respondents in wave 1.  Samples were corrected for survey design, national representativeness and 
non-random attrition; astandard deviation †dummy variable (=1 if respondent is an employee; 0 
otherwise); ††number of under-17 children in the household; ‡provincial unemployment rate; ‡‡dummy 
variable (=1 if respondent resides in formal location; 0 otherwise); ¥dummy variable (=1 if respondent 
belongs to the managerial/professional occupational category; 0 otherwise) 
 
As Table 5.1 indicates, average values/proportions of most variables did not 
change remarkably between both waves. There was a five percentage point 
increase in the proportion of the sample that self-reported excellent, very 
good or good health between waves 1 and 3. Also, average real wage 
increased by 15%. Average provincial unemployment rate worsened over 
time, a two percentage point increase. As noted in the Chapter 4, this 
variable is used as a proxy for local labour market conditions in an attempt 
to capture demand-side determinants of labour supply. Also, given the 
possible existence of (an often negative) wage curve depicting the 




Oswald, 1994; Ilkkaracan & Selim, 2003), it is expected to be negatively 
associated with both employment and wages. While the racial composition of 
the sample remained virtually unchanged, the proportion of grant-receiving 
households increased by two percentage points. Though both racial groups 
analysed here were victims of racial segregation under apartheid, the huge 
disparities in the unemployment rates among them (Table 2.2 in Chapter 2) 
apparently suggests that race may be a significant determinant of 
employment. The same can be said about wages (Figure 2.5 in Chapter 2). 
As observed in Chapter 4, household grant receipt may negatively affect 
labour supply by imbuing beneficiary household members with higher 
reservation wage. Conversely, it may increase prime age labour supply (and 
hence employment) by providing resources for job search or providing the 
care-giving which might have initially kept prime age household members 
out of the labour market (Ardington et al., 2009). Therefore, its relationship 
with employment, especially in a South African context, is ambiguous a 
priori. Age is likely to be positively related to employment and wages. 
Similarly, residing in formal locations is expected to be positively related to 
employment and wages as informal locations have been historically 
associated with poor living standards in South Africa (Statistics South 
Africa, 2004). The proportion of the sample residing in formal locations 
remained constant at 57% across waves. Presence of young children is 
expected to be negatively associated with reduced labour supply (Dinkelman 
& Pirouz, 2002). More children (especially if they are biological) may increase 
wage through an increase in dependency allowance (which is part of take-
home pay used as a measure of wage in this study). The average number of 
under-17 children in the household slightly declined from 1.8 to 1.5 
between wave 1 and wave 3. The inclusion of marital status in the wage 
equation was informed by the literature on marriage premium especially for 
men (see e.g. Antonovics & Town, 2004). Tenure, union membership, 
belonging to the managerial/professional occupational category (relative to 
the semi-skilled and elementary classes), working more hours and 




private/exterritorial sector) are expected to be positively correlated with 
wages. 
The sample became heavier on average, with average BMI increasing from 
26.1 to 27.2. Given that the original BMI distribution was highly skewed, 
especially due to suspect responses (e.g. BMI values well above 100), the 
analysis was restricted to BMI values not exceeding 50 (BMI values above 50 
constituted about 1% and 0.6% of non-missing BMI observations in the 
wave 1 and wave 3 datasets respectively). A log transformation (used in the 
regression analyses) was very close to the normal distribution (kernel 
density graph available on request). Additionally, such log transformation is 
necessary as a non-linear relationship is suspected between BMI and 
earnings given that not all BMI ranges are considered to have beneficial 
health consequences; for individuals aged at least 20 years, WHO classifies 
BMI values less than 18.5, 18.5-24.9, 25-29.9, and at least 30 as 
underweight, normal, overweight and obese respectively (Ardington & Case, 
2009). Such a log transformation of BMI has also been used in a similar 
study in Ethiopia (Croppenstedt & Muller, 2000) and has the added 
advantage of yielding elasticities. A quadratic BMI specification may be 
argued to be suitable as it will enable the calculation of a turning point. But 
initial checks showed that such a quadratic specification did not suit the 
sample. This may not be surprising given generally non-decreasing 
association between BMI and income in developing countries as opposed to 
developed countries’ experience (Wittenberg, 2011). 
A look at the wage distribution suggests enough observations to carry out 
the proposed quantile analysis as the sample size in each wage quartile had 
approximately 790 and 765 observations in wave 1 and wave 3 respectively. 




Figure 5.2: Wage quantiles 
Source: Author computation 
 
Figure 5.2 (which can be viewed as an empirical CDF with reversed axes) 
depicts comparative wage distributions in waves 1 and 3 across different 
wage quantiles. This is consistent with, and more informative than, Table 
5.1 (which only shows averages) as the wave 3 wage distribution dominated 
the wave 1 distribution. 
Table 5.2- Table 5.4 compare average real wage between health (SAH), 










Table 5.2: Healthy-sick average real wage differences across wage quartiles 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
 Average real wage (Rands)  Average real wage (Rands) 
Quartiles N Sick Healthy N Sick Healthy 
1 786 676 752 768 924 921 
2 782 1398 1399 758 1901 1876 
3 784 2482 2648 767 3737 3448 
4 782 6311 8929 760 8865 10339 
Source: NIDS wave 1and wave 3; author’s calculations. Sample is restricted to 20-56-year-old 
respondents in wave 1.  Samples were corrected for survey design, national representativeness and 
non-random attrition 
 
Table 5.2 reveals some important features. Firstly, average monthly real 
wage differential between the healthy and the sick across wage quartiles 
were not uniform in both waves. More formal tests of mean differences (not 
presented here) showed that though these differences were statistically 
significant at conventional levels, the strength of statistical significance 
declined with increasing quartiles in wave 1, as the third and fourth 
quartiles were barely significant at the 10% level while the bottom two 
quartiles were significant at 1% and 5% respectively. In wave 3, only the 
bottom quartile showed a statistically significant difference between the 
healthy and the sick. These findings apparently suggest some heterogeneity 
in the health-wage relationship across the wage distribution at least in 
absolute terms. Another feature of the data is that average real wage in each 
quartile increased temporally across waves, i.e. both the sick and healthy 
groups earned higher in real terms in wave 3 relative to wave 1 in each 
quartile. Even the sick in wave 3 earned more than the healthy in wave 1 
except for the topmost quartile. 
It is also important to examine descriptive evidence on the heterogeneity of 
the relationship between wage and key covariates. Table 5.3 conducts 
similar analysis as Table 5.2 for educational attainment (between 





Table 5.3: Matric vs. non-matric average real wage differences across 
quartiles 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
 Average real wage (Rands)  Average real wage (Rands) 
Quartiles N Non-matric Matric N Non-matric Matric 
1 788 737 743 767 913 974 
2 790 1384 1452 758 1854 1944 
3 788 2556 2756 767 3386 3564 
4 782 6071 9614 760 7430 11151 
Source: NIDS wave1 and wave 3; author’s calculations. Sample is restricted to 20-56-year-old 
respondents in wave 1.  Samples were corrected for survey design, national representativeness and 
non-random attrition 
 
From Table 5.3, wage differences between respondents with at least a matric 
and their less educated counterparts were statistically significant across all 
quartiles in both waves except for the lowest quartile in wave 1. Moreover, 
there was apparently a widening of education-related wage gaps over time in 
absolute terms. Also, though not shown in the table, the bottom three 
quartiles were mainly populated by those with low education levels while the 
converse obtained for the topmost quartile. 
The above analysis was also conducted for racial groups in Table 5.4. In 
wave 1, significant wage differences occurred only at the two poorest 
quartiles, where Africans earned more than coloureds. The same was true in 










Table 5.4: Race-based wage differences across wage quartiles 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
 Average real wage (R)  Average real wage (R) 
Quartiles N African Coloured N African Coloured 
1 789 746 669 768 920 934 
2 791 1402 1388 759 1869 1962 
3 790 2637 2620 767 3462 3470 
4 786 8584 9100 760 10088 11587 
Source: NIDS wave1 and wave 3; author’s calculations. Sample is restricted to 20-56-year-old 
respondents in wave 1.  Samples were corrected for survey design, national representativeness and 
non-random attrition 
 
Finally, Table 5.5 below depicts the means/proportions of the different 
health measures analysed in this study, across wage quartiles. The purpose 
is to tentatively ascertain whether any relationship is likely to exist between 
each of them and wage as well as the likely direction of such relationship. 
From the table, it is apparent that a positive relationship likely exists 
between SAH and wages, while a negative relationship is expected between 
cesd10 and wages. These findings clearly follow a priori expectations. There 
was no clear-cut pattern for BMI, though the highest earner group had the 
highest BMI value in each wave. High BMI among top earners may not be 
surprising in a developing country context given observed positive 
relationship between BMI and wellbeing in developing countries (Wittenberg, 
2011). 
In summary, the foregoing analysis gives tentative indication of differing 
strengths of association between general health status (proxied by SAH) and 
wages over the wage distribution. This makes it even more imperative to 
analyse whether an analysis which focuses on different points of the wage 
distribution may reveal important features of this relationship which are 
likely to be masked in a mean-based analysis. Additionally, analysis at 
different points of the wage distribution will enable one to ascertain whether 
controls affect wages differently at different points across the wage 




Table 5.5: Distribution of health indicators across wage quartiles 
 BMI CESD10 SAH 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 Wave 1 Wave 3 Wave 1 Wave 3 
Quartiles Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1 25.8 705 26.9 758 8.8 788 7.0 768 0.81 786 0.89 768 
2 25.5 685 26.7 738 7.6 788 7.0 759 0.90 782 0.92 758 
3 25.6 677 26.4 744 7.2 787 6.1 767 0.91 784 0.95 767 
4 27.6 653 29.3 738 6.5 784 5.9 760 0.91 782 0.95 760 
Total 26.2 2720 27.4 2978 7.4 3147 6.4 3054 0.89 3134 0.93 3053 





The approach adopted in the following sections was to estimate OLS 
regressions of wage on each of the health measures and relevant controls. 
Thereafter, specifications accounting for censoring were implemented in 
both mean- and quantile-based analyses, where the latter examined the 
relationships among the first quartile, median and top quartile of the wage 
distribution. 
 
5.5 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.5.1 Ordinary least squares estimates 
 
Table A5.1 in the appendix depicts OLS regression results for both waves. 
The results suggest positive association between physical health (proxied by 
BMI) and general health condition (proxied by SAH) on the one hand, and 
wages on the other, as well as negative gradients between adverse 
psychological health and wages. As shown in the table, coefficients of health 
measures were stable across waves while coefficients of regression controls 
were robust to both health measure and wave. 
5.5.2 Accounting for censoring 
 
Earlier, it was noted that the nature of wages makes it susceptible to 
censoring given that one cannot observe wages for the unemployed. If 
censoring exists, the sub-sample of wage earners will no longer be a random 
sample of labour market participants and failure to account for such 
censoring will lead to inconsistent estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
Given that 56% (44%) of the sample was left-censored in wave 1 (wave 3), I 
present results from Heckman sample selection models (capturing the 
average gradient) and censored quantile regression models (allowing for 
heterogeneity of association) for each of the health measures in both waves. 






Heckman sample selection results for waves 1 and 3 are depicted in Table 
A5.2 and Table A5.3 in the appendix. As earlier indicated, identification was 
achieved by excluding grant receipt (i.e. non-labour income) and household 
size from the wage equation (non-labour income has also been previously 
used to identify participation in a similar context (Jones et al., 2006)). Both 
tables show evidence of negative sample selection bias if censoring was not 
controlled for, i.e. if the possibility that the sub-sample of wage earners may 
be different from the unemployed was ignored. Ordinarily, this goes against 
conventional wisdom as it suggests that unobserved determinants of 
employment are negatively correlated with unobserved determinants of 
employee earnings. However, a possible explanation lies in South Africa’s 
high graduate unemployment rate; the result of a structural mismatch 
between available jobs and the skill set of the unemployed (African 
Economic Outlook, 2012). Therefore, there appears to be a glut at menial 
low-paying jobs often performed by low ability individuals, and acute labour 
scarcity at jobs requiring high end skills even though many graduates 
remain unemployed. Consequently, it appears that low ability individuals 
have a higher probability of being employed than their high ability (and more 
educated) counterparts. 
A 10% BMI increase was associated with 2.1-2.6% wage increase. Also, a 
10% increase in the CES-D10 index was associated with a 0.5% decrease in 
wages (only in wave 1), while self-reporting good, very good or excellent 
health was associated with 11-15% wage rise relative to self-reporting fair or 
poor health. 
To obtain more nuanced estimates of the various health-wage gradients, 
censored quantile regression models were estimated - Table 5.6 - (full 






Table 5.6: Censored quantile regression results of health-wage gradient 
across health definitions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8 (9) 
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 
lnbmi lncesd10 sah 
Wave 1 
N=2189 N=2518 N=2505 
0.31*** 0.33*** 0.37*** -0.07* -0.06* -0.06 0.22** 0.17*** 0.20*** 
(0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Wave 3 
N=2747 N=2806 N=2805 
0.33*** 0.41*** 0.45*** -0.06* -0.07** -0.05 0.22* 0.17** 0.22*** 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5.6 shows statistically significant gradients in both waves and across 
all quantiles for the different health measures. All coefficient signs also 
conformed to a priori expectations. A 10% increase in BMI was associated 
with 3.1%-3.7% (3.3%-4.5%) wage increase in wave 1 (wave 3). These results 
are not very different from findings in Europe, where a 10% BMI increase 
was associated with real earnings reduction of 3.3% and 1.9% for males and 
females respectively (Brunello & d’Hombres, 2007). They are however 
smaller than that found among Ethiopian farmers, where a 10% BMI 
increase was associated with 27% wage increase (Croppenstedt & Muller, 
2000). This difference possibly emanates from differences in context as 
Croppendstedt and Muller examined the gradient for farmers (for whom 
physical strength is arguably a very important requirement for work) while 
this study focuses on all wage employees. To further buttress these 
differences, only 8.9% (7.2%) of respondents in this study were involved in 
the agricultural sector in wave 1 (wave 3); and that, even in an apparently 
more mechanized agricultural sector compared to what obtains in Ethiopia. 
In another study, Schultz (2002) found that a one centimetre height increase 
was associated with 1.5% (1.7%) wage increase for men (women) in Ghana. 
Though these estimates may not be directly comparable as noted in the 
empirical review above, these indicate that anthropometric measures of 





Similarly, a 10% increase in the CES-D10 index was associated with a 0.6%-
0.7% (0.7%) decline in real wages across the quantiles in wave 1 (wave 3). 
These CES-D10 coefficients are similar to the above mean-based estimates. 
As noted in the empirical review, serious mental illness was associated with 
annual earnings reduction of about USD16300 in the US (Kessler et al., 
2008) while psychological conditions in childhood permanently lowered 
earnings by about USD4094 per year in the US (Smith & Smith, 2010). Also, 
serious mental illness sufferers earned a third less than median earnings in 
a survey of 19 countries including some in Africa (Levinson et al., 2010). 
Though direct comparison of these estimates with the ones in this study is 
not intended due to fundamental differences in study design including 
psychological health measurement, these results validate my finding that 
psychological health is an important determinant of wages. Also similar to 
the findings in this study, mental health did not appear to significantly 
affect earnings among top earners for a number of mental health conditions 
like anxiety disorder and anti-social personality disorders in the US 
(Marcotte & Wilcox-Gok, 2003). The authors explained significant mental 
health effect at lower quantiles and insignificance at higher quantiles as 
possibly emanating from limited access to mental health services for low-
paid workers as well as better working conditions (e.g. more paid sick leave) 
for salaried high earners relative to their low-earning hourly paid 
counterparts. Unfortunately, there is hardly any developing country 
empirical evidence on the mental health-wage gradient to the best of my 
knowledge. Regressions using non-logged CES-D10 measures also 
conformed to a priori expectations while statistical significance at 
conventional levels were only attained at the median as in Table 5.6 
(available on request).  
Also, self-reporting excellent, very good or good health was associated with 
17-22% wage increase relative to reporting fair or poor health in both waves. 
There was no consistently monotonic pattern in the coefficient size across 
the wage distribution for psychological and overall health variables. 





result at variance with Rivera and Currais (2005) who noticed decreasing 
gradients as one moved up the wage distribution in Brazil. This might be 
due to the health measure used by Rivera and Currais, an index of health 
limitation, which is likely to affect low-earning workers (who are often 
engaged in physically demanding tasks) more than high earners. 
In comparing the magnitudes of the gradient between wages on the one 
hand and SAH and psychological health on the other, Contoyannis and Rice 
(2001) found that the SAH-wage gradient exceeded that of psychological 
health (though the former was only statistically significant for females). 
Though both gradients are not directly comparable in this study given that 
SAH is a dummy variable while psychological health is continuous, the 
tenuous statistical significance as well as insignificance in some quantiles 
for the latter makes one inclined to accept the existence of steeper general 
health gradient relative to psychological health. Also, Table 5.6 indicates 
nontrivial numerical heterogeneity for BMI especially in wave 3, while there 
was not much heterogeneity across the quantiles for general health and 
psychological conditions. The above results show that mean-based 
coefficient estimates were lower than quantile-based estimates. These 
results were generally replicated when all three health measures were 
included in the same regression except that lncesd10 was no longer 
statistically significant at conventional levels in both waves. These latter 
results are available on request. 
Given that the BMI and CES-D10 coefficients measure elasticities, the 
foregoing shows that the gradient between physical health and wages 
exceeded that of psychological health. This is not surprising when 
considered in light of the above point that the cross sectional psychological 
health variable likely suffered from nontrivial measurement error (which will 






5.5.3 Robustness checks 
 
To obtain arguably more exogenous (i.e. less error-ridden) estimates, I 
constructed a dummy variable measure of long term 
psychological/depression condition, ltdep. Given Andresen et al.’s (1994) 
suggestion that a CES-D10 measure of 10 or more indicates depressive 
symptoms, I considered an individual as suffering from long term 
psychological condition/depression if her CES-D10 index was at least 10 in 
both waves. I excluded those with CES-D10 measure in only one wave. This 
measure is likely to be less error-ridden and thus represent true 
psychological health condition more accurately than the cross sectional 
measure. This is because, individuals with such depressive scores over both 
waves are likely to be truly suffering from some psychological condition. This 
resulted in a sample size of 2536 of which 7.4% (190 respondents) had long 
term psychological/depressive condition(s). The resulting censored quantile 
regression results are depicted in the first three columns of Table 5.7. 
Similarly, to examine the long term gradient between SAH and wages, I 
constructed an index of long term health, where respondents who self-
reported fair or poor health (the so-called sick) in both waves were classified 
as being long term sick (ltsick). On the other hand, those who reported 
excellent, very good or good health (the so-called healthy) in both waves were 
deemed to not being long term sick. This resulted in a sample size of 3794 of 
which 3.6% (138 respondents) reported being “long term sick”. The results 
are presented in columns 4-6 of Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Censored quantile regression results of gradient between long 
term health conditions and wages 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 
ltdep† (N=2330) ltsick†† (N=1950) 
-0.15 -0.23*** -0.21** 
 
-0.32 -0.27** -0.21 
(0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.25) (0.13) (0.21) 
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.34 0.37 0.27 0.34 0.37 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; † dummy variable (=1 if 
the respondent is long term depressed; 0 otherwise); †† dummy variable (=1 if the respondent is long 






Table 5.7 shows that the signs of all ltdep and ltsick coefficients conformed 
to a priori expectations. Though coefficients of ltdep and lncesd10 cannot be 
directly compared given the categorical and continuous nature of both 
variables respectively, the coefficients of ltdep exhibited stronger statistical 
significance compared to lncesd10. Also, ltdep coefficients were similar to 
their SAH counterparts. Individuals with depressive symptoms in both time 
periods suffered wage penalties of about 21-23% relative to their healthier 
counterparts. Longer term general health (ltsick) coefficients were mostly 
larger than their cross-sectional counterparts though they were largely 
statistically insignificant. These latter coefficients (ltsick) should however be 
viewed with caution given very low variation (as indicated above, the “long 
term sick” constituted only 3.6% of the sample). This low variation resulted 
in higher standard errors (relative to cross-sectional estimates) thereby 
rendering all but the median coefficient statistically insignificant. Similar 
regressions for experiencing long term underweight could not be estimated 
due to very low variation, as only 1.7% of the sample were consistently 
underweight over the two waves. 
On whether gradients persisted over time, I estimated wave 3 censored 
quantile wage regressions as a function of wave 1 health variables and wave 
3 controls. This exercise is especially important given the earlier observation 
that BMI may be determined by socio-economic status indicators like wealth 
(which can be enhanced by wage income) and employment especially among 
blacks in South Africa (Wittenberg, 2011). A similar point applies to the 
other health measures. Such analysis will likely yield more exogenous 
gradients given that the health condition in question preceded wages by four 
years. The results, shown in Table 5.8, below indicate persistent gradients 
for physical health across the different estimated quantiles, though 
attenuated relative to the cross-sectional gradients as expected. Similarly, 
psychological health gradients were statistically significant at conventional 





the median gradient was significant at 10% for general health status. 
Apparently, these results suggest that the earlier observed gradients were 
not mainly driven by simultaneity between wage and health, especially for 
BMI and cesd10. A 10% increase in BMI in wave 1 was associated with 2.1-
2.4% wage increase in wave 3 while such change in cesd10 was associated 
with a 0.8% wage rise. 
Table 5.8: Censored quantile regressions of current (wave 3) wage on past 
(wave 1) health measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 
 Past lnbmi (N=2054) Past lncesd10 (N=2330) Past sah (N=2321) 
 0.21** 0.24** 0.24** -0.07 -0.08** -0.08** 0.10 0.12* 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
          
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.26 0.34 0.37 0.26 0.34 0.37 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Apart from using the log of BMI, another way to exploit possible non-
linearities in the wage-body mass gradient is to estimate the gradient 
between wages and a discrete variable denoting being underweight (i.e. 
underweight). Given the earlier observation by Husain (2010) that BMI is an 
indicator of the extent of nutrient intake, it is expected that being 
underweight is associated with reduced productivity, hence lower wages, 
therefore resulting in a negative gradient. To empirically explore this 
hypothesis, I estimated an OLS regression of wage as a function of 
underweight and all controls included in the main regressions10. The results 
indicate that being underweight was associated with 22% (30%) wage 
decline (p<0.01) relative to being heavier in wave 1 (wave 3). This is 
                                       
10 Result is available on request. Though I also estimated censored quantile regressions of this relationship, the 
results are similar to the OLS results in terms of sign and statistical significance especially at the top quartile but 
these are not reported given very small sample of the underweight, especially in wave 3 where there were only 96 





consistent with the above positive and significant gradient between higher 
body mass and wages. 
I also used the CES-D8 depression index to test the robustness of the 
psychological health measure. OLS wage gradients in wave 1 and wave 3 
were -0.04 and -0.06, significant at 5% and 1% respectively. For the 
Heckman selection model, only the wave 3 gradient (-0.03) was significant 
(p<0.1). The same is true of the censored quantile model, as none of the 
wave 1 gradients was statistically significant at conventional levels. In wave 
3 however, the lower quartile and median gradients were -0.07 (significant 
at 5% and 1% respectively). This is similar to the wave 3 median gradient for 
the CES-D10 index. 
A gendered analysis accounting for censoring (see Table A5.6 in the 
appendix) suggests more nuanced relationships than are obvious in the 
foregoing analysis. It shows that the BMI-wage gradients were driven by 
males as there was hardly any statistically significant relationship among 
females in both waves. This apparently indicates significant returns for heft 
among males only. This is not surprising as men are generally employed in 
more physically demanding jobs relative to women, and therefore are likely 
to suffer higher wage penalties to physical health deficiencies. There was no 
such stark pattern for psychological health even as most coefficients were 
insignificant or barely significant statistically. Finally, gradients for overall 
health status were generally positive and statistically significant across the 
entire wage distribution. In Britain however, Contoyannis and Rice (2001) 
found significant association between psychological health and hourly wages 
for only males.  
From the foregoing and considering the main model (i.e. the censored 
quantile model), one can deduce that the BMI-wage gradient was quite 
robust to model and time period as it retained its positive sign and 
statistical significance across quantiles. For SAH, coefficients were 
remarkably stable between waves 1 and 3. The same is true for lnced10 





longer term measures, psychological health gradients were shown to be 
about as steep as the cross-sectional general health gradient while longer 
term general health gradients largely lost statistical significance due to 
minimal variation (the magnitudes were mainly larger than their cross-
sectional counterparts though). Using arguably more exogenous past 
physical and psychological health measures (relative to their cross-sectional 
counterparts), gradients generally remained strong and statistically 
significant while displaying minimal heterogeneity. Mean-based gradients 
were also generally stable for the different health measures over the four-
year period but attenuated relative to the more informative quantile 
estimates. 
For the regression controls (refer to the censored quantile regressions in 
Table A5.4 and Table A5.5), their signs largely conformed to a priori 
expectations while magnitudes were generally stable across waves. 
Magnitudes were also generally robust to health measure. A one year 
increase in job tenure was associated with 1-2% wage increase across 
quantiles. This is same as found in the UK (Jones et al., 2006).  Also, having 
at least a matric qualification was associated with 54-61% wage increase in 
the two waves. Prior evidence indicated that education premium for African 
males and females with post-secondary education  was 29% and 37% 
respectively, while that of coloured were 19% and 31% respectively in 1993 
(Mwabu & Schultz, 2000). Managers/professionals had nontrivial wage 
premium over those in other occupational categories especially in wave 3, 
earning up to 46-53% more. In general, respondents in formal locations 
significantly earned higher than informal dwellers; formal location dwellers 
earned 9-22% more than informal dwellers. In a similar study, rural 
dwellers were found to earn 36-42% (Africans) and 11-100% (coloureds) less 
than their non-rural counterparts in South Africa in 1993 (Mwabu & 
Schultz, 2000). Though these cannot be directly compared with estimates in 
this study given differences in the two measures as well as the fact that 
Mwabu and Schultz estimated separate regressions for Africans and 





determination appears to have narrowed over time in South Africa, perhaps 
indicating some spatial convergence. Such narrowing notwithstanding, the 
returns to formal location dwelling has important welfare implications given 
the apartheid legacy whereby most jobs were located away from informal 
areas, necessitating substantial transport costs for informal location 
dwellers. High commuting costs, together with lower wages will likely result 
in substantial welfare loss for such individuals and their families. The 
statistical insignificance of race may be due to the fact that the two racial 
groups considered in this analysis have been victims of racial segregation in 
the past. The gender gap was substantial across quantile and wave, as being 
a man was associated with 23-36% (25-41%) wage increase relative to being 
a woman in wave 1 (wave 3). A consistent pattern over the two waves was 
that returns to males was highest among the topmost quartile irrespective of 
the health measure being considered. Respondents that were married/living 
with a partner generally earned more than their “single” counterparts at the 
topmost quartile in wave 3. This suggests even more welfare gains to 
marriage/cohabitation given possible economies of scale (assuming such 
couples do not have more dependants than the “single” on the average). 
However, this relationship was not consistently statistically significant. The 
higher union premium uncovered in this study (43-51% across quantiles 
and health measure in wave 3) relative to previous evidence (for instance, 
Butcher and Rouse (2001)  found a 20% union wage premium among 
African workers) might not be unconnected to evidence regarding unions 
persistently obtaining wage increases for their members in South Africa 
(Banerjee et al., 2008). Finally, more children in the household was 




This chapter has established positive and statistically significant gradients 
between better health (physical, psychological and general) and wages for 





and other important wage determinants like occupational category, 
industry, union membership and gender. These gradients range from an 
elasticity of -0.06 to -0.07 for psychological health/depression to 0.31-0.45 
for BMI in the short term. Persistently adverse general health and 
psychological conditions exhibit steep gradients though those associated 
with general health status are statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels save for the median.  The gradients do not generally exhibit much 
heterogeneity save for physical health in 2012 (i.e. wave 3). Also, mean-
based estimates are generally smaller than the more informative quantile 
estimates. Furthermore, the physical and psychological health-wage 
gradients are persistent across the estimated quantiles even after four years, 
as previous health conditions significantly predict current wages, while that 
of general health is only significant at the median. Gender-based analysis 
show steeper physical health-wage gradients for males relative to females. 
Thus, the study shows the existence of nontrivial relationship between 
physical, psychological and general health conditions on the one hand, and 
wages on the other, in South Africa. Also, there remain substantial wage 
premiums for being a professional/manager relative to being semi-skilled or 
















6 IMPAIRMENT-RELATED WAGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR MARKET 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
The last two chapters have established positive relationships between health 
on the one hand, and the willingness to participate in the labour market as 
well as wages earned upon securing wage employment, on the other. With 
regard to wages, the theoretical review in Chapter 3 noted that differences in 
human capital play an important role in determining productivity/wage 
differentials. And given that health constitutes part of human capital, it 
stands to reason that health should play a role in determining wage 
differentials. However, it was also pointed out in chapter 3 that wages may 
differ for non-productive reasons, one of which is discrimination (defined in 
this context as a situation where identical individuals in similar jobs are 
paid differently because of non-productive characteristics (Altonji & Blank, 
1999)). It was mentioned that some of the markers of wage discrimination 
are gender, ethnicity and disability/impairment. 
The need to combat health-related discrimination has led to the enactment 
of legislations like the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1990 as well as the 
UK Disability Discrimination Act, 1995 (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2001; Madden, 
2004). Having recognized that apartheid institutionalized discrimination in 
many facets of national life especially on the basis of race, post-apartheid 
South Africa has also passed a number of anti-discrimination laws. These 
include the Employment Equity Act, 1998 (and its various amendments) and 
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 
2000. While the former was mainly concerned with addressing employment-
related discrimination, the latter was a more comprehensive legislation 





organizations and individuals on the basis of race, gender, disability, marital 
status, religion, etc. Therefore, issues of discrimination in arguably most 
aspects of national life have been taken care of from a policy perspective. 
The foregoing policy framework notwithstanding, there is need to empirically 
ascertain whether discrimination on the basis of key characteristics and 
attributes still exist in the country. An important form of discrimination is 
wage discrimination and empirical evidence on the issue is mixed (Baldwin 
& Johnson, 1994; DeLeire, 2001; Jones et al., 2006). I examine such 
literature in the literature review section of this chapter and subsequently 
ascertain the existence or otherwise of unexplained impairment-related wage 
gaps (often dubbed wage discrimination) in South Africa. 
 
6.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of this chapter is to ascertain whether impairment-related wage 
discrimination exists in South Africa. Specifically, the study intends to 
uncover: 
i) The magnitude of average impairment-related differences in 
returns to characteristics (loosely termed wage discrimination) in 
South Africa. 
ii) Whether such discrimination changed between 2008 and 2012. 
iii) Whether such discrimination was heterogeneous across the wage 
distribution. 
  
6.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Studies on the existence of wage gaps/wage discrimination in South Africa 
have focused on the effect of gender, race and union membership in 
engendering such gaps/discrimination (Mwabu & Schultz, 2000; Schultz & 
Mwabu, 1998b). This, to the best of my knowledge, is the first study to 





discrimination in South Africa. Indeed, in ascertaining the wage premium 
associated with education, region, race and sex in South Africa, Mwabu and 
Schultz (2000) highlighted the need to investigate the health-related 
premium as well. Therefore, this study fills this research gap. From a policy 
perspective, the results of the study will enhance knowledge of the obviously 
complex nature of discrimination in South Africa and improve policy 
makers’ ability to tackle the problem of inequity, a major goal of the South 
African government. 
 
6.4 EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF THE HEALTH-RELATED WAGE 
DISCRIMINATION LITERATURE 
 
This section focuses on a review of empirical evidence regarding health-
related wage discrimination. This is to keep the discussion focused given the 
vastness of the empirical wage discrimination literature. Where non-health 
related literature is reviewed, it will be based on methodological grounds (i.e. 
if it has direct implications for the methods to be applied in this study). As 
the following review indicates, the workhorse model of wage discrimination 
studies in economics is the Blinder-Oaxaca model (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 
1973). 
Johnson and Lambrinos (1985) and Baldwin and Johnson (1994) found, 
using Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions that handicapped men (women) in the 
US received a wage that was 44.5% (85%) that of their non-handicapped 
counterparts on the average, while a third of these differentials were 
unexplained by included characteristics. “Handicap” was defined to include 
individuals who suffered from diseases that have been demonstrated as 
evoking prejudice in attitudinal studies, like blindness or deafness. Also 
using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition on the 1984, 1992 and 1993 
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation in the US, DeLeire 
(2001) found that among health-impaired men who self-reported that their 





earnings gap was explained by discrimination. Also, the amount of 
discrimination did not decrease between 1984 and 1993. Maranto and 
Stenoien (2000) have noted that obese individuals are not as well protected 
against labour market discrimination as people suffering from other forms of 
discrimination, under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Noting that men 
did not experience wage penalties until their weight exceeded standard 
weight by 100lb (where standard weight was defined as a BMI which 
equalled 21.1 or weight equal to 127 lb for a 5ft 5in woman, and BMI equal 
to 21.7 or weight equal to 162 lb for a 6ft man), they maintained that mildly 
obese white women in the US experienced greater wage penalties than black 
men experienced for weight exceeding 100% of standard weight. A drawback 
of this study however was the use of ordinary least squares log wage 
regression which was clearly inadequate to uncover wage discrimination. 
A shortcoming of many studies on disability-related wage discrimination is 
the failure to account for possible non-random selection into wage 
employment when decomposing wage gaps. To fill this gap, Kidd et al. (2000) 
estimated wage gaps based on selectivity-corrected wage regressions. The 
results showed the existence of substantial wage and labour force 
participation differences between able-bodied and disabled men in the UK. 
Madden (2004) accounted for selection into both health and labour market 
status in the UK. The result suggested that accounting for selection into 
health status was of little empirical importance, while accounting for 
selection into labour market status and the direct impact of health on 
productivity resulted in a fall in measured discrimination. Using selectivity-
corrected wage gap decompositions, O’Hara (2004) found evidence of double 
discrimination against American women as they were subject to gender- and 
impairment-related wage discrimination in the early stages of employment. 
Jones et al. (2006) found evidence of impairment-related wage 
discrimination in the UK especially among women. Exploiting differences in 
the work-limiting nature of a disability, Jones (2006) found that unobserved 
productivity differences played an important role in engendering 





selection, a drawback of most of them is that they netted out the selection 
term from the raw wage gap, thereby obtaining only the offered wage gap 
rather than the actual/observed wage gap, as in Reimers (1983).  
While maintaining that sample selection should be accounted for when 
performing wage decompositions, Neuman and Oaxaca (2003) averred that 
netting out the selection term from a typical raw wage gap is not ideal as 
such a method would only yield selection-corrected average wage gap and 
not the more policy-relevant average observed wage gap (more on this in the 
theoretical model specification section). Using data from Israel, Neuman and 
Oaxaca (2003) found larger gender-related wage differentials than ethnic-
based wage differentials. They suggested that the difference between average 
wage gaps when controlling for selection relative to when it was not 
controlled for could be quite high. Also, the selectivity-corrected gender- and 
ethnic-related wage gaps were found to be substantial. 
Apart from non-correction for sample selection, another shortcoming of 
traditional Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is that it only focuses on the 
mean wage gap, ignoring what happens at other points of the wage 
distribution. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) have proposed an estimation 
technique to correct for this. Using this procedure, Beblo et al. (2003) found 
that endowment effects became more prominent at higher deciles of the 
distribution of the gender-based wage gap in Germany, while it varied 
greatly over the wage distribution in France. 
But, given that the model based on Juhn et al. (1993) is not robust to 
heteroscedasticity, a semi-parametric heteroscedasticity-robust 
decomposition technique (based on quantile regression) that decomposes 
unconditional quantiles has been adopted in decomposing wage gaps across 
time and between gender groups (Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, & Sommerfeld, 
2010; Melly, 2005). Using this technique to decompose changes in the wage 
distribution between 1973 and 1989 in the US, Melly (2005) found that a 





differences in returns to skills, especially education, while residuals 
accounted for 20% of the increase in inequality in the 1980s. 
To the best of my knowledge, empirical evidence on impairment-related wage 
gaps/discrimination in developing countries is limited; most studies focus 
on disability-related employment gaps/discrimination. Mitra and 
Sambamoorthi (2008) found no evidence of disability-related wage 
discrimination among men in rural Tamil Nadu, India. Rather, there existed 
disability-related employment discrimination. Also in a study of 
discrimination against the disabled in fifteen developing countries, Mizunoya 
and Mitra (2013) found that in those countries characterized by a disability-
related employment gap (i.e. in nine countries), observable characteristics 
did not explain most of such gaps. Most developing country studies found 
lower employment rates among the disabled relative to the non-disabled 
(Hoogeveen, 2005; Palmer et al., 2012; Trani & Loeb, 2012). 
A number of studies have also been conducted on wage gaps in South 
Africa. On wage discrimination and inequality, Schultz and Mwabu (1998b) 
have noted that the average wage between white and black workers differed 
by a factor of five, though half of this differential could be attributed to 
educational and location differences across the races (see also Mwabu & 
Schultz, 2000)). Also, union membership was associated with higher wages 
at the lower end of the wage distribution. Furthermore, detailed 
decompositions conducted by Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001) showed that 
household inequality in South Africa was closely linked to wage differences. 
A similar conclusion was also reached by Leibbrandt et al. (2011). Grun 
(2004) found evidence of employment discrimination against African women, 
while white women were likely to suffer from wage discrimination in the 
post-apartheid period. Furthermore, there is evidence of decline in the rate 
of employment of people with disabilities in South Africa; such decline has 
been mainly attributed to increase in disability grant pay-outs (Mitra, 2008). 





inequality, there is hardly evidence of a possible association between 
impairment and wage gaps in South Africa. 
 
6.5 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
6.5.1 Theoretical model specification 
 
The first model estimated was a selectivity-corrected Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition model of average (log) wage differences as in Neuman and 
Oaxaca (2004). This is due to plausible sample selection bias arising from 
non-random selection into wage employment and was intended to capture 
the average wage gap.  Furthermore, differences in the unconditional wage 
distribution based on quantile regression model a la Melly (2005) were 
decomposed. 
A major challenge in conducting studies of health-related wage 
gaps/discrimination is the possible endogeneity of health. Unlike race and 
gender (some of the popular measures on which discrimination is analysed) 
which can be plausibly argued to be exogenous, some health conditions are 
the result of choices. Moreover, health can influence wages just as wages 
and working conditions can affect health. These relationships can 
theoretically result in health endogeneity in a wage regression. However, 
Madden (2004), who carried out similar analysis in the UK noted that 
accounting for health endogeneity made little difference relative to when 
endogeneity was not controlled for. Again, Ettner (2000), who adopted a two-
step IV model on US data found that the effects of health on labour market 
outcomes were not sensitive to reverse causation (see also Jones et al., 
2006). Therefore, given the lack of suitable instruments in the dataset as 
well as the foregoing findings, this analysis did not account for the possible 
endogeneity of impairment to wages. 
For the selection-corrected Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the following 








𝛽𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗                                                                                          [6.1] 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗
/
𝛼𝑗 + 𝜗𝑖𝑗                                                                                                 [6.2] 
where 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗
∗  and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 are respectively a latent variable associated with 
employment and wage for individual i in impairment status 𝑗 = {𝑁𝐼, 𝐼}; 𝐺 and 
𝑋 are predictors of employment and wages respectively for individual i in 
health status j. 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛼𝑗 are parameters, while 𝑖𝑗 and 𝜗𝑖𝑗 are i.i.d. normal 
error terms with the following distribution, (0,0, 𝜎𝜀𝑗
2 , 𝜎𝜗𝑗
2 , 𝜌𝑗  ). NI and I stand for 
“non-impaired” and “impaired” respectively. 
The choice of the term “impairment” rather than disability or handicap was 
informed by the WHO’s definition of impairment as “any loss or abnormality 
of psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure or function” (WHO, 
1980, unpaged), a definition that most suits the impairment variable used in 
this study (as shown below). This is in contrast with the other terms 
respectively defined as “any restriction or lack (resulting from an 
impairment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the 
range considered normal for a human being”, and “a disadvantage for a 
given individual, resulting from an impairment or disability, that prevents 
the fulfilment of a role that is normal. . .” (WHO, 1980, unpaged). 
Correction for sample selection bias adds an extra term to traditional wage-
gap decompositions (Neuman & Oaxaca, 2004). For illustrative purposes, 
using the plausible assumption that the wage profile of the non-impaired 
(𝑤𝑁𝐼) is the non-discriminatory norm (i.e. the wage profile that would be 
observed in the absence of discrimination), the non-impaired versus 
impaired wage gap decomposition is therefore: 
?̅?𝑁𝐼 − ?̅?𝐼 = (?̅?𝑁𝐼 − ?̅?𝐼)𝛼𝑁?̂? + 𝑋𝐼
/̅̅ ̅(𝛼𝑁?̂? − 𝛼?̂?) + (𝜃𝑁?̂? ?̅̂?𝑁𝐼 − 𝜃?̂? ?̅̂?𝐼)                    [6.3𝑎] 
where the first, second and last terms on the right hand side are the 
respective contributions of impairment-based differences in 





discrimination) and selection, to the wage-gap. Alternatively, the first and 
second components are also referred to as the explained and unexplained 
components respectively (Beblo et al., 2003). For the selection term, 𝜆 is the 
inverse of the Mill’s ratio. Alternatively, a three-part decomposition of the 
non-selection part of the wage differential into characteristics, prices (or 
discrimination) and an interaction term is possible. It is important to 
acknowledge that though differences in the returns or the unexplained 
component is used here to denote discrimination, it also incorporates the 
effect of all unobserved variables to the wage gap (Jann, 2008). Additionally, 
even differences in observed characteristics may exist due to prior 
discrimination (Beblo et al., 2003). As a result, the returns component may 
over- or under-estimate discrimination depending on which effect dominates 
(this point is especially important in health-related decomposition analysis, 
an issue I return to subsequently). Therefore, the term “discrimination” is 
used throughout this thesis in a loose sense to refer to the contribution of 
differences in returns to the total wage gap. 
How to deal with the selection term in equation (6.3a) is often a complication 
when conducting selectivity-corrected Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. Most 
authors simply netted it out from the average raw wage gap on the left hand 
side (Beblo et al., 2003; Boymond, Flückiger, & Silber, 1994; Reimers, 
1983). But Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) pointed out that such an adjustment 
only yields a selectivity-corrected wage differential. As observed by Beblo et 
al. (2003) and Jones et al. (2006), this quantity is simply the potential or 
offered wage gap and not the (more policy-relevant) average differential of 
observed wages realized by actual labour market participants. In this study, 
I decomposed the observed wage gap, rather than the potential gap, by 
obtaining a separate term for the contribution of the difference in the 
selection terms to the observed wage gap. 
The foregoing analysis only deals with the average decomposition. A useful 
extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca framework to deal with the distribution of 





drawback of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (JMP) decomposition is that it is not 
robust to heteroscedasticity; a shortcoming that can lead to incorrect 
inference if the error term is not independent and normally distributed 
(Melly, 2005). Melly (2005) therefore proposed a heteroscedasticity-robust 
model based on quantile regression, that decomposes the wage gap across 
the entire wage distribution in a number of steps. Firstly, the conditional 
wage distribution is estimated via linear quantile regression and secondly, 
the unconditional wage distribution is estimated by integrating the 
conditional distribution over the range of the covariates. This follows earlier 
work on quantile regression-based decomposition (Machado & Mata, 2005). 
Similar to the JMP decomposition, differences in the wage distribution can 
be decomposed into characteristics, prices and residuals (i.e. unmeasured 
prices/returns and characteristics/quantities). 
Though conceptually feasible, the estimation of the unconditional quantiles 
across all quantiles is computationally burdensome. Therefore, following 
Antonczyk et al. (2010), I avoided estimating all possible quantile regression 
coefficients by estimating quantile regressions for only 49 equally-spaced 
quantiles beginning from the second percentile. Therefore, instead of 
treating the quantiles (i.e. 𝜏) as a uniformly distributed random variable on 
the interval, (0,1), I treated 𝜏 as uniformly distributed on the 49 evenly-
spaced percentiles on the interval [0.02, 0.98]. 
To demonstrate the foregoing decomposition of the unconditional 
distribution of log wage differences between the impaired and non-impaired 
groups using the notation as in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition above 
(and taking the median as a measure of central tendency for illustrative 
purposes in line with Melly (2005)), the wage equation for each group can be 
written as follows: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗
/
𝛼𝑗(0.5) + 𝜗𝑖𝑗, 𝑗 = {𝑁𝐼, 𝐼} 
where 𝛼𝑗(0.5) is the median regression coefficient for group 𝑗. It is now 





residuals. The 𝜏th quantile of the counterfactual distribution of wages that 
would have obtained among the impaired if the characteristics distribution 
was that of the non-impaired can be stated as follows11: 
?̂?(?̂?𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼) = inf {𝑞: 
1
𝑁






Therefore, ?̂?(?̂?𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼) − ?̂?(?̂?𝐼 , 𝑋𝐼) is brought about by differences in 
characteristics. To separate the returns effect from the residual effect, it can 
be noted that the 𝜏th quantile of the residual distribution conditional on X 
can be consistently estimated by 𝑋[?̂?(𝜏) − ?̂?(0.5)]12. Defining the 𝐻 × 1 vector, 
?̂?𝑚𝑁𝐼,𝑟𝐼, whose hth element is denoted, ?̂?𝑚𝑁𝐼,𝑟𝐼(𝜏ℎ) = [?̂?𝑁𝐼(0.5) + ?̂?𝐼(𝜏ℎ) −
?̂?𝐼(0.5)], the counterfactual distribution that would have prevailed if the 
median return to characteristics had been the same as the non-impaired 
but the residual distribution had been that of the impaired can be estimated 
by, ?̂?(?̂?𝑚𝑁𝐼,𝑟𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼). Thus, it is obvious that ?̂?(?̂?𝑚𝑁𝐼,𝑟𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼) − ?̂?(?̂?𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼) is due to 
differences in coefficients. In the same manner, ?̂?(?̂?𝑁𝐼, 𝑋𝑁𝐼) − ?̂?(?̂?𝑚𝑁𝐼,𝑟𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼) is 
the result of residual differences (i.e. unmeasured prices and quantities). 
Combining the foregoing, a similar decomposition to the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition can now be carried out for the entire wage distribution as 
follows: 
?̂?(?̂?𝑁𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼) − ?̂?(?̂?𝐼 , 𝑋𝐼) = [?̂?(?̂?𝑁𝐼, 𝑋𝑁𝐼) − ?̂?(?̂?𝑚𝑁𝐼,𝑟𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼)] + [?̂?(?̂?𝑚𝑁𝐼,𝑟𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼) −
                                                 ?̂?(?̂?𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼)] + [?̂?(?̂?𝐼 , 𝑋𝑁𝐼) − ?̂?(?̂?𝐼 , 𝑋𝐼)]                                    [6.3𝑏]  
where the left hand side represents differences in the wage distribution 
between the non-impaired and impaired; the square brackets on the right 
                                       
11 A full description of the process of deriving the unconditional quantile distribution from conditional quantiles 
(which yielded the following counterfactual distribution) will be distracting while not adding to new knowledge. 
Basically, the process consists of obtaining the conditional CDF of wages given the characteristics, X; using the 
law of iterated expectations to obtain the marginal distribution of wages; and inverting this marginal distribution 
to obtain the unconditional quantile distribution of wages for 𝜏 ∈ (0,1). A full derivation can be found in Melly 
(2005) and Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
12 The differences in coefficients across quantiles depict the distribution of the unobservable characteristics of 
individuals with given covariates or the conditional distribution of the dependent variable conditional on the 





hand side represent differences due to residuals, (median) 
coefficients/returns (or discrimination) and characteristics (i.e. endowment) 
respectively. 
6.5.2 Empirical model specification 
 
The empirical model closely follows the above theoretical model.  As in 
Chapter 5, identification for the selectivity-based Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition was achieved by excluding household grant receipt and 
household size from the wage equation.  
With regard to equation (6.1), the G vector (i.e. determinants of employment) 
comprises years of schooling, health (the CES-D10 index of depression), a 
quadratic in age, number of under-17 children in the household, provincial 
unemployment rate, location, race, marital status, gender, household receipt 
of government grant, and household size. 
The X vector in the outcome equation – i.e. equation (6.2)- is made up of 
years of schooling, health (the CES-D10 index of depression), quadratic in 
age, location, race, gender, number of under-17 children in the household, 
provincial unemployment rate, marital status, number of years spent on the 
job (tenure), union status, occupational category, sector of employment and 
number of weekly hours worked. To avoid repetition, a priori expectations 
are as discussed in Chapter 5 as the models are virtually identical. 
As already emphasized in this thesis, discrimination is used in a very loose 
sense as wage gaps unexplained by observable characteristics (i.e. due to 
differences in returns to characteristics) may also capture the effect of non-
included/unobserved productive characteristics on the wage gap. This is an 
important issue especially with health-related decomposition, as wage gaps 
between the impaired and non-impaired may simply reflect the fact that the 
impaired are less likely to be as productive as the non-impaired and should 
therefore be paid less. To mitigate this problem, a number of the above-
mentioned controls deserve particular mention. Firstly, education and 





important controls that are likely to help obtain the pure discrimination 
effect. Moreover, it is important to realize that disability/impairment is likely 
to be associated with emotional distress. This is likely to be associated with 
reduced productivity even when the above host of characteristics have been 
controlled for. Therefore, controlling for the respondent’s state of emotional 
health is likely to enable one to obtain a cleaner measure of pure 
discrimination. Additionally, much of wage differences between both groups 
is likely to arise from the fact that the impaired are likely to put in less 
hours at work (due to, say debilitation or time used in seeking health care). 
To the extent that wage differences arise nontrivially from differences in time 
spent working, controlling for hours worked (as done in this study) mitigates 
the non-discrimination component of the coefficient/returns component. 
6.5.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, I describe the variables used in the regression analysis, set 
up the empirical model and provide a description of the data used in this 
study. Unless otherwise stated, the sample in both waves (i.e. wave 1 and 
wave 3) consists of African and coloured adults aged 20-56 years in wave 1. 
This is to ensure the comparability of results for both waves. The racial 
restriction above was necessitated by the small number of impaired whites 
and Asians/Indians (according to the definition of impairment). Also, only 
employees in wage employment were considered in the wage equation (i.e. 
self-employed and casual workers were excluded). 
Impairment was defined as a dummy variable which equals one if the 
respondent suffered from any of the following conditions: memory loss, 
tuberculosis, stroke, physical handicap and psychological/psychiatric 
disorder. The impairment variable can be considered similar to Johnson and 
Lambrinos’ (1985) measure of handicap and in like manner, I defined 
impairment to include those conditions likely to evoke prejudice in the 
labour market. However, my measure contains fewer health conditions than 
in Johnson and Lambrinos given the need to not include too many 





handicap variable in Johnson and Lambrinos included seven conditions, 
“total deafness, inability to read ordinary size print with glasses, blindness, 
partial or complete paralysis, convulsive disorders, distortion of limbs or 
spine, and mental illness” (Johnson & Lambrinos, 1985, p. 266)). 
A potential problem with this measure of impairment is the identical 
treatment of the effect of the union and intersection of these health 
conditions, i.e. it assumes that the effect of suffering from one condition is 
identical to that of suffering from another condition or even having both 
impairment conditions concurrently. This is a common problem with 
dichotomous variables made up of multiple measures. It would have been 
ideal to ascertain the amount of wage discrimination (if any) associated with 
only one condition at a time. However, the choice of this “multiple 
conditions” impairment variable was necessitated by the small sample of 
individuals suffering from each condition. For instance, the number of 
respondents in the estimation sample suffering from memory loss, 
tuberculosis, stroke, physical handicap and psychological/psychiatric 
disorder in wave 1 (wave 3) were 109(142), 65(29), 9(6), 18(4), and 11(3) 
respectively. Thus, it is virtually impractical to obtain robust estimates from 
models based on each of these individual conditions. However as 
subsequently shown, the results were robust to the inclusion of only 
memory loss and tuberculosis (the two conditions with the largest sub-
samples of “impaired” wage earners). 











Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev.a N Mean Std.Dev. 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
employee† 7122 0.47 0.5 5437 0.58 0.5 
impaired 9496 0.07 0.3 7830 0.08 0.3 
real wage 3156 3993.00 6053.0 3054 4593.03 5353.0 
schooling 11321 9.04 3.7 8778 9.21 3.8 
cesd10 9479 8.34 4.8 7824 7.13 4.4 
age 11400 34.29 10.0 8795 38.95 10.2 
num. children†† 11400 1.78 2.0 8795 1.45 1.7 
prov. unemp‡ 11400 23.58 3.0 8795 25.55 3.5 
uf only‡‡  11400 0.50 0.5 8775 0.50 0.5 
African 11400 0.89 0.3 8795 0.90 0.3 
coloured 11400 0.11 0.3 8795 0.10 0.3 
married 9481 0.43 0.5 7828 0.43 0.5 
male 11400 0.48 0.5 8775 0.47 0.5 
grant 11400 0.55 0.5 8775 0.57 0.5 
household size 11400 4.71 3.3 8775 4.76 3.2 
tenure 3088 6.87 7.7 3030 7.70 8.7 
union 3076 0.34 0.5 3047 0.35 0.5 
manprof¥ 3115 0.19 0.4 3014 0.21 0.4 
tertiary 2916 0.50 0.5 2919 0.63 0.5 
hours 2880 40.58 14.8 3001 41.04 13.5 
Source: NIDS wave1 and wave 3; author’s calculations. Sample is restricted to 20-56 year-old 
respondents in wave 1. Both samples corrected for survey design, national representativeness and 
non-random attrition; a standard deviation; †dummy variable (=1 if respondent is an employee; 0 
otherwise); ††number of under-17 children in the household; ‡provincial unemployment rate; ‡‡dummy 
variable (=1 if respondent resides in urban formal area; 0 otherwise); ¥dummy variable (=1 if 
respondent belongs to the managerial/professional occupational category; 0 otherwise) 
 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, the various means and proportions did not change 
much for most variables over the four-year period. The proportion adjudged 
impaired remained virtually unchanged across waves while the proportion in 
wage employment increased from 47% to 58%. Average individual monthly 
real wage increased by 15%. As expected in a highly unequal country like 
South Africa, the respective wage standard deviations were high though 
declining: R6053 and R5353. Average years of completed schooling in wave 
1 (wave 3) was approximately 9 in both waves while the rate of unionization 
remained virtually unchanged. Furthermore, 19% (21%) of workers belonged 





Finally, average number of years so far spent on current job (i.e. tenure) 
were 6.9 and 7.7 in waves 1 and 3 respectively. 
Table 6.2 depicts impairment-related gaps across key variables in both 
waves.  Real wage, years of schooling, employment probability as well as 
probabilities of being a manager/professional and a union member were 
higher among the non-impaired relative to the impaired across waves. Also, 
the real wage gap widened across waves. Moreover, the impaired were 
significantly older than the non-impaired across waves. These results 
conformed to expectations. 
On the whole, there is at least descriptive evidence suggesting impairment-
related disparities in individual characteristics in general and wages in 
particular. However, it cannot be suggested that such disparities are due to 
discrimination till more rigorous analysis is conducted. Ascertaining the 
discrimination component of the foregoing impairment-related wage gaps as 





Table 6.2: Relationship between impairment status and key variables among working age Africans and coloureds: two-
sample tests of mean and proportional differences (p value of test statistic in parenthesis) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  Wave 1  Wave 3 


















real wage 2979/173 3248.92 2043.61 1205.31*** (0.0) 2896/158 4033.95 2719.74 1314.22*** (0.0) 
age 8713/783 35.0 40.4 -5.5*** (0.0) 7109/721 39.4 44.6 -5.3*** (0.0) 
schooling 8697/782 8.5 6.1 2.4*** (0.0) 7102/718 8.8 6.7 2.0*** (0.0) 
hours 2721/156 40.9 39.6 1.3 (0.13) 2846/155 41.2 39.3 2.1** (0.03) 
employee† 6640/476 0.45 0.36 0.06*** (0.0) 5076/359 0.57 0.44 0.13*** (0.0) 
manprof†† 2940/172 0.18 0.11 0.07** (0.01) 2857/157 0.20 0.15 0.05* (0.07) 
union 2905/169 0.30 0.24 0.07** (0.03) 2889/158 0.32 0.26 0.06** (0.048) 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; statistics corrected for complex survey design and national representativeness; † dummy 









Table 6.3 displays impairment-related wage decompositions for both OLS 
and selection-corrected wage regressions in waves 1 and 3 respectively using 
the (more realistic) wage profile of the non-impaired as the non-
discriminatory norm. These estimates were similar to estimates obtained 
from using the wage profile from a pooled regression of both impairment 
groups (as suggested by Neumark (1988)), as well as that of the impaired 




Table 6.3: Impairment-related Blinder-Oaxaca log wage decompositions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Non-discriminatory norm N/N1/N2 Raw gap Xteristics† Returns Selection Estimated 
gap 
Percentage contribution to 
estimated gap 
    Xteristics Returns 
Wave 1 





































Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; statistics corrected for complex survey design and national representativeness; standard 
errors of difference between selection terms obtained via bootstrapping with 400 replications; non-impaired wage profile regression serves as non-





From Table 6.3, the estimated wage gap was higher in selectivity-corrected 
decompositions relative to OLS-based decompositions in both waves. While 
the estimated gap obtained from the OLS regression was 0.46 (0.47) in wave 
1 (wave 3), it was 1.03 (0.88) respectively for the selection-corrected 
decomposition. In terms of the portion of the estimated gap contributed by 
both the characteristics and returns components, column 8 shows that the 
characteristics (returns/discrimination) contributions were 67% (33%) and 
23% (77%) respectively for the OLS and selection-corrected decompositions 
in wave 1. In wave 3, characteristics (returns) contributions were 51% (47%) 
for OLS and 22% (78%) for the decomposition based on the sample-selection 
model. Thus, the percentage contribution of the discrimination component 
increased across waves in both OLS and selection-corrected models (though 
the latter remained virtually stable with only a one percentage point 
increase). Moreover, the magnitude of the wage gap contributed by the 
endowment (i.e. characteristics) component decreased over the waves. 
However, these temporal changes in both the endowment and discrimination 
components as well as in the aggregate estimated gaps were not statistically 
significant (p>0.1).  Furthermore, the negative selection effect recorded in 
Table 6.3 is consistent with a lot of Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions (albeit 
mostly gender-based), implying that the offered wage gap exceeded the 
observed wage gap (see e.g. Ogloblin, 1999). It was however, not statistically 
significant in both waves. 
With regard to previous evidence, Baldwin and Johnson (1994) observed 
that discrimination explained 47% of the total wage gap against the 
handicapped in the US while the figure was 48.2% against disabled men in 
the US (Kidd et al., 2000). Similarly, for the exogenous treatment of health 
as in this study, Madden (2004) maintained that discrimination explained 
30% of the wage gap against men with long term illness. Using the wage 
profile of the non-disabled as the non-discriminatory norm in a selectivity-
corrected framework (similar to this study), Jones et al, (2006) observed that 
discrimination accounted for 65.9% (51.4%) of the wage gap between work-




British men. For women, the figures were 56.2% and 75.7% in 1997 and 
2003 respectively. However, the percentage contribution of discrimination to 
the wage gap was higher between the non work-limiting disabled and the 
non-disabled, though the absolute wage gaps were smaller than between the 
two previous groups. However, a drawback of the Jones et al. (2006) study is 
that the statistical significance of these wage gaps were not reported. 
Unfortunately, I am unaware of developing country estimates of impairment-
related wage gaps obtained using similar methodology as used in this 
chapter, but as these estimates show, the component of 
impairment/disability-related wage gaps accounted for by discrimination in 
South Africa is similar in proportional terms to much of what obtained in 
developed countries.  
To ascertain whether the estimates were robust to the components of the 
impairment variable, I re-estimated the above models with an impairment 
variable made up of memory loss and tuberculosis, the two sub-components 
with the largest number of the impaired. The results (Table A6.1 in the 
Appendix) were robust to this restriction and a comparison of Table 6.3 and 
Table A6.1 indicate that most of the results were mainly driven by these two 
health conditions. As I mentioned earlier, it would have been desirable to 
ascertain whether discrimination was present for each impairment variable 
but data constraints prevented such analysis. 
Given the possibility of different dynamics relating to wage discrimination in 
public and private sectors, it would have been desirable to conduct the 
analysis separately for both sectors. Unfortunately, the data does not permit 
such an analysis. 
Table 6.4 below depicts the contributions of individual regressors to the 
wage gap. Most of the regressors did not significantly contribute to both the 
explained and unexplained gaps individually across waves. However, years 
of schooling and occupational class significantly contributed to the 
explained gap in both waves. Union membership only contributed in wave 3. 




determinant of explained impairment-related wage gaps as measured in this 
study, followed by occupational category. 
Table 6.4: Contributions of variable groups to wage gap 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
VARIABLES explained unexplained explained unexplained 
     
schooling 0.10*** -0.15 0.10*** 0.39* 
 (0.04) (0.17) (0.03) (0.23) 
age -0.00 -0.17 -0.00 0.42 
 (0.01) (1.20) (0.01) (1.29) 
uf only† 0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.20 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.00) (0.13) 
coloured 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
male 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) 
num. children†† -0.00 0.12** -0.00 0.12* 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) 
prov. unemp‡ -0.00 -0.57 -0.00 0.97 
 (0.01) (0.66) (0.00) (0.65) 
married 0.01 -0.12** 0.00 -0.08 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.07) 
tenure -0.00 -0.12* -0.01 -0.08 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) 
union 0.01 -0.02 0.04** 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) 
manprof‡‡ 0.06*** 0.00 0.04** -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
tertiary 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.10) 
hours 0.00 0.18 0.00 -0.20 
 (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.21) 
cesd10 0.02 -0.09 0.01 0.18 
 (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.17) 
     
constant  1.78  -0.90 
  (1.29)  (1.54) 
     
Observations 11,258 11,258 8,734 8,734 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; †dummy variable (=1 if respondent 
resides in urban formal area; 0 otherwise); ††number of under-17 children in the household; 
‡provincial unemployment rate; ‡‡dummy variable (=1 if respondent belongs to the 
managerial/professional occupational category; 0 otherwise) 
 
A general caveat in explaining detailed decomposition results pertaining to 
categorical covariates (with more than two categories) in the Blinder-Oaxaca 




interpretation of the results if care is not taken. Additionally, it becomes 
difficult to differentiate between the portion of the unexplained part 
attributed to group membership (captured by intercept differences) and the 
portion attributed to differences in the coefficient of the base category 
(Fortin, Lemieux, & Firpo, 2011). However, this is not an issue in this thesis 
as all categorical covariates are binary. 
The underlying regression results that yielded the above decomposition 
results are shown in the Appendix in Table A6.2 (for OLS) and Table A6.3 
and Table A6.4 (for selection-corrected results in wave 1 and wave 3 
respectively). The results largely conformed to a priori expectations for both 
the impaired and the non-impaired. For the participation equation in the 
sample selection model, education and being male were positively associated 
with being employed, while household grant receipt and a higher depression 
score had a negative association with employment. Age had a quadratic 
relationship with employment. Also, job tenure, education, unionization, 
being in the managerial/professional occupational class, being male and 
living in urban formal areas were positively associated with higher wages. As 
the selection-corrected results indicate, there existed negative sample 
selection bias among the non-impaired while such evidence was lacking 
among the impaired. The plausible explanation of such a negative selection 
effect, which was provided in Chapter 5, also applies here. Furthermore, the 
non-significance of the selection variable among the impaired may be due to 
their small sample size. 
With regard to magnitudes, for the selection-corrected wage regressions, an 
additional year spent on the job was associated with 2% wage increase while 
one additional year of schooling was associated with 7-8% wage increase. 
Union premium ranged between 32% and 43%. Substantial union premium 
has also been previously found among Africans where union membership 
among African males in the bottom wage decile was associated with wages 
that were 145% higher than those of their non-unionized counterparts 
(Schultz & Mwabu, 1998b). Apparently, such a premium has persisted over 




semi-skilled and elementary occupations. A gender-based analysis was not 
conducted due to the small sample size of the impaired. The small sample 
size for the impaired also resulted in a smaller number of statistically 
significant variables in the impaired regressions relative to the non-
impaired. 
Decomposition of differences in wage distributions 
 
As earlier noted, a drawback of the Blinder-Oaxaca technique is that it is 
not very informative regarding other parts of the (wage) distribution other 
than the mean. The main purpose of this section is to analyse the estimated 
distribution of the wage gap as well as its components across the wage 
distribution in each wave. Following equation (6.3b), I illustrate the 
differential impairment-related decomposition results for workers at 49 
quantiles of the log wage distribution in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 (wave 1 
and wave 3 respectively) for each of the components of the log wage gap13. 
The numerical contributions of the different components for only select 
quantiles (precisely nine deciles) are presented in Table A6.5 in the 
appendix. Comparing Table A6.5 and Table 6.3, the total estimated gap for 
the median was virtually identical to the mean total estimated gap in the 
Blinder-Oaxaca model. Following Melly (2005), the standard errors were 
computed via a bootstrap procedure with 100 replications. 
                                       




Figure 6.1: Quantile regression-based decomposition of impairment-related 
differences in distribution (wave 1: 2008) 
 
As Figure 6.1 shows, the degree of variation in the total gap as well as its 
various components differed slightly. The total estimated gap as well as the 
portion contributed by differences in characteristics was slightly u-shaped 
for most part of the distribution, indicating similar magnitude of the wage 
gap at both ends of the wage distribution which was slightly higher than 
what obtained around the median. The total gap was 0.58 and 0.56 among 
respondents in the 10th and 90th percentiles respectively (i.e. above the 
average of 0.46 from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results) but a low of 
0.41 at the 40th percentile. Differences due to returns gently decreased 
across the wage distribution as one moved up the wage distribution. 
Therefore in terms of magnitude, Figure 6.1 indicates that discrimination 
was more acute among low earners relative to other parts of the wage 
distribution. This is clearly shown by comparing the returns curve and the 
solid horizontal average returns line in Figure 6.1 (wage gap=0.15, obtained 




hypothesis of constant quantile effects across the wage distribution for the 
returns/discrimination component could not be rejected based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic (p>0.10). This suggests homogeneity of 
the absolute contribution of the returns/discrimination component across 
the wage distribution. Finally, the distribution of differences in the residual 
contributed least in explaining the wage gaps for most portions of the 
distribution. 
In wave 3 (see Figure 6.2 below), differences in returns accounted for a 
substantial part of the estimated wage gap across the wage distribution. 
While its relative contribution declined among higher earners as in wave 1, 
its absolute contribution generally remained flat across the wage 
distribution. This suggests homogeneity of the discrimination component, a 
claim supported by failure to reject the null hypothesis of constant quantile 
effects of the returns component as in wave 1 (p>0.10). 
Figure 6.2: Quantile regression-based decomposition of impairment-related 






As shown in the Blinder-Oaxaca results in Table 6.3, the proportion of the 
total estimated wage gap contributed by the returns/discrimination 
component increased between wave 1 and wave 3 using both OLS and 
sample selection specifications. The above distributional decomposition 
supports this finding as the proportion of total estimated wage gaps 
explained by the returns/discrimination component was higher in wave 3 
relative to wave 1 in all but one of the estimated 49 quantiles. Even in terms 
of numerical magnitude, the wave 3 returns component generally exceeded 
their wave 1 counterparts in 35 quantiles (6 deciles in Table A6.5). This 
implies that impairment-related wage discrimination not only increased in 
relative terms between 2008 and 2012 on the average (based on the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition), most parts of the wage distribution also experienced 
a temporal increase in the returns component in both absolute and relative 
terms among African and coloured South African employees (based on the 
distributional decomposition). 
Pinpointing the exact reason(s) for such proportional increase in 
impairment-related wage discrimination between 2008 and 2012 is not easy 
as many factors might have been at play. However, it may not be 
unconnected with poor growth in post-2008 recession South Africa (for 
instance, data from the South African Reserve Bank shows that GDP per 
capita growth rate increased from 0.2% in 1999 to 4.1% in 2007 but 
declined to 1.3% in 2012 (South African Reserve Bank, undated). This may 
have placed a lot of stress on the labour market to the extent that 
impairment was viewed in more negative light relative to the pre-2008 period 




This chapter set out to ascertain the magnitude of impairment-related wage 
discrimination (i.e. unexplained wage gaps), the temporal nature of such 




distribution in the South African labour market. From the results, non-
trivial impairment-related wage discrimination existed among African and 
coloured employees in both 2008 and 2012. Average returns to 
characteristics (loosely termed discrimination) increased over time as a 
percentage of total estimated wage gaps when using both ordinary least 
squares and sample selection models as the basis for the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decompositions. This was similar to more nuanced findings from 
distributional decompositions, as the ratio of the contribution of returns to 
the total gap was higher in 2012 relative to 2008 in most deciles of the wage 
distribution. Moreover, the discrimination component of total estimated 
wage gaps was largely homogenous across the wage distribution in each 
wave. Finally, education was the most important factor in determining 
explained wage gaps while occupational class and union membership also 




















This thesis has examined a key issue in the economic growth literature: the 
role of health in the determination of labour market outcomes. Specific 
issues investigated were the impact of health on labour force participation; 
the gradient between physical, psychological and general health on the one 
hand, and wages on the other; and the existence of impairment-related 
differences in returns to human characteristics (i.e. wage discrimination). 
These issues were examined both descriptively and more formally using 
various econometric methods like instrumental variables, quantile 
regression, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and quantile regression-based 
distributional decomposition. 
Several insights were uncovered in the analysis. Firstly, it was found that 
better health (measured as respondents’ self-reports of their overall health 
status) had a positive impact on labour force participation at the extensive 
margin irrespective of whether the broad or strict measure of LFP was used. 
In numerical terms, average treatment effects ranged from 20 to 23%, 
treatment effect on the treated, 29 to 33%, and local average treatment 
effect, 23 to 26%. Even if one is not convinced about the exogeneity of the 
instruments used for identification, there was still evidence of a positive 
association between both health and LFP in both cross-sectional and 
temporal settings. 
Furthermore, positive and nontrivial gradients were uncovered between 
better health (physical, psychological and general) and wages for African and 
coloured employees. This was largely true for the average worker as well as 
for those at the bottom quartile, median and top quartile of the earnings 
profile. The gradients for physical and psychological health (as well as the 
median of the wage distribution for general health) were persistent even four 




was steeper for males relative to females, possibly due to greater demand for 
physical strength for jobs mostly done by men. 
Again, it was found that substantial impairment-related differences in 
returns to characteristics (loosely termed wage discrimination) existed 
among Africans and coloureds in South Africa whether or not sample 
selection was accounted for. It also increased as a proportion of the total 
estimated wage gap between 2008 and 2012. More nuanced analysis showed 
that this temporal proportional increase occurred for all but one of the 
estimated quantiles of the wage distribution. Also in terms of magnitude, the 
discrimination component in wave 3 exceeded its wave 1 counterpart in 
most of the estimated quantiles. 
For the various controls, I found that males were more likely than females to 
be labour force participants. Also, household grant receipt was associated 
with reduced LFP probability (possibly due to higher reservation wages of 
grant-receiving household members) while education and age were 
associated with increased LFP. Location also played an important role in 
determining LFP as living in traditional authority areas was associated with 
reduced LFP relative to residing in other areas. Furthermore, the presence of 
at least one employed male in the household was associated with increased 
female LFP probability, while marriage/cohabitation was negatively 
(positively) associated with female (male) participation. For wage 
determination, education, occupational class, gender and industry were very 
important factors. Finally, education and occupational class mostly 
contributed to the explained part of impairment-related wage gaps among 
Africans and coloureds between 2008 and 2012. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Though this thesis has uncovered important issues regarding the 
relationship between health and the labour market, it is by no means 
perfect. It was limited by time and data constraints. Therefore, a number of 




Firstly, an important phenomenon in the labour supply discourse is the 
issue of the impact of health on presenteeism, i.e. on-the-job productivity 
loss (Goetzel et al., 2004). Goetzel et al. have demonstrated that different 
health conditions like heart disease, depression and hypertension are 
associated with substantial absenteeism and presenteeism costs in the 
United States. This study could not investigate the health-presenteeism 
relationship due to data constraints. 
Additionally, examining the health-wage gradient for the informal sector and 
the self-employed will throw more light on the relationship for the entire 
labour market. In this thesis, I focused on the gradient among wage 
employees only given the small number of individuals in the sample who are 
either self or informally employed. This is due to the small size of the 
informal sector in South Africa relative to other African countries (Kingdon & 
Knight, 2007). The above is also true for impairment-related wage 
discrimination among those in informal/self-employment. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to link the discrimination results to 
theory, i.e. to test whether, say, prejudice or information asymmetry is the 
likely underlying or dominant cause of impairment-related wage 
discrimination. For instance, a possible means of testing prejudice-based 
discrimination exploits the notion that discriminatory wage differentials 
against the impaired should vary according to the intensity of prejudice 
against specific impairments if indeed prejudice is a key determinant of 
impairment-related wage discrimination (Baldwin & Johnson, 2006). Such 
an exercise will involve estimating the impairment-related wage 
discrimination associated with different ailments that are often associated 
with varying degrees of prejudice and functional limitation. For instance, 
epilepsy is often associated with more intense prejudice but less work 
limitation relative to arthritis and vice versa. In this case, evidence of more 
impairment-related wage discrimination among epilepsy sufferers relative to 
arthritis patients may be suggestive of prejudice-based discrimination. 




sample of the impaired for separate impairment types as earlier mentioned. 
A larger survey in the future may enable one conduct such analysis. 
Finally, most of the econometric analyses in this thesis were confined to 
Africans and coloureds. This therefore limited the generalizability of the 
findings especially given that the various racial groups are different in many 
respects especially in their labour market experiences due to apartheid. In 
the future, analyses that encompass all racial groups may be possible with 






















Table A4.1: Non-health (“traditional”) determinants of LFP (marginal effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit LPM 
Variables Total Female Male Total Female Male 
       
grant -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
matric 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.06** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
age26-30 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.10*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age31-35 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age36-40 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
age41-45 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
age46-50 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
age51-60 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07** -0.05* -0.04 -0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
rural formal 0.06** 0.01 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
urban formal 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
urban informal 0.06** 0.09*** 0.02 0.07** 0.10*** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
African 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
coloured -0.01 0.06 -0.09 0.00 0.06 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
prov. unemp† 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
married†† 0.03* -0.03 0.10*** 0.03* -0.03 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
male 0.12***   0.11***   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   
num. children‡ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
household size -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
employed male‡‡  0.04**   0.04**  
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
constant    0.49*** 0.49*** 0.60*** 
    (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
       
F-stat 38.0 20.4 12.8 52.7 28.6 18.3 
R2 adjusted    0.12 0.11 0.10 
N 9791 5832 3959 9791 5832 3959 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 
design and non-random attrition; †provincial unemployment rate; ††married/cohabiting; ‡number of 





Table A4.2: First stage estimates: IV-LPM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Total Female Male 
    
joint pain -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.23*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
memory loss -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.20*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
grant -0.02*** -0.02* -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
matric 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
age26-30 -0.02* -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
age31-35 -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
age36-40 -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
age41-45 -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
age46-50 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
age51-60 -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
rural formal -0.06** -0.08** -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
urban formal -0.01 -0.03* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
urban informal -0.02* -0.04* -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
African -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
coloured -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
prov. unemp† -0.00** -0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
married†† 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
male 0.02***   
 (0.01)   
num. children‡ 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
household size 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
employed male‡‡  -0.01  
  (0.01)  
constant 1.08*** 1.05*** 1.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
    
R2 adjusted 0.13 0.14 0.10 
N 9795 5836 3956 
F-stat 27.2 20.8 7.6 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 
design and non-random attrition; †provincial unemployment rate; ††married/cohabiting; ‡number of 








Table A5.1: OLS results of health-wage relationships 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
Variables       
lnbmi 0.36***   0.33***   
 (0.07)   (0.06)   
lncesd10  -0.09***   -0.06***  
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
sah   0.22***   0.29*** 
   (0.04)   (0.07) 
tenure 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
matric 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.59*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
age 0.02* 0.03** 0.03** 0.02 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
age2 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
union 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
manprof† 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
tertiary 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
formal loc†† 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
coloured 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
hours 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
male 0.34*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
prov. unemp‡ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
married 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
num. children‡‡ -0.03*** -0.02** -0.02** -0.03*** -0.02** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
constant 5.01*** 6.26*** 5.89*** 5.29*** 6.39*** 5.94*** 
 (0.36) (0.26) (0.26) (0.34) (0.29) (0.28) 
       
N 2,189 2,518 2,505 2,747 2,806 2,805 
R2 adjusted 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49 
F-stat 127.9 133.2 132.1 125.9 130.9 134.5 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; † dummy variable (=1 if 
respondent is in the managerial/professional occupational category); †† dummy variable (=1 if respondent 
resides in a formal location; 0 otherwise); ‡ provincial unemployment rate; ‡‡ number of under-17 children 










Table A5.2: Heckman selection results of health-wage gradient in wave 1 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables lnrealwage employee lnrealwage employee lnrealwage employee 
lnbmi 0.26*** 0.28***     
 (0.07) (0.08)     
lncesd10   -0.05** -0.10***   
   (0.02) (0.03)   
sah     0.11** 0.23*** 
     (0.05) (0.05) 
tenure 0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
matric 0.47*** 0.35*** 0.47*** 0.37*** 0.47*** 0.36*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
age -0.03** 0.12*** -0.02* 0.12*** -0.02* 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
age2 0.00* -0.00*** 0.00* -0.00*** 0.00* -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
union 0.49***  0.51***  0.51***  
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
manprof† 0.39***  0.42***  0.41***  
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
tertiary 0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
formal loc†† -0.04 0.50*** -0.04 0.50*** -0.04 0.50*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
coloured -0.05 0.21** -0.11* 0.18** -0.10 0.19** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
hours 0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
male 0.18*** 0.39*** 0.15*** 0.32*** 0.16*** 0.31*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
prov. unemp‡ 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.02** 0.00 -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
married 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
num. children‡‡ 0.01 -0.04* 0.01 -0.04* 0.01 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
grant  -0.40***  -0.41***  -0.40*** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
household size  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
constant 6.87*** -3.26*** 7.75*** -2.26*** 7.54*** -2.61*** 
 (0.43) (0.44) (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) (0.36) 
N 5,808 5,808 6,460 6,460 6,436 6,436 
F-stat 58.7 58.7 58.1 58.1 59.5 59.5 
IMR -0.61***  -0.60***  -0.60***  
 (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; † dummy variable (=1 if 
respondent is in the managerial/professional occupational category); †† dummy variable (=1 if respondent 
resides in a formal location; 0 otherwise); ‡ provincial unemployment rate; ‡‡ number of under-17 children 








Table A5.3: Heckman selection model of health-wage gradient in wave 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables lnrealwage employee lnrealwage employee lnrealwage employee 
       
lnbmi 0.21*** 0.30***     
 (0.07) (0.09)     
1ncesd10   -0.03 -0.09**   
   (0.02) (0.04)   
sah     0.15** 0.27*** 
     (0.06) (0.07) 
tenure 0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
matric 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.44*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
age -0.02 0.07*** -0.01 0.07*** -0.01 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
age2 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
union 0.44***  0.46***  0.46***  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
manprof† 0.48***  0.49***  0.50***  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
tertiary 0.18***  0.19***  0.19***  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
formal loc†† -0.11** 0.48*** -0.10** 0.47*** -0.10** 0.48*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
coloured -0.12** 0.33*** -0.12** 0.29*** -0.12** 0.32*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
hours 0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
male 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
prov. unemp‡ 0.01 -0.01* 0.01 -0.01* 0.01 -0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
married 0.03 0.13*** 0.04 0.14*** 0.04 0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
num. children‡‡ 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
grant  -0.35***  -0.34***  -0.34*** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
household size  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
constant 6.98*** -2.42*** 7.65*** -1.30*** 7.41*** -1.77*** 
 (0.43) (0.46) (0.34) (0.37) (0.33) (0.37) 
       
N 5,089 5,089 5,186 5,186 5,184 5,184 
F-stat 79.5 79.5 84.8 84.8 86.0 86.0 
IMR -0.70***  -0.70***  -0.69***  
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; † dummy variable (=1 if 
respondent is in the managerial/professional occupational category); †† dummy variable (=1 if respondent 







Table A5.4: Censored quantile regression results of health-wage gradients across health definitions in wave 1 
(negative zero coefficients due to rounding) 
Variable Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 
lnbmi 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.37***       
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)       
lncesd10    -0.07* -0.06* -0.06    
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)    
sah       0.22*** 0.17** 0.20*** 
       (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
tenure 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
matric 0.60*** 0.59*** 0.61*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.61*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
age 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.03 0.03** 0.03 0.03 0.03** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
age2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
union 0.55*** 0.58*** 0.53*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.55*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.56*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
manprof† 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.47*** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
tertiary 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.24*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
formal loc†† 0.12* 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.12* 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.13* 0.16*** 0.18*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
coloured -0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
hours 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
male 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
prov. unemp‡ -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
married 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
num. children‡‡ -0.03** -0.03** -0.02 -0.03* -0.03** -0.02 -0.03 -0.02** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
constant 4.95*** 5.14*** 5.50*** 6.20*** 6.23*** 6.66*** 5.81*** 6.02*** 6.54*** 
 (0.61) (0.41) (0.46) (0.36) (0.33) (0.41) (0.34) (0.33) (0.36) 
N 2189 2189 2189 2518 2518 2518 2505 2505 2505 
Pseudo-R2 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.27 0.34 0.36 0.27 0.34 0.36 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; †dummy variable (=1 if respondent is in the managerial/professional occupational 







Table A5.5: Censored quantile regression results of health-wage gradients across health definitions in wave 3 
(negative zero coefficients due to rounding) 
Variable Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 
lnbmi 0.33*** 0.41*** 0.45***       
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)       
lncesd10    -0.06* -0.07** -0.05    
    (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)    
sah       0.22* 0.17** 0.22*** 
       (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) 
tenure 0.01** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
matric 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
age 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
age2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
union 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.45*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
manprof† 0.53*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.53*** 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.47*** 0.50*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
tertiary 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
formal loc†† 0.22*** 0.10** 0.09* 0.19** 0.10** 0.09** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.10** 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
coloured 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
hours 0.01*** 0.00 0.00** 0.01*** 0.00* 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
male 0.34*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
prov. unemp‡ -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
married 0.04 0.04 0.10** 0.08 0.03 0.12** 0.07 0.05 0.12*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
num. children‡‡ -0.04* -0.03* -0.02 -0.04** -0.02 -0.01 -0.03** -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
constant 4.92*** 5.32*** 5.44*** 6.13*** 6.50*** 6.69*** 5.83*** 6.29*** 6.48*** 
 (0.59) (0.48) (0.46) (0.48) (0.41) (0.40) (0.49) (0.46) (0.37) 
N 2747 2747 2747 2806 2806 2806 2805 2805 2805 
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.33 0.36 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; †dummy variable (=1 if respondent is in the managerial/professional occupational category); ††dummy variable 






Table A5.6: Gender-based censored quantile regression results of health-wage gradients across health 
definitions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
lnbmi lncesd10 sah 
F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M 
Q25 Q25 Q50 Q50 Q75 Q75 Q25 Q25 Q50 Q50 Q75 Q75 Q25 Q25 Q50 Q50 Q75 Q75 
Wave 1 
0.19 0.47** 0.14 0.56*** 0.16 0.69*** -0.08* -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.30** 0.14 0.18** 0.14* 0.18*** 0.18* 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) 
Wave 3 
0.17 0.62*** 0.12 0.76*** 0.20* 0.82*** -0.04 -0.09** -0.06 -0.06* -0.09** -0.01 0.29** 0.20* 0.15 0.24** 0.20*** 0.25* 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.18) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.14) 
                  
N(W1†) 1065 1124 1065 1124 1065 1124 1221 1297 1221 1297 1221 1297 1215 1290 1215 1290 1215 1290 
R2(W1) 0.28 0.23 0.35 0.30 0.43 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.36 0.30 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.36 0.30 0.43 0.29 
N(W3††) 1433 1314 1433 1314 1433 1314 1464 1342 1464 1342 1464 1342 1463 1342 1463 1342 1463 1342 
R2(W3) 0.30 0.21 0.36 0.28 0.42 0.29 0.30 0.21 0.37 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.30 0.21 0.37 0.25 0.43 0.28 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table A6.1: Impairment-related Blinder-Oaxaca log wage decomposition (memory loss and tuberculosis only) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Non-discriminatory norm N/NG1/NG2 Raw gap Xteristics† Returns Selection Estimated 
gap 
Percentage contribution 
to estimated gap 
    Xteristics Returns 
Wave 1 





































Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; statistics corrected for complex survey design and national representativeness; standard 
errors of difference between selection terms obtained via bootstrapping with 400 replications; non-impaired wage profile serves as non-discriminatory norm; 






Table A6.2: Ordinary least squares log wage regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
Variables Non-impaired Impaired Non-impaired Impaired 
     
schooling 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
age 0.04** -0.01 0.03* -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
age2 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
urban formal location 0.30*** 0.31** 0.20*** 0.36** 
 (0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.18) 
coloured 0.09 0.32 0.02 -0.35 
 (0.07) (0.30) (0.08) (0.25) 
male 0.34*** 0.18 0.31*** 0.12 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.13) 
Num. of U-17 children† -0.03** -0.06* -0.02 -0.08* 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) 
provincial unemployment rate -0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
married/cohabiting 0.08* 0.37*** 0.13*** 0.23 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.15) 
tenure 0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
union 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.14 
 (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.14) 
managerial/professional 0.41*** 0.36* 0.49*** 0.51** 
 (0.07) (0.22) (0.05) (0.24) 
tertiary 0.08 0.12 0.13*** 0.18 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.05) (0.16) 
hours 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
cesd10 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.01* -0.03 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
constant 5.48*** 5.63*** 5.65*** 8.03*** 
 (0.35) (1.11) (0.38) (1.36) 
     
R2 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.39 
N 2379 139 2661 145 
F-stat 70.2 13.0 86.3 4.8 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 











Table A6.3: Selection-corrected log wage regressions (wave 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Non-impaired Impaired 
Variables lnrwage† employee lnrwage employee 
     
schooling 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
age -0.01 0.11*** 0.00 0.26*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) 
age2 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
urban formal location 0.25*** 0.11 0.34** 0.49** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.19) 
coloured 0.03 0.14 0.31 -0.17 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.30) (0.24) 
male 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.19 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.21) 
number of under-17 children in household 0.02* -0.02 -0.06* -0.19** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) 
provincial unemployment rate -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
married/cohabiting 0.04 0.09 0.37*** -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.12) (0.20) 
tenure 0.01  0.02***  
 (0.00)  (0.01)  
union 0.39***  0.43***  
 (0.05)  (0.14)  
managerial/professional 0.42***  0.36  
 (0.07)  (0.22)  
tertiary 0.08  0.12  
 (0.06)  (0.16)  
hours 0.00  -0.00  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
cesd10 -0.01 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
grant  -0.45***  -0.39* 
  (0.06)  (0.22) 
household size  -0.02  0.08** 
  (0.02)  (0.04) 
constant 7.21*** -2.42*** 5.43*** -4.55*** 
 (0.43) (0.50) (1.23) (1.35) 
     
N 6019 6019 441 441 
F-stat 31.7 31.7 10.9 10.9 
IMR -0.62***  0.07  
 (0.05)  (0.18)  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 









Table A6.4: Selection-corrected log wage regressions (wave 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Non-impaired Impaired 
Variables lnrwage† employee lnrwage employee 
     
schooling 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.03 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
age -0.01 0.09*** -0.02 -0.08 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) 
age2 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
urban formal location 0.06 0.23*** 0.36** -0.13 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.18) (0.21) 
coloured -0.10 0.33** -0.35 -0.34 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.27) (0.35) 
male 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.11 0.20 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.21) 
number of under-17 children in household 0.02 -0.06** -0.08* 0.17* 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) 
provincial unemployment rate 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
married/cohabiting 0.06 0.25*** 0.23 -0.18 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.15) (0.22) 
tenure 0.02***  0.02***  
 (0.00)  (0.01)  
union 0.32***  0.14  
 (0.05)  (0.14)  
managerial/professional 0.48***  0.51**  
 (0.05)  (0.24)  
tertiary 0.11***  0.18  
 (0.04)  (0.16)  
hours 0.00  0.01  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
cesd10 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
grant  -0.44***  -0.28 
  (0.06)  (0.21) 
household size  0.00  -0.11** 
  (0.01)  (0.05) 
constant 7.14*** -2.21*** 8.04*** 0.39 
 (0.51) (0.58) (1.41) (1.98) 
     
N 4840 4840 345 345 
F-stat 42.88 42.88 4.315 4.315 
IMR -0.68***  -0.01  
 (0.07)  (0.31)  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; estimates corrected for complex survey 







Table A6.5: Wage gap components across deciles of the wage distribution (t 
values in parentheses): wave 1 and wave 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Wave 1 Wave 3 
Quantiles total characteristics returns residual total characteristics returns residual 
0.1 0.58 0.33 0.28 -0.03 0.31 0.20 0.17 -0.06 
 (2.71) (3.58) (1.84) (-0.20) (1.60) (2.56) (0.89) (-0.54) 
0.2 0.48 0.28 0.23 -0.03 0.31 0.18 0.19 -0.06 
 (2.64) (3.27) (1.91) (-0.28) (2.56) (2.42) (1.41) (-0.74) 
0.3 0.42 0.25 0.19 -0.02 0.33 0.19 0.19 -0.06 
 (2.75) (3.01) (1.76) (-0.24) (3.04) (2.82) (1.82) (-0.76) 
0.4 0.41 0.25 0.17 -0.01 0.34 0.22 0.20 -0.08 
 (2.70) (2.97) (1.68) (-0.10) (4.52) (3.46) (2.12) (-1.32) 
0.5 0.44 0.25 0.16 0.03 0.48 0.24 0.20 0.04 
 (2.88) (3.03) (1.62) (0.39) (6.08) (3.70) (2.05) (0.52) 
0.6 0.47 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.51 0.24 0.21 0.05 
 (3.01) (3.34) (1.47) (0.69) (7.60) (3.69) (2.13) (0.80) 
0.7 0.46 0.31 0.11 0.04 0.58 0.26 0.21 0.11 
 (3.84) (4.10) (1.11) (0.44) (6.88) (3.78) (1.97) (1.54) 
0.8 0.47 0.34 0.09 0.03 0.62 0.29 0.21 0.12 
 (3.59) (4.35) (0.91) (0.36) (5.87) (4.14) (1.72) (1.48) 
0.9 0.56 0.37 0.05 0.14 0.67 0.32 0.24 0.11 


















Select health questions as they occur in the questionnaire 
SAH was derived from the following question: 
Question: How would you describe your health at present? Would you say it 
is excellent, very good, good, fair or poor? 
Possible responses: Excellent [1]; Very good [2]; Good [3]; Fair [4]; Poor [5] 
BMI was obtained from height and weight questions. It starts with the 
following general question: Now, we would like to take your height, weight, 
waist and blood pressure measurements. 
Respondent’s height (centimetres) 
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